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Displaying 31 - 40 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US - Service Animals - Part 35. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local | 28 C.F.R. § 35.101 to .139 | The purpose of this part is to effectuate subtitle A of title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12131), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by public entities. The section defines "service animal" as any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability. Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or untrained, are not service animals for the purposes of this definition. | Administrative | ||
| Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NSF | LEXSEE 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22315 |
The Center for Biological Diversity sought a temporary restraining order to enjoin the National Science Foundation from continuing its acoustical research in the Gulf of California. The scientists who conducted the acoustical research in the Gulf of California, which was an environmentally sensitive area, used an array of air guns to fire extremely high-energy acoustic bursts into the ocean. The sound from the air guns was as high as 263 decibels (dB) at the source. The government had acknowledged that 180 dB caused significant injury to marine mammals. The court found that the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), governed the activities of the scientists on the research vessel, and that any injury or harassment to marine mammals in the course of the research project in the Gulf of California, outside the territorial waters of Mexico, would violate the MMPA. |
Case | ||
| AU - Wildlife - National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) | National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 | An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the establishment, preservation and management of national parks, historic sites and certain other areas and the protection of certain fauna, native plants and Aboriginal objects . | Statute | ||
| Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior | 397 F. Supp. 3d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) | This case centers on the Trump Administration's new interpretation of incidental takings under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA). In December 2017, the Principal Deputy Solicitor of the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) issued a memorandum that countered almost 50 years of the agency’s interpretation of “takings” and “killings” under the MBTA (the "Jorjani Opinion"). According to the DOI in that opinion, the MBTA does not prohibit incidental takes or kills because the statute applies only to activities specifically aimed at birds. Environmental interest groups and various states brought three now-consolidated actions to vacate the memorandum and subsequent guidance issued in reliance on the memorandum. Both parties moved for summary judgment. In essence, the question before the court is whether DOI’s interpretation of the MBTA must be set aside as contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or upheld as a valid exercise of agency authority. The court first observed that, from the early 1970s until 2017, the DOI interpreted the MBTA to prohibit incidental takes and kills, imposing liability for activities and hazards that led to the deaths of protected birds, irrespective of whether the activities targeted birds or were intended to take or kill birds. To conserve migratory birds and ensure compliance with the MBTA’s prohibition on “incidental take,” the DOI's Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) used a range of strategies: sending companies notice of the risks their facilities and equipment posed to migratory birds; issuing industry guidance; informally negotiating remediation efforts; and issuing permits authorizing takes. In fact, the court noted that the agency prioritized a cooperative approach with industry over enforcement actions. In 2015, the DOI formalized this approach by undergoing a rulemaking process regulating incidental take. In early 2017, the DOI's Solicitor then issued a memorandum that reaffirmed the long-standing interpretation that the MBTA prohibited incidental take that became known as the "Tomkins Opinion." Once presidential administrations changed and Tomkins departed, the new Principal Deputy Solicitor issued a new memorandum that stated any agency comments, recommendations, or actions not be based on the principle that the MBTA prohibited incidental take (the Jorjani Opinion). This triggered the instant lawsuits by conservation organizations and several states. On July 31, 2019, the lower court found that the plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated standing and denied the DOI's motion to dismiss. On appeal here, this court first noted that both parties agree with longstanding precedent that the MBTA's misdemeanor provision creates strict liability. In contrast, the Jorjani Opinion contends that the criminal penalty provisions under the MBTA is limited to only acts directed at birds and those activities whose purpose is to "render an animal subject to human control" like hunting or capturing. In reviewing the Jorjani Opinion