Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| State v. LeVasseur | 613 P.2d 1328 (1980) |
The trial court convicted defendant of first degree theft after he freed dolphins from a university laboratory. The court affirmed the conviction on appeal. It reasoned that the choice of evils defense was unavailable to defendant because the definition of "another" under Hawaii statute clearly did not include dolphins. |
Case | ||
| U.S. v. Taylor | 585 F.Supp. 393 (D.C. Me. 1984) |
The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Maine section 7613 (related to the importation of fish bait species) places an impermissible burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. While the court noted there is nothing in either the statute or its legislative history which expresses the clear intent of Congress that the Lacey Act Amendments are meant to insulate state legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause, it found that the somewhat unique characteristics associated with Maine's wild fish population, the substantial uncertainties surrounding the effects these organisms have on fish and the unpredictable consequences attending the introduction of exotic species into Maine's wild fish population (including the introduction of fish parasites into the native population), the state clearly has a legitimate and substantial purpose in prohibiting the importation of live bait fish. |
Case | ||
| MN - Health - 1721.0500. IMPORTATION OF DOGS, CATS, OR FERRETS. | MN ADC 1721.0500 | Minn. R. 1721.0500 | This Minnesota regulation states that, unless otherwise provided, a dog, cat, or ferret imported into the state must be accompanied by a certificate of veterinary inspection. A dog, cat, or ferret three months of age or older imported into the state must be currently vaccinated for rabies unless they meet all conditions of subpart 1, item D, or are exempted by the board based on the written recommendations of a licensed veterinarian who has examined the animal and who has determined that vaccination is contraindicated due to a medical condition. | Administrative | |
| ZOOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF CINCINNATI v. THE GORILLA FOUNDATION | Slip Copy, 2019 WL 414971 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2019) | In 1991, the plaintiff, Zoological Society of Cincinnati, transferred a western lowland Gorilla named Ndume who had been living at the Zoo to The Gorilla Foundation (TGF) in Northern California. Ndume was sent to TGF in hopes that he and another gorilla there, named Koko, would mate and produce offspring. That never happened. In 2015, the Zoo and TGF entered into a new written agreement which expressly superseded any prior agreements. The agreement provided that upon the death of Koko, Ndume was to be placed at an institution that is accredited by the Association of Zoos and Aquariums (AZA). TGF is not an AZA accredited institution. KoKo died and the Zoo now wants to transfer Ndume back to the zoo. TGF has not made arrangements for a transfer to be carried out. The Zoo brought this suit seeking specific enforcement of the 2015 agreement and contends that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor. TGF argued that the agreement was illegal and unenforceable because the transfer would harm Ndume. TGF identified a number of potential risks, particularly, that Ndume has a Balantidium Coli infection. TGF contended that stress could trigger an outbreak which could be fatal. The court was unpersuaded and stated that TGF signed the 2015 agreement less than 3 years before the present dispute arose and that all of the circumstances that TGF contends makes compliance with the agreement risky existed when the agreement was negotiated. TGF also contended that the agreement is impracticable due to unreasonable (non-monetary) costs. However, the Court again stated that TGF knew these facts and circumstances when it entered into the agreement. The Court granted the Zoo's motion for summary judgment and denied TGF's request for a continuance to permit it to take discovery. The parties were ordered to confer and attempt to reach a consensus on as many aspects of the protocol for transporting Ndume to the Zoo as possible. If within 30 days of the date of the order the parties cannot reach a consensus, they will have to file a joint statement setting out any issues on which they have reached a stalemate. | Case | ||
| WA - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws (Chapter 16.52) | West's RCWA 16.52.010 - 360 | WA ST 16.52.010 - 360 | This section of statutes contains Washington's anti-cruelty provisions. Under the section, "animal" means any nonhuman mammal, bird, reptile, or amphibian. Sections 16.52.205 and 16.52.207 are the primary anti-cruelty provisions that categorize cruelty in either the first or second degree. A person is guilty of animal cruelty in the first degree (a class C felony) when he or she intentionally inflicts substantial pain on, causes physical injury to, or kills an animal by a means causing undue suffering, or forces a minor to inflict unnecessary pain, injury, or death on an animal. A person is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree (a misdemeanor) if, under circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the person knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence inflicts unnecessary suffering or pain upon an animal. An owner of an animal is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree the owner knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence fails to provide the animal with necessary food, water, shelter, rest, sanitation, ventilation, space, or medical attention and the animal suffers unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain as a result of the failure, or if he or she abandons the animal. | Statute | |
