Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GA - Breeding - Chapter 40-13-13. Animal Protection | GA ADC 40-13-13-.01 to .09 | Ga Comp. R. & Regs. 40-13-13-.01 to .09 | There regulations set out the requirements for licensing animal shelters, pet dealers, kennels, and stable operators. They also provide provisions for controlling disease and shipping animals into the state. | Administrative | |
| WA - Dangerous Dog - 16.08.040. Dog bites. Liability and Dangerous dogs and related provisions. | West's RCWA 16.08.010 - 110 | WA ST 16.08.010 - 110 | This Washington statute outlines the state's dangerous dog laws. Under the law, the owner or keeper of any dog shall be liable to the owner of any animal killed or injured by such dog for the amount of damages sustained in a civil action. Further, there is strict liability for the owner of any dog that bites any person while in a public place or lawfully on a private place including the property of the owner of such dog, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness. However, proof of provocation of the attack by the injured person shall be a complete defense to an action for damages. | Statute | |
| WA - Buckely - Breed - Chapter 9.10 (Pit Bull Ordinance) | BUCKELY, WA., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 9.10.020, 9.10.260 - 9.10.300 (2008) |
In Buckely, Washington, pit bulls are defined to be “dangerous dogs." Such dogs are considered to be a public nuisance and shall be humanely destroyed or removed from the city. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Perpetual Trustees Tasmania Ltd v State of Tasmania | [2000] TASSC 68 |
A testatrix bequeathed a part of her estate to be used in support of 'animal welfare'. It was held that this constituted a charitable trust as the purpose was so predominantly charitable that the intention was to be assumed and that even if that portion of the estate could be used for non-charitable purposes, this was in a manner allowed under the Wills Act 1992 (Tas). |
Case | ||
| Ladnier v. Norwood | 781 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1986). |
Plaintiff horse owner sought review of a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, which found in favor of defendants, veterinarian and insurer, in an action to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's horse. The court affirmed the judgment that found defendants, veterinarian and insurer, not negligent in the death of a horse belonging to plaintiff horse owner because they met the statutorily required standard of care. Defendants did not breach a duty to warn because the risk of a fatal reaction to the drug they gave to the horse was common and was considered by equine specialists to be insubstantial. |
Case | ||
| Nonhuman Rights Project on behalf of Tommy and Kiko v. | 31 N.Y.3d 1054, 100 N.E.3d 846 (2018) | 2018 WL 2107087 (Mem), 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 03309 | The petitioner, Nonhuman Rights Project brought this appeal on behalf of Tommy and Kiko, who are two captive chimpanzees. The chimpanzees had been confined by their owners in small cages within a warehouse and a cement storefront in a crowded residential area, respectively. Petitioner sought leave to appeal from an order of the Appellate Division, which affirmed two judgments of the Supreme Court declining to sign orders to show cause to grant the chimpanzees habeas relief. The lower courts based their denial of habeas corpus for the chimpanzees on the dictionary definition for "person." The term “person” tends to lean towards an entity that is recognized by law as having most of the rights and duties of a human. The Appellate Division also reasoned that chimpanzees are not considered people because they lack the capacity to bear legal duties or to be held legally accountable for their actions. As a counter, the Petitioner argued that the same can be said for human infants or comatose human adults, yet no one would say that it is improper to seek a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of one of them. The Appellate Division therefore based their denial on the fact that chimpanzees are not a member of the human species. In the instant action, Court of Appeals of New York denied the motion for leave to appeal. In the concurring opinion, Judge Fahey states that the better approach is not to ask whether a chimpanzee fits the definition of a person or whether it has the same rights and duties as a human being, but whether he or she has the right to liberty protected by habeas corpus. The concurring opinion also found that the Appellate Division erred by misreading the case it relied on and holding that a habeas corpus challenge cannot be used to seek transfer; a habeas corpus challenge can be used to seek a transfer to another facility. Although Judge Fahey recognizes that Chimpanzees share at least 96% of their DNA with humans and are autonomous, intelligent creatures, he concurred with the Appellate Division’s decision to deny leave to appeal. However, he ultimately questioned whether the Court was right to deny leave in the first instance. | Case | |
| TX - Dangerous - Subchapter B: Dogs That Are A Danger to Animals | V. T. C. A., Health & Safety Code § 822.011 - 013 | TX HEALTH & S § 822.011 - 013 | Subchapter B prohibits dogs from running at large and enumerates the criminal penalty for such violation. | Statute | |
| Noah v. Attorney General | appeal 9232/01 |
Court held that the forsed feeding of geese for making foie Gras was a violation of the laws of Israel.(In Hebrew)( English language .pdf - translated by CHAI) |
Case | ||
| Celinski v. State | 911 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App. 1995). |
Criminal conviction of defendant who tortured cats by poisoning them and burning them in microwave oven. Conviction was sustained by circumstantial evidence of cruelty and torture. |
Case | ||
| RI - Research - Chapter 27. Retirement of Research Dogs and Cats | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-27-1 - 2 | RI ST § 4-27-1 - 2 | This chapter, adopted in 2018, is the “Research Animal Retirement Act." A higher education research facility that receives public money must assess the health of a cat or dog to determine whether it is suitable for adoption once any testing or research on the animal has been completed. The facility must then make reasonable efforts to place those suitable dogs or cats through private adoption or adoption through a shelter or rescue. These efforts shall be made prior to euthanizing the dog or cat. | Statute |