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Displaying 51 - 60 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IN RE: JAMES W. HICKEY, D/B/A S&S FARMS, AND S.S. FARMS, INC. | 47 Agric. Dec. 840 (1988) | 1988 WL 243389 (U.S.D.A.) | Licensed dealer found guilty of numerous violations of Act involving care and housing of dogs and cats, failure to allow inspection of records, and failure to keep and maintain adequate records as to acquisition and disposition of animals, is properly penalized with 25-year suspension of license, civil penalty of $40,000, and cease and desist order. | Case |
| Labor Commission, Antidiscrimination and Labor Division v. FCS Community Management | --- P.3d ----, 2024 WL 1203693 (Utah App., 2024) | 2024 UT App 39 | This is an appeal of a complaint filed by the Utah Anti-discrimination and Labor Division (ULAD) seeking review of the determination that an HOA violated members' request for reasonable accommodation by denying homeowner's the ability to keep chickens on their property. The chickens were intended to be assistance animals for the homeowner's daughter, who has anxiety and PTSD. The district court found that the HOA constructively denied the homeowner's request for reasonable accommodation by delaying their response to the request for three months. This court reversed the decision of the lower court, finding that there was no constructive denial of the request since the HOA allowed the homeowners to keep the chickens during the interim period, did not punish them for keeping the chickens, and ultimately granted the request to keep the chickens. | Case |
| CO - Animal welfare - Ley 1801 de 2016 | Ley 1801 de 2016 | Ley 1801 of 2016, or “National Code of Safety and Citizen Coexistence.” Title XIII is titled “of the relationship with animals.” chapter one talks about the respect and care owed to animals, prohibiting behaviors that negatively affect animals, such as the promotion, participation, or sponsorship of betting activities involving animals; the sale of domestic animals on public roads; the wandering of animals on the streets; and the use of captive animals as shooting targets. Chapter II “Domestic animals or pets,” establishes that only species authorized by the law can be kept as pets. The ownership of wild animals as pets is prohibited. Services animals accompanying their owners are always allowed in public spaces. Dog fighting is prohibited in the entire territory. Chapter IV regulates the management and ownership of potentially dangerous dogs, tort liability, the registry of potentially dangerous dogs. | Statute | |
| ND - Initiatives - Prevention of Animal Cruelty Initiative, Measure 5 | Initiative, Measure 5 (2012) | This initiated statutory measure would create section 36-21.1-02.1 of the North Dakota Century Code. This measure would make it a class C felony for an individual to maliciously and intentionally harm a living dog, cat or horse and provide a court with certain sentencing options. The measure would not apply to production agriculture, or to lawful activities of hunters and trappers, licensed veterinarians, scientific researchers, or to individuals engaged in lawful defense of life or property. It failed at the polls in 2012 (34.6% yes). | Statute | |
| CT - Domestic Violence - § 46b-15. Relief from physical abuse by family | C.G.S.A. § 46b-15 | CT ST § 46b-15 | Under this Connecticut law, any family or household member who has been subjected to a continuous threat of present physical pain or physical injury by another family may apply to the Superior Court for an order of protection . Under subsection (b), The court may also make orders for the protection of any animal owned or kept by the applicant including, but not limited to, an order enjoining the respondent from injuring or threatening to injure such animal. | Statute |
| UK - Farming - UK Welfare of Farmed Animals (Amend.) | Statutory Instrument 2002 No. 1646 |
For historical purposes only. Law has been repealed and/or replaced. These Regulations may be cited as the Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2002. The provisions mainly concern egg-laying hens. |
Statute | |
| Knowles Animal Hospital, Inc. v. Wills | 360 So.2d 37 (Fla.App.,1978) |
Dog owners brought negligence action against veterinarian and animal hospital after their dog suffered injuries while under the veterinarian's and the hospital's care. The Appeals Court held that the trial court did not err by allowing the jury to consider plaintiff-owners' mental pain and suffering, and that the jury could reasonably have viewed defendants' neglectful conduct resulting in the dog's injury to have amounted to great indifference to plaintiffs' property. |
Case | |
| Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service | 930 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.D.C. 2013) | 2013 WL 1111285 (D.D.C.,2013) |
Using the Administrative Procedures Act, the Sierra Club filed a suit against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) due to the USFWS's response to the Sierra Club's petition to revise critical habitat for the leatherback sea turtle; the Sierra Club also charged the USFWS with unlawfully delaying the designation of the Northeastern Ecological Corridor of Puerto Rico as critical habitat for the leatherback sea turtle. While both sides filed a motion for summary judgment, the District Court only granted the USFWS motion for summary judgment because the USFWS's 12–month determination was unreviewable under the Administrative Procedures Act. |
