Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Houk v. State | 316 So. 3d 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021) | 2021 WL 1685627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2021) | Appellant Crystal Houk challenges her convictions and sentences for animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty on several grounds. Appellant contends her dual convictions for those crimes violate double jeopardy because animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty are degree variants under section 775.021(4)(b)2. The conviction stems from Houk leaving her dog Gracie May in a car in a Walmart parking lot with the windows closed on a hot, humid day in Florida for over an hour. Apparently, Appellant had pressed a PVC pipe against the accelerator to keep the car accelerating since there was something wrong with the air conditioner. When employees gained entry to her vehicle, they discovered the A/C was actually blowing hot air and the dog was in great distress. Gracie died soon thereafter from heat stroke. A postmortem examination revealed her internal temperature was above 109.9 degrees. Houk was charged with aggravated animal cruelty and animal cruelty, tried by jury, and convicted. She was sentenced to concurrent terms of thirty-six months of probation on Count 1 and twelve months of probation on Count 2, each with a condition that she serve thirty days in jail. On appeal here, this court first found that the offenses of animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty satisfy the Blockburger same elements test and do not fall under the identical elements of proof or subsumed-within exceptions. However, as to the degree variant exception, the court agreed with Appellant that the offense of animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty are not based on entirely different conduct and a violation of one subsection would also constitute a violation of the other. Additionally, while another statutory section allows the charging of separate offenses for multiple acts or acts against more than one animal, the section does not authorize "the charging of separate offenses or the imposition of multiple punishments when a single act against one animal satisfies both subsections." Accordingly, the court agreed with Appellant and reversed her conviction for animal cruelty (while keeping the higher degree conviction of aggravated cruelty). | Case | |
| State v. Cleve | 980 P.2d 23 (N.M. 1999) |
Defendant was convicted of two counts of cruelty to animals, two counts of unlawful hunting, and negligent use of firearm. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that "any animal," within meaning of animal cruelty statute, applied only to domesticated animals and wild animals previously reduced to captivity, and thus, the animal cruelty statute did not apply to defendant's conduct in snaring two deer. The court also held that even if the Legislature had intended to protect wild animals in Section 30-18-1, New Mexico's laws governing hunting and fishing preempt the application of Section 30-18-1 to the taking of deer by Cleve in this case. |
Case | ||
| Keith v. Commonwealth ex rel. Pennsylvania, Department of Agriculture | 116 A.3d 756 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) | 2015 WL 2214849 (Pa. Commw. Ct., 2015) | This case focuses on the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture's preliminary objection that Petitioners' had taxpayer standing to request injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that regulations promulgated by the Department were in conflict with the mandates set forth in the Pennsylvania Dog Law Act. Petitioners asserted that the Department was not authorized to exempt nursing mothers from the statutory ban on metal strand flooring and from the statutory requirement of unfettered access to exercise areas. Department argued that Petitioners had not pled sufficient facts to show that those directly and immediately affected by the regulations were beneficially affected. The court found Petitioners were at least as well inclined and situated as any other entities to challenge regulations that might be in conflict with those provisions. The court therefore overruled the Department's preliminary objections to Petitioners' standing. | Case | |
| Sri Lanka - Cruelty - Chapter 573 Cruelty to Animals (English) | Ordinances Nos 13 of 1907, 19 of 1912, 43 of 1917, Y of 1919, 33 of 1921, 16 of 1927, 17 of 1970, 12 of 1945, 22 of 1955 | This Ordinance, in English, details Sri Lanka's animal cruelty laws. It also provides provisions for starving animals, using disabled or ill animals for labor, killing animals with unnecessary cruelty, and permitting diseased animals to die in the street. This ordinance also gives the Minister the power to appoint infirmaries to treat and care for animals that are the victims of offenses committed under this ordinance; the owner of the animal is liable for the cost of caring for the infirmed animal. Any Magistrate, Superintendent, or Assistant Superintendent of Police, Judge of primary Court or the divisional Assistant Government Agent of a division may direct the immediate destruction of an animal who was a victim of an offense if in that person's opinion the animal's sufferings are such as to render such a direction proper. Offenders shall be fined or jailed depending on the seriousness of the offence. | Statute | ||
| Creekstone Farms Premium Beef v. United States Department of Agriculture | 517 F.Supp.2d 8 (D.D.C.,2007) | 2007 WL 1020786 (D.D.C.,2007) | Creekstone Farms Premium Beef (Creekstone) sought to independently test their slaughtered cows so they could more safely provide meat to consumers. Creekstone requested testing kits from the USDA, the same kits that USDA inspectors use to test for BSE. The district court ruled that Creekstone could perform the tests. | Case | |
| AZ - Domestic Violence - Chapter 36. Family Offenses. | A. R. S. § 13-3602 | AZ ST § 13-3602 | This Arizona law provides that, if a court issues an order of protection, the court may grant the petitioner the exclusive care, custody or control of any animal that is owned, possessed, leased, kept or held by the petitioner, the respondent or a minor child residing in the residence or household of the petitioner or the respondent, and order the respondent to stay away from the animal and forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, committing an act of cruelty or neglect in violation of section 13- 2910 or otherwise disposing of the animal (see (G)(7)). | Statute | |
| Connecticut General Statutes: Chapter 333: Sections 6402-6405 | Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 6402-6405 (1918) | Sections 6402-6405 of Chapter 333 from the 1918 General Laws of Connecticut covers offences against humanity and morality. Specifically, the statutes cover following topics: animal cruelty, transportation of animals, and docking of horses. | Statute | ||
| Hendricks v. Barlow | 656 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. 1995) | 656 N.E.2d 481 (Ind. 1995) |
Landowners were held in violation of a zoning regulation, established under a Hendricks County ordinance, which forbade having wild animals residing on residential property. The trial court held that the county could not pass such a law, since it would be preempted by state and federal law. However, on appeal, this Court found that federal (the AWA) and state law did not preempt the County from passing such ordinances. The trial court erroneously attempted to interpret the law when it was not ambiguous, and, thus, preemption by state and federal law should not have been found. Thus, the zoning regulation was permitted. |
Case | |
| US - Chimpanzees - Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 90-Day Finding on a Petition To List All Chimpanzees (Pan trog | 2011 WL 3840975 (F.R.) | Docket No. FWS-R9-ES-2010-0086; MO 92210-1111F113 B6 |
We, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, announce a 90-day finding on a petition to list all chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) as endangered under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended (Act). Based on our review, we find that the petition presents substantial scientific or commercial information indicating that listing all chimpanzees as endangered may be warranted. Therefore, with the publication of this notice, we are initiating a review of the status of the species to determine if listing the entire species as endangered is warranted. To ensure that this status review is comprehensive, we are requesting scientific and commercial data and other information regarding this species. Based on the status review, we will issue a 12-month finding on the petition, which will address whether the petitioned action is warranted, as provided in section 4(b)(3)(B) of the Act. |
Administrative | |
| ID - Ordinances - § 50-319. Animals at large--Regulation | I.C. § 50-319 | ID ST § 50-319 | This Idaho law gives the authority to the mayor and city council to do things like regulate the running at large of domesticated animals, to impound animals running at large, and to manage pounds for such animals. | Statute |