| WI - Montello - Breed - § 117-17 Pit Bull Dogs. | MONTELLO, WI., CODE § 117-17 (1989) |
In Montello, Wisconsin, it is unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess any pit bull dog, provided that dogs previously registered may be kept subject to certain requirement. These requirements are keeping the dog properly confined or on a leash and muzzle, posting a "Beware of Dog” sign, keeping $50,000 liability insurance, and taking photographs for identification purposes. Sale or transfer of ownership of pit bulls is prohibited. Failure to comply may result in the seizure and impoundment of the dog, a fine of up to $1,000 and imprisonment for up to 30 days. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| US - Livestock - Humane Handling and Treatment of Livestock; Notice of Solicitation of Information (Republication) | 1980 WL 89059 (F.R.) | FR Doc. 80-28060 (1980) |
The Food Safety and Quality Service is seeking information from all interested members of the public on the need for modification of certain provisions relating to the humane handling of livestock contained in the Federal meat inspection regulations. The Agency has been requested to allow the withholding of water from cattle for a period of time not in excess of 24 hours when such withholding is specified in the sales contract. The Agency has also been requested to allow the withholding of water from animals which are to be slaughtered within 24 hours from the time they arrive at the slaughter establishment. |
Administrative | |
| Daniele v Weissenberger | 2002 WL 31813949,136 A Crim R 390 | 2002 WASCA 346 |
Court uphold conviction for failure to provide food and water for horses. Even thought not the owner, he was the responsible party. Sentence of $3,000 fine and suspended 3 month was not excessive. |
Case | |
| Center for Biological Diversity v. Badgley | 335 F.3d 1097 (C.A.9 (Or.),2003) | 33 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,244, 3 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6393, 2003 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8066 |
The Center for Biological Diversity and eighteen other nonprofit organizations appealed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. The Center claimed the Secretary of the Interior violated the Endangered Species Act by making an erroneous, arbitrary, and capricious determination that listing the Northern Goshawk (a short-winged, long-tailed hawk that lives in forested regions of higher latitude in the northern hemisphere and is often considered an indicator species) in the contiguous United States west of the 100th meridian as a threatened or endangered species was not warranted. In the absence of evidence that the goshawk is endangered or likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future, the court found the FWS's decision was not arbitrary or capricious and affirmed the summary disposition. |
Case | |
| Reid v. Kramer | Not Reported in N.W. Rptr., 2019 WL 2866091 (Mich. Ct. App. July 2, 2019) | In July of 2017, Alpena County Animal Control Officer Michelle Reid, filed a complaint against the respondents alleging that a black and tan German Shepherd named Bruiser had attacked or bit a person. The victim, Joshua Henderson, testified that as he was jogging past the respondents’ house, Bruiser ran toward him and bit his left bicep and left forearm. The Respondents stated that Bruiser had never attacked or bitten anyone before and was raised around children. The prosecutor clarified that euthanization was not being sought at the time, however, the district court found that Bruiser had caused serious injury to Henderson and noted the possibility of Bruiser injuring children in the future and ordered Bruiser to be destroyed. The Respondents appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the district court’s decision. The Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Respondents argued that the circuit court erred in determining that Bruiser was a dangerous animal and that the evidence did not support a finding that Bruiser caused death or serious injury or that he was likely to do so in the future. The Court of Appeals concluded that Bruiser fit the definition of a dangerous animal under the statute, however, the Court agreed with the Respondents that the evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that Bruiser caused serious injury or was likely to cause death or serious injury in the future. In order for an animal to be destroyed, it must be more than dangerous. Henderson’s injuries consisted of scrapes, puncture wounds, and three stitches. Those injuries did not rise to the level of a “serious injury” as defined under MCL 287.321(e) which defines serious injury as permanent, serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health, or serious impairment of bodily function. The district court did not properly interpret MCL 287.322 and based their decision solely on the fact that Bruiser had bitten someone once and concluded that because of that, the court knew that Bruiser was more likely to do so again. The circuit court erred by affirming the district court’s order because the evidence did not support a finding that Bruiser had caused serious injury or death to a person or that he was likely to do so in the future. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the district court. | Case |