Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IN - Law enforcement - Chapter 42.5. Burial with Law Enforcement Animals or Service Animals | IC 23-14-42.5-1 - 7 | This chapter allows the cremated remains of a deceased law enforcement or military animal of a deceased owner to be scattered, placed, or interred in a manner described in this subsection before, after, or in conjunction with the interment of the remains of the deceased owner. The deceased animal's cremated remains may be scattered or placed on top of the deceased owner's burial plot or interred on top of the deceased owner's burial plot as long as the interment of the deceased animal's cremated remains does not encroach on a neighboring burial plot, involve disinterment of the owner, or involve digging greater than one foot of depth. The person owning the deceased animal must consent in writing and give this consent to the cemetery owner. If the deceased owner does not own the animal at the time of the deceased animal's death, the deceased owner may provide written notice in his or her last will, in a written designation to the cemetery, or in a funeral planning declaration. | Statute | |
| Haggblom v. City of Dillingham | 191 P.3d 991 (Alaska 2008) | This is an owner's appeal of the city order which ordered her dog be euthanized or banished from city limits because the dog bit a person without provocation. The order had been affirmed by the superior court and is now in front of the state Supreme Court. Haggblom argues that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it does not provide meaningful process, and is too vague because it does not explicitly offer the alternative of banishment from city limits. This court found that due process was satisfied and that the ordinance is constitutionally clear, and thus affirms the order. | Case | |
| VA - Disaster - § 44-146.18. Department of Emergency Services continued as Department of Emergency Management; | VA Code Ann. § 44-146.18 | VA ST § 44-146.18 | In Virginia, the State Department of Emergency Management must develop an emergency response plan to address the needs of individuals with household pets and service animals in the event of a disaster (subsection (B)(18)). | Statute |
| OK - Licenses - § 22-115. Animals running at large--Regulation and taxation | 11 Okl. St. Ann. § 22-115 to 115.1 | OK ST T. 11 § 22-115 to 115.1 | This Oklahoma statute provides that the municipal governing body may regulate or prohibit animals from running at large. The governing body may also regulate and provide for taxing the owners and harborers of dogs, and authorize the killing of dogs which are found at large in violation of any ordinance regulating the same. | Statute |
| Cetacean Cmty. v. President of the United States | 249 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D.C. Hawaii, 2003) | Plaintiff, a community of whales, dolphins, and porpoises, sued Defendants, the President of the United States and the United States Secretary of Defense, alleging violations of the (NEPA), the (APA), the (ESA), and the (MMPA). The Plaintffs were concerned with the United States Navy's development and use of a low frequency active sonar (LFAS) system. The community alleged a failure to comply with statutory requirements with respect to LFAS use during threat and warfare conditions. | Case | |
| Raymond v. Bujold | 199 A. 91 (N.H.,1938) |
A finder of a lost dog did not become the "keeper" of the dog when he tied it up and summoned the owner to retrieve it. The finder was therefore entitled to sue the owner for damage caused by the dog. |
Case | |
| Duncan v. State | 975 N.E.2d 838 (Ct. App. Ind. 2012) | 2012 WL 4470240 (Ct. App. Ind.) |
A complaint regarding the welfare of horses led to the defendant being convicted of 6 charges of animal cruelty, all of which were class A misdemeanors. Upon appeal, the defendant argued that he had not knowingly waived his right to a jury trial, that Indiana’s animal cruelty law was unconstitutionally vague and that there was no sufficient evidence to overcome a defense of necessity. The appeals court agreed that the defendant did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial and therefore reversed and remanded the case on that issue; however, the appeals court disagreed with the defendant on the other issues. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Case |
| Barger v. Jimerson | 276 P.2d 744 (Colo. 1954) | 130 Colo. 459 (1954) |
In order for liability to attach in an action for damages for personal injuries resulting from a dog attack, defendants had to have notice of the vicious propensities of their dog. Even though the dog had never attacked a person before, a natural fierceness or disposition to mischief was sufficient to classify the dog as "vicious." Finally, it is permissible for the jury to consider the loss of earning capacity of plaintiff resulting from the injuries as an element of damages. |
Case |
| Argentina - Slaughter - Ley 18.819, 1970 | LEY N° 18.819 | This law contains the provisions for the procedures for the slaughter of animals. More specifically the slaughter of animals of the bovine, equine, ovine, porcine and caprine species. However, Article 2 establishes that executive power may extend these provisions to the slaughter of birds, rabbits, and other minor species. Slaughterhouses and meat packing plants in Argentina must comply with the desensitization requirements and procedures established by the executive power. This law prohibits the use of the clubs in slaughtering. The veterinary inspection services of the national and of the provincial or municipal administrations are the control entities for the compliance of this law. The Secretary of State for Agriculture and Livestock is the entity that imposes sanctions to establishments subject to national veterinary inspection and those that violate these provisions. | Statute | |
| Syracuse Book 1 Symposium on Animal Law |
Syracuse Law Review
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