Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UT - Impound - (Repealed) § 77-24-1.5. Safekeeping by officer pending disposition--Records required | U.C.A. 1953 § 77-24-1.5 (§§ 77-24-1 to 77-24-5. Repealed by Laws 2013, c. 394, § 40, eff. July 1, 2013) | Sections 77-24-1 to 77-24-5. Repealed by Laws 2013, c. 394, § 40, eff. July 1, 2013 (Formerly: this Utah statute, amended in 2011, states that each peace officer shall hold all "property" in safe custody until it is received into evidence or disposed of as provided in this chapter. He or she must also maintain a record that identifies it. Note that the provisions related to specifically to animal impoundment/euthanasia were removed.) | Statute | |
| KS - Roeland Park - Breed - 2-211 Pit Bulls | ROELAND PARK, KS., CITY ORDINANCE § 2-211 | On January 1, 2018, the prohibition on the keeping of more than one pit bull on any property in the City of Roeland Park, Kansas officially expired. Before this 2015 ordinance that made the possession of more than one pit bull unlawful, the city had a complete pit bull ban that prohibited the keeping, harboring, or owning a pit bull dog, including Staffordshire bull terrier, American pit bull terrier, American Staffordshire terrier, or any dog that has the appearance and characteristics of being one of those breeds. Now, unless the city enacts another ordinance related to pit bulls, the ban has ended. | Local Ordinance | |
| Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n Inc., (A.L.V.A.) v. Weinberger | 765 F.2d 937 (C.A.9 (Cal.),1985) | 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,697 (C.A.9 (Cal.),1985) |
The Animal Lovers Volunteer Association (ALVA) brought this action to enjoin the Navy from shooting feral goats on San Clemente Island (a military enclave under the jurisdiction of the Navy). After the district court granted (Cite as: 765 F.2d 937, *938) summary judgment for the Navy, the ALVA appealed. This Court found that the ALVA failed to demonstrate standing, where it only asserted an organizational interest in the problem, rather than allegations of actual injury to members of the organization. The organization failed to demonstrate an interest that was distinct from an interest held by the public at large. Affirmed.
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| Bassani v. Sutton | Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1734857 (E.D.Wash.) |
Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit in 2008 claiming money damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988,and alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In 2004, plaintiffs two dogs were seized by Yakima County Animal Control after responding to a citizen's report that he had been menaced by dogs as he ran past plaintiff's house. Before the court here are Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. In granting the motions, the court held that the doctrine of res judicata did warrant a grant of summary judgment as defendants' failure to release plaintiff's dog. Further, the animal control officer was entitled to qualified immunity because he reasonably relied on the deputy prosecuting attorney's advice. Finally, there was no evidence of a pattern of behavior on the part of Yakima County sufficient to be a "moving force" behind a constitutional violation. |
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| AL - Restaurant - § 22-20-5.3. Pet dogs permitted in outdoor dining areas | Ala.Code 1975 § 22-20-5.3; Ala.Code 1975 § 22-20-5.4 | AL ST § 22-20-5.3; § 22-20-5.4 | This Alabama law enacted in 2021 states that a pet dog that is under the control of a person shall be permitted in an outdoor dining area of a food service establishment if conditions listed in the law are all met. These include things like the food service facility owner filing a waiver with the State Health Department stating they will adhere to the prescribed rules, a prominent sign that puts the public on notice, a separate entrance for the dogs and owners that does not go through the food establishment, and making sure the pet owners adhere to rules like keeping dogs on leashes or in carriers. | Statute |
| Just Puppies, Inc. v. Frosh | 438 F. Supp. 3d 448 (D. Md. 2020), vacated and remanded, No. 20-1631, 2021 WL 4452349 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 2021) | The State of Maryland passed a “No More Puppy-Mill Pups Act” which went into effect January 1, 2020. The Act prohibits retail pet stores in Maryland from offering for sale or otherwise transferring or disposing of cats or dogs. Four pet stores, a dog breeder, and a dog broker filed suit against Brian Frosh, the Attorney General of Maryland, the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Maryland Attorney General (CPD), the Maryland House Economic Matters Committee, and the Maryland State Senate Finance Committee seeking an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Act as well as a declaration that it is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Defendants were all entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, unless an exception were to apply. Under the Ex parte Young exception “private