Case |
| Hines v. Pardue | --- F.Supp.3d -------, 2023 WL 5254673 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2023) | 2023 WL 5254673 (S.D.Tex., 2023) | Plaintiff and veterinarian Ronald S. Hines brings this action to challenge a Texas law that mandates a veterinarian conduct a physical examination of an animal before practicing veterinary medicine on the grounds that the law violates his First Amendment right to free speech. Plaintiff, who was unable to maintain a veterinary practice in person due to medical issues, began providing veterinary advice to animal owners via a website without first examining their animals. Plaintiff was disciplined by the Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners for doing this, and was fined $500 and sentenced to a year of probation. Plaintiff then sued the members of the Board on two separate occasions, with the second appeal being remanded by the Fifth Circuit with instructions to determine whether the requirement for a physical examination before issuing veterinary advice regulates speech incidentally to the regulation of non-expressive professional conduct, or is a regulation of non-expressive conduct. Here, the district court first examined multiple instances of plaintiff providing veterinary advice to animal owners via the internet. Next, the court asserts that plaintiff has standing to pursue his claims against the board. Lastly, the court examines plaintiff’s First Amendment argument. Plaintiff argues that his email exchanges with animal owners constitutes speech, and the court agrees that this is speech and that the Examination Requirement regulates this speech. However, the court finds that this regulation of plaintiff’s speech is content neutral, because the requirement for a physical examination of the animals before issuing advice applies neutrally to all forms of veterinary care and veterinary speech regardless of content. Therefore, the court held that defendants may enforce the Examination Requirement without violating plaintiff’s free speech rights. | Case |
| Ass'n des Éleveurs de Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Bonta | 33 F.4th 1107 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Ass'n des Éleveurs de Cananards et D'oies du Quebec v. Bonta, 143 S. Ct. 2493, 216 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2023) | California prohibits the in-state sale of products that are “the result of force feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird's liver beyond normal size.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25982. The law had a 7.5-year grace period before it went into effect. The law has two components: first, it bans the practice of force-feeding ducks and geese to produce foie gras; and second, the law banned the in-state sale of products that are "the result" of that practice. After nine years of litigation and in their third set of appeals before this Court, the parties ask the court here to decide whether California's sales ban is preempted by the Poultry Products Inspection Act (“PPIA”) or violates the dormant Commerce Clause. As to the first issue of preemption, the plaintiff sellers contend that at least one USDA Policy Book defines foie gras as liver from poultry that has been "specially fed and fattened" and other USDA documents suggest this is done via forced-feeding. Thus, contend the sellers, it is impossible to produce and properly label foie gras, as is required by the PPIA, and then also comply with the California law. The court disagreed with the assertion, finding that the sellers can still force feed birds to make their products, but not sell those in California. Said the court, "The sales ban is neither a command to market non-force-fed products as foie gras nor to call force-fed products something different." Further, the sellers raise a new suggestion that the ban constitutes express preemption because force feeding operates as an "ingredient requirement." Essentially, they contend you cannot have foie gras without force-feeding birds. This was also rejected, as the court found nothing new that would reverse the precedent established in the prior decision by the court. Finally, the sellers appeal dismissal of their dormant Commerce Clause claim, arguing that the sales ban is impermissibly extraterritorial because force-feeding is only banned in California and therefore, only regulates out-of-state conduct. The court dismissed this, noting states are free to regulate commerce within their boundaries provided such regulation does not affect transactions from out of that state. Moreover, the sellers' argument that the ban is "unduly burdensome" for this reason also failed since there is not requirement that a state impose the "least burdensome" method for in-state commerce. The court held that the sales ban is neither preempted nor unconstitutional and that the specified transactions are out-of-state sales permitted by California law. | Case |