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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
FL - Ordinances - Interpretation of Dog Ordinances under Dangerous Dogs West's F. S. A. § 767.07 FL ST § 767.07 This Florida statute provides that the statutory section relating to state regulation of dangerous dogs is supplemental to all other state laws affecting dogs and shall not be construed to modify those laws or to prevent municipalities from prohibiting, licensing, or regulating the running at large of dogs within their respective limits by law or ordinance. Statute
AKERS v. SELLERS 54 N.E.2d 779 (Ind.App.1944) 114 Ind.App. 660 (1944)
This Indiana case involves an action in replevin by John W. Akers against his former wife, Stella Sellers. The controversy at issue was ownership and possession of a Boston bull terrier dog. At the time of the divorce decree, the dog was not part of the property division and was instead left at the marriage domicile in custody of the former wife. Appellant-Akers claimed that legal title and the dog's best interests rested with him and unsuccessfully brought a suit in replevin in the lower court. On appeal, this Court held that there was no sufficient evidence to overturn the lower court's determination. The judgment was affirmed.
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IN RE: JAMES AND JULIA STUEKERJUERGEN, D/B/A CORNER VIEW KENNELS. 44 Agric. Dec. 186 (1985) 1985 WL 62918 (U.S.D.A.) Dog broker shipping dogs under 8 weeks old was assessed civil penalty of $7,000 and license as dealer under Animal Welfare Act was suspended for 35 days, since broker was one of largest dog brokers in state, 8-week minimum age requirement was based on finding that ability of dogs to function in adult environment was adversely affected if shipped under that age, violations were serious and flagrant in view of large number of puppies shipped on 10 different occasions during 2-month period, and broker had violated Act and standards on prior occasion resulting in 12 day license suspension. Case
Mathis v. Crawford Not Reported in N.E. Rptr., 2021 WL 3127697 (Ill.App. 5 Dist., 2021) 2021 IL App (5th) 190012-U Plaintiff filed this suit in small claims court seeking damages for the destruction of his three dogs, that were mauled to death by dogs owned by defendant over a period of 15 years. The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and awarded him $5,000. Defendant appealed to request that the court of appeals amend the trial court's award of damages to a lesser amount of $500. The court found that, although plaintiff was able to show that he suffered damages at the result of defendant's dogs killing his dogs, the value of the dogs was still unclear. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial solely to discern the issue of the value of the dogs. Case
Riley v. Bd. of Commissioners of Tippecanoe Cty. Slip Copy, 2016 WL 90770, 2016 WL 90770 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 6, 2016) (unpublished) The plaintiff filed suit based on violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA) after he was denied entrance into the Tippecanoe County Courthouse with his service dog. Initially, defendant's claims were dismissed because the Court did not adequately allege that his dog was a service dog. Defendant then filed an amended complaint with plausible allegations that his dog is a service dog. The defendants moved to dismiss the case, stating that the plaintiff had not established that his dog was a service dog according to the definition listed under rules promulgated under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The court found that the plaintiff’s dog was a service dog under the definition because the dog was “individually trained to, among other things, provide [plaintiff] with balance support and assistance during episodes of PTSD.” As a result, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the case was denied. Case
CT - Transport, poultry - § 53-249. Cruelty to poultry C. G. S. A. § 53-249 CT ST § 53-249 This statute makes it illegal to transport poultry in any manner that is not sanitary, warm, and ventilated. Poultry must receive "reasonable care" to "prevent unnecessary suffering." Violation of this provision is a class D misdemeanor. Statute
Kennedy v. Byas 867 So.2d 1195 (D. Fla. 2004) 29 Fla. L. Weekly D564, 2004 WL 393239 (D. Fla.)

Plaintiff filed for a Writ of Certiorari requesting that his case be transfered from circuit court to county court.  He was seeking damages for emotional distress, following alleged veterinary malpractice by the defendant.  The Court held that Florida would not consider pets to be part of an actual family, that damages for emotional distress will not be permitted, and therefore the plaintiff did not have sufficient damages to met the circuit court jurisdictional amount.   Petition denied..

Case
Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entertainment, Inc. 842 F.Supp.2d 1259 (S.D.Cal.,2012) 2012 WL 399214 (S.D.Cal.,2012)

Plaintiffs sued aquarium for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking a declaration that wild-captured orcas were being held in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude. The court dismissed the action, holding that Plaintiffs had no standing because the Thirteenth Amendment only applies to humans, and therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

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North American Meat Institute v. Becerra 825 F. App'x 518 (9th Cir. 2020) 825 Fed.Appx. 518 (C.A.9 (Cal.), 2020) The North American Meat Institute (NAMI) brought suit in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 12 brought suit in federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 12 (which forbids the sale of pork meat and eggs in California from producers that do not comply with its animal housing standards). NAMI alleged that Proposition 12 violated the dormant commerce clause by improperly regulating economic activity outside of California’s boundaries and substantially burdening interstate commerce. Plaintiffs acknowledged that Proposition 12 was not facially discriminatory, and that Proposition 12 did not have a discriminatory purpose, because there was a lack of evidence that the state had protectionist intent when enacting Proposition 12. The district court dismissed the case, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Case
United States v. Univ. of Neb. at Kearney 940 F. Supp. 2d 974, 975 (D. Neb. 2013). This case considers whether student housing at the University of Nebraska–Kearney (UNK) is a “dwelling” within the meaning of the FHA. The plaintiff had a service dog (or therapy dog as the court describes it) trained to respond to her anxiety attacks. When she enrolled and signed a lease for student housing (an apartment-style residence about a mile off-campus), her requests to have her service dog were denied, citing UNK's "no pets" policy for student housing. The United States, on behalf of plaintiff, filed this suit alleging that UNK's actions violated the FHA. UNK brought a motion for summary judgment alleging that UNK's student housing is not a "dwelling" covered by the FHA. Specifically, UNK argues that students are "transient visitors" and the student housing is not residential like other temporary housing (migrant housing, halfway houses, etc.) and more akin to jail. However, this court was not convinced, finding that "UNK's student housing facilities are clearly 'dwellings' within the meaning of the FHA." Case

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