citizens may sue state officials in their official capacities in federal court to obtain prospective relief from ongoing violations of federal law.” The CPD and Committee Defendants were not State officials and, therefore, they did not fall within the Ex parte Young exception. The Ex parte Young exception, however, applied to Mr. Frosh as he was the Attorney General of Maryland since he had some connection with the enforcement of the Act. In Counts I, II, and III, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act violated the Constitution's Commerce Clause. The Court found that the Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the Act discriminated against out-of-state breeders and brokers in its text, in its effect, or in its purpose. Count IV alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act was preempted by the AWA. The Court found that prohibiting Maryland pet stores from selling dogs or cats had no effect on the operation of the AWA. The Puppy-Mill Act's impact on pet stores did not clash with the AWA, because pet stores were explicitly exempt from the AWA. Count V alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional right to the equal protection of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court found no merit in this argument. Count VI asserted that the Act created a monopoly prohibited by Article 41 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court found that the Puppy-Mill Act did not constitute an exclusive right to sell cats and dog in Maryland. Although the Act prohibited brick and mortar stores from participating in the sale of cats and dogs, consumers still had a plethora of choices when seeking to obtain a pet, including rescue shelters, animal control units, USDA licensed breeders and brokers, and unregulated hobby breeders. The Court ultimately dismissed all claims against the CPD and the Committee Defendants and allowed the claims against Brian Frosh to proceed. | Case | |
| WY - Feral animals - Chapter 48. Feral Livestock | W. S. 1977 § 11-48-101 to 102 | WY ST § 11-48-101 to 102 | This Wyoming chapter deals with feral livestock. Under the chapter, "feral" means a domestic animal that is not under the control of nor cared for by a person and which has returned to a wild or semi-wild state. Before livestock can be declared feral, an attempt must be made to locate the owner. If the owner cannot be located, the director of the Wyoming livestock board or state veterinarian can then capture or dispose of any feral livestock damaging public or private property, and destroy any feral livestock thought to be infected with disease. The owner of feral livestock is responsible for costs associated with this chapter for damage or care of the feral livestock. | Statute |
| SC - Impound - § 47-3-540. Destruction of identifiable dog by animal control officer; prior notification of owner | Code 1976 § 47-3-540 | SC ST § 47-3-540 | This South Carolina statute provides that animal control officers must not destroy any positively identifiable dog until they have notified the owner at his or her last known address by registered mail that they have the dog in their possession. The owner then has two weeks to reclaim his or her dog, after which the animal may be destroyed. | Statute |
| Phillips v. San Luis Obispo County Dept. | 228 Cal.Rptr. 101 Cal.App. (2 Dist.,1986) | 183 Cal.App.3d 372 (1986) |
In this case, the owners of dog petitioned for writ of mandamus requesting vacation of destruction order and declaration that ordinances under which the dog was seized were unconstitutional. The Court of Appeal held that due process required that owners have hearing prior to seizure of or destruction of dog (a property interest) and that a "courtesy hearing" did not satisfy due process requirements. Further, the court concluded that the ordinances here were unconstitutional for failing to provide for notice and a hearing either before or after the seizure of an uncontrollable biting or vicious dog. |
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| Scott v. Jackson County | 403 F.Supp.2d 999 (D.Or.,2005) |
On July 22, 2003, plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, various state common law claims, and violation of the Oregon Property Protection Act (plaintiff's neighbor complained to animal control in May 2001 after hearing the rabbits "screaming and dying"). Plaintiff's claims arise from the seizure of over 400 rabbits from her property, and the subsequent adoption and/or euthanasia of these rabbits. Defendants move for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity, failure to allege the proper defendant, and failure to provide notice under the Oregon Tort Claims Act. In granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court found that even if the officers' entry and seizure of plaintiff's property was unlawful, they reasonably believed their actions to be lawful, therefore affording them qualified immunity protection. Further, the court found no taking occurred where the rabbits were euthanized and/or adopted out as part of a initial criminal forfeiture action. |
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