Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bal Harbour Village v. Welsh | 879 So.2d 1265 (Fl. 2004) | 879 So.2d 1265 (Fl. 2004) |
Defendant owned four dogs prior to the enactment of an ordinance prohibiting municipality residents from owning more than two dogs in one household. The municipality brought suit against Defendant for failing to comply with the ordinance. The trial court denied the municipalities prayer for permanent injunctive relief, but the Court of Appeals overruled the decision holding the ordinance could constitutionally be enforced under the police power to abate nuisance. |
Case | |
| CT - Cruelty, reporting - § 17a-100a. Reporting of neglected or cruelly treated animals. | C.G.S.A. § 17a-100a - § 17a-100c | Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17a-100a - § 17a-100c (West) | These Connecticut statutes require state employees who work with children and families to also report suspected animal harm, neglect, or cruelty. The statutes explain how the reporting should be completed and describes the implementation of training programs for employees to recognize animal abuse. The statutes also discuss the development of an annual report on actual or suspected instances of animal neglect or cruelty within the state. | Statute | |
| Robinson v. Pezzat | 83 F.Supp.3d 258 (D.D.C. 2015) | 2015 WL 1263143 | While executing a search warrant at the plaintiff’s home, a police officer shot and killed the plaintiff’s thirteen-year-old dog. Accounts differed as to whether the dog bit the officer before shooting or whether the bite was a result of the shooting. The plaintiff filed suit against the police officer and municipality and alleged, inter alia, violations of her constitutional rights, several common law torts, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court was not swayed by the plaintiff’s “uncorroborated version of events” and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the plaintiff had not met her burden to defeat either the individual police officer’s or the municipality’s immunity. This case is under appeal as of September 15, 2015. | Case | |
| US - Eagle - Endangered and Threatened Species; Bald Eagle Reclassification; Final Rule | Federal Register: July 12, 1995 (Volume 60, Number 133) | RIN 1018-AC48 |
The Fish and Wildlife Service reclassifies under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (Act), as amended, the bald eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus) from endangered to threatened in the lower 48 States. The bald eagle remains classified as threatened in Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Oregon, and Washington where it is currently listed as threatened. The special rule for threatened bald eagles is revised to include all lower 48 States. This action will not alter those conservation measures already in force to protect the species and its habitats. The bald eagle also occurs in Alaska and Canada, where it is not at risk and is not protected under the Act. Bald eagles of Mexico are not listed at this time due to a recently enacted moratorium on listing additional taxa as threatened or endangered. |
Administrative | |
| IA - Veterinary - Veterinary Practice Code | I. C. A. § 169.1 - 56 | IA ST § 169.1 - 56 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |
| Nutt v. Florio | 914 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. Ct. App., 2009) | 75 Mass.App.Ct. 482 (2009) |
This Massachusetts case involves an appeal of a summary judgment in favor of the landlord-defendant concerning an unprovoked dog attack. The dog, described as a pit bull terrier, was kept by a tenant of Florio's. The court found that, while the defendants cannot be held strictly liable by virtue the dog's breed, "knowledge of that breed and its propensities may properly be a factor to be considered in determining whether the defendants were negligent under common-law principles." Reviewing the record de novo, the court held that this question and the defendant's knowledge of the dog's propensities, created a genuine issue of material fact. The order of summary judgment for defendant was reversed and the case was remanded. |
Case | |
| In re: JACK D. STOWERS, DOING BUSINESS AS SUGAR CREEK KENNELS | 56 Agric. Dec. 279 (1996) | 1996 WL 881664 (U.S.D.A.) | Willfulness is not required for cease and desist orders or for monetary fines; it is only required for license revocation if agency has not given respondent written notice of violations and opportunity to come into compliance with regulations. (Chief Administrative Law Judge Victor W. Palmer imposed a civil penalty of $15,000.00, issued a cease and desist order, and revoked Respondent's license after finding that Respondent: failed to allow department officials to inspect its facility; failed to maintain complete and accurate records of the acquisition, disposition, and identification of dogs; failed to properly identify dogs; failed to hold dogs for the required period of time; offered dogs for transportation in enclosures that did not conform to structural strength and space requirements; failed to construct and maintain primary enclosures for dogs that protect the dogs from injury; failed to deliver health certificates for dogs transported interstate; failed to provide adequate veterinary care; and obtained random source dogs from individuals who had not bred and raised the dogs on their own premises.) | Case | |
| UT - Hunting, Internet - § 23A-5-307. Use of a computer or other device to remotely hunt wildlife prohibited | U.C.A. 1953 § 23A-5-307 | UT ST § 23A-5-307 | This Utah law states that a person may not use a computer or other device to remotely control the aiming and discharge of a firearm or other weapon for hunting an animal. Violation is a class A misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| Becker v. Elfreich | 821 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2016) | 2016 WL 2754023 (7th Cir.,2016) | Appellant, Officer Zachary Elfreich, went to the home of Appellee Jamie Becker in order to execute an arrest warrant. When Becker did not surrender right away, Officer Elfreich allowed his police dog to find and attack Becker. Upon seeing Becker, Officer Elfreich pulled him down three steps of the home staircase, and placed his knee on Becker’s back while allowing the dog to continue to bite him. Becker sued the city of Evansville and Officer Elfreich under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officer used excessive force in arresting him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied Officer Elfreich's motion for summary judgment and the officer appealed. The Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, held that: first, under the totality of the circumstances, the force used by the officer post-surrender of Becker was not reasonable. Second, a police dog's use of the “bite and hold” technique is not per se deadly force. Third, Becker, was a nonresisting (or at most passively resisting) suspect when Officer Elfreich saw him near the bottom of the staircase and the officer should not have used significant force on him. Based on these factors, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity and a reasonable jury could find such force was excessive. The lower court decision to deny Officer Elfreich's motion for summary judgment was affirmed. | Case | |
| NE - Lien, veterinary - Article 7. Veterinarian's Lien. | Neb. Rev. St. § 52-701 - 702 | Neb. Rev. St. § 52-701 - 702 | These Nebraska laws provide the state's veterinary lien provisions, which concern only liens on livestock animals. Under Section 52-701, a licensed veterinarian who is contracted or hired to treat or in any way take care of any kind of livestock has a lien on that livestock for the reasonable value of services and medicines provided. This lien is treated as an agricultural lien under the UCC and may be enforced in the manner of other secured transactions in article 9 of the UCC. The lien must be perfected as provided under article 9 with the information outlined in this law. | Statute |