under the lessened deference standard afforded by administrative law, this court found the DOI overstated the any conflicts in interpretation of the MBTA among circuit courts (a "dramatized representation"). In addition, the court found the Jorjani Opinion "is a recent and sudden departure from long-held agency positions backed by over forty years of consistent enforcement practices." The court found the Jorjani Opinion was an unpersuasive interpretation of the MBTA's unambiguous prohibition on the killing of birds and is contrary to the plain language of the law itself. Such an interpretation runs contrary to legislative history, decades of enforcement practices by the DOI, and caselaw. Because the agency's action was held unlawful under the APA, the court found the only appropriate remedy was vacatur. Thus, Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment were granted, and Interior’s motion was denied. | Case | ||
| Washington v. Olatoye | 173 A.D.3d 467, 103 N.Y.S.3d 388 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) | 2019 WL 2425735 (N.Y. App. Div. June 11, 2019) | This New York case involves an appeal by a public housing tenant after his petition to declare his dog an assistance animal was denied and he was placed on probation with instructions to his dog from the premises. The denial stems from an incident where Petitioner's English Bulldog "Onyx" allegedly bit a NYCHA employee when the employee was delivering a hotplate to petitioner's apartment when petitioner was not home. After the incident, NYCHA notified petitioner that it would seek to terminate his tenancy for non-desirability and breach of its rules and regulations. Petitioner suffered from mental illness as well as a traumatic brain injury and was in the process of trying to register Onyx as an assistance animal, which was validated by a letter from the psychiatric support center where he received services. At a hearing, the NYCHA hearing officer sustained the charges against petitioner, required him to remove the dog from his apartment immediately and placed him on probation for one year. It did not address petitioner's request for an assistance animal as a reasonable accommodation and ignored the mental health records submitted into evidence. On appeal, this court first noted that housing providers are required to allow a person who proves their burden of showing that an animal assists them with aspects of their disability to keep an assistance animal. Here, the hearing officer engaged in no such analysis and relied on the "direct threat" exemption to the Fair Housing Amendments Act. Because there was no initial record that addressed petitioner's reasonable accommodation request, the appellate court was left with an insufficient record that precluded adequate review. Thus, the petition was held in abeyance and this court remanded the proceeding to NYCHA for a determination, on the existing record, in accordance with this decision. | Case | |
| WY - Equine Activity Liability - Chapter 1. General Provisions as to Civil Actions | W.S.1977 § 1-1-122 to 123 | WY ST § 1-1-122 to 123 | The Wyoming equine liability provisions immunize equine professionals by declaring that those who engage in equine activities or any recreational activities assume the inherent risks in the sport or recreational opportunity. However, actions based upon negligence of the provider wherein the damage, injury or death is not the result of an inherent risk of the sport or recreational opportunity shall be preserved pursuant to W.S. 1-1-109. | Statute | |
| MO - Liberty - Breed - Sec. 4-24. - Keeping of pit bull dogs prohibited. | LIBERTY, MO., CITY CODE §§ 4-24 - 4-25 (2010) |
In Liberty, Missouri, it is be unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess any pit bull dog, with exceptions for pit bull dogs already residing in the city. Such dogs may remain as long as the owner complies with certain requirements, such as proper registration, proper confinement, the use of a leash and muzzle, the posting of "Beware of Dog-Pit Bull," keeping $50,000 liability insurance, and taking identification photographs. Any dog found to be the subject of a violation may be subject to seizure and impoundment. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| SC - Veterinary - Chapter 69. Veterinarians. | Code 1976 § 40-69-5 to 305 | SC ST § 40-69-5 to 305 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws amended in 2006. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute | |
| Grise v. State | Grise v. State, 37 Ark. 456 (1881). |
The Defendant was charged under the Arkansas cruelty to animal statute for the killing of a hog that had tresspass into his field. The Defendant was found guilty and appealed. The Supreme Court found that the lower court commited error by instructing the jury that all killing is needless. The Court reveresed the judgment and remanded it for further consideration. |
Case | ||
| CA - Housing - Pet Friendly Housing Act of 2017 | West's Ann. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 50466 | CA HLTH & S § 50466 | The California Department of Housing and Community Development requires each housing development to authorize a resident of the housing development to own or maintain one or more common household pets within a resident's dwelling unit. | Statute |