Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. v. Gay-Lord | 799 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1986) |
Gay-Lord was found guilty of engaging in interstate commerce in striped bass (rockfish) in violation of regulations and statutes of the Commonwealth of Virginia after purchasing the fish from undercover FWS agents and later selling it to an interstate distributor. The Court held that conviction was proper despite undercover agents having transported fish from Virginia to trafficker's place of business in North Carolina. |
Case | ||
| SC - Endangered Species - Chapter 123 Department of Natural Resources | S.C. Code of Regulations R. 123-150 - 170 | SC ADC 123-150 to 170 | These South Carolina regulations list the non-game wildlife on the state's List of Endangered Wildlife Species, as well as the animals that are considered threatened and "in need of management." If an animal is listed as threatened or endangered, a permit must be obtained in certain situations to avoid penalty for "taking" a listed species. Furthermore, these regulations also set out provisions for hunting alligators and selling alligator meat and hide; for obtaining vultures, kites, hawks, eagles, ospreys, falcons, and owls for the practice of falconry; and for protecting sea turtles by regulating the nets on shrimping trawls. | Administrative | |
| Sanders v. Frank | 37 N.E.3d 1305 (Ohio App. 11 Dist. 2015) |
In this case, Heather Sanders filed suit against Joseph D. Frank after she suffered injuries as a result of rescuing Frank’s horses that were running at large. The lower court dismissed Sander’s complaint with prejudice and Sanders appealed. On appeal, Sanders asserted four main arguments: (1) the doctrine of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk should not be applied when defendant negligently violates a statute; (2) the rescue doctrine should preclude the assumption of the risk doctrine even though Sanders voluntarily assisted in the capture of the horses; (3) the trial court erred in applying the assumption of risk doctrine; and (4) the trial court erred by preventing recovery of damages. Ultimately, the court of appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss the complaint. The court found that all four of Sander’s arguments were without merit. The court held that although Frank had negligently violated a statute, allowing his horses to escape and run at large, Sanders voluntarily assisted in the capture of the horses and was not responding to any immediate emergency or threat to human life. Also, the court pointed out that Sanders had “assumed the risk” based on the fact that she had helped rescue Frank’s horses in the past. As a result, the lower court did not err in dismissing Sander’s claim based on contributory negligence and the assumption of the risk doctrine. |
Case | ||
| TN - Vehicle - § 29-34-209. Forcible entry of a motor vehicle for purposes of removing a minor or an animal | T. C. A. § 29-34-209 | TN ST § 29–34–209 | This statute grants a person who forcibly breaks into a motor vehicle to save a minor or animal immunity from civil liability. | Statute | |
| MI - Habitat Protection - Chapter 324. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. | M.C.L.A. 324.30101 - 301113 | MI ST 324.30101 - 301113 | These sections describe the necessity and process of obtaining a permit to build a marina, canal or any other project that affects any inland lake, stream or bottomland. | Statute | |
| FL - Assistance Animal - Florida's Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | West's F. S. A. § 413.08 - 081; West's F. S. A. § 316.1301, 1303; West's F. S. A. § 760.08; § 760.27; § 817.265 | FL ST § 413.08 - 081; FL ST § 316.1301, 1303; FL ST § 760.08; § 760.27; § 817.265 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and service animal laws. | Statute | |
| New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Farmer Boy AG, Inc. | Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 33125128 (S.D.Ind.) |
Lightning struck a hog breeding facility, which disabled the ventilation system and killed pregnant sows. Plaintiff Insurance Company sued defendant for damages. The Court held that evidence of damages relating to the lost litters and subsequent generations was excluded because damages for future unborn litters are not recoverable when damages are recovered for the injury to or destruction of the pregnant sows. |
Case | ||
| Kleppe v. New Mexico | 426 U.S. 529 (1976) |
The state of New Mexico challenged the constitutionality of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act after they were ordered by the U.S. government to recover several wild horses they had rounded up from public lands within their state and sold at auction in violation of the WFRHBA. The Supreme Court upheld the Act, finding it to be a valid exercise of federal power under the Article IV Property Clause of, which gave Congress the power to protect wildlife on state lands, state law notwithstanding. |
Case | ||
| Triumph Foods, LLC v. Campbell | --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2024 WL 421994 (D. Mass. Feb. 5, 2024) | This case was brought by a group of pork producers and farmers to challenge the Massachusetts' Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act on the grounds that it violates the dormant Commerce Clause by improperly regulating interstate commerce. The Act would require pork producers to phase out certain means of pig confinement in order to sell pork products in Massachusetts. In response, the state filed a motion to dismiss arguing that there is no causally connected harm to the pork producers, which the court denied. The court first evaluated the slaughterhouse exemption, which exempts sales from the requirement that they must take place within Massachusetts if the buyer takes physical possession of the pork while on the premises of an establishment inspected under the Federal Meat Inspection Act. Plaintiff argued that as an out-of-state pork processor, it could not take advantage of this exemption, even though it operates entirely federally inspected facilities, because it ships its product into Massachusetts from out-of-state and, its buyers do not take physical possession of its product while at its facilities. The court found that this exemption has a discriminatory effect, and vacated the order in part to allow the court to consider whether the Act with the slaughterhouse exemption severed is preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act. | Case | ||
| Friends of Animals v. Clay | 811 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2016) | 2016 WL 305359 (2d Cir. Jan. 26, 2016) | Friends of Animals (“FOA”) appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees William Clay in his official capacity as a Deputy Administrator in the Department of Agriculture-APHIS and the FWS. FOA challenged FWS's issuance of a “depredation permit” to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey authorizing the emergency “take” of migratory birds that threaten to interfere with aircraft at JFK Airport. FOA argues that FWS's own regulations unambiguously prohibit it from issuing such a permit and that the permit should therefore be set aside as the product of agency action that was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” The District Court granted summary judgment for defendant FWS. On appeal, this court affirmed that ruling. FOA pointed out that the "emergency take" regulation at 50 C.F.R. § 21.41 does not authorize FWS to issue a permit that allows the emergency take of a migratory bird irrespective of its species, but instead requires a "species-specific" inquiry. However, this court disagreed, finding that "§ 21.41 does not place Port Authority officials in the untenable position of having to choose between violating federal law and deliberately ignoring serious threats to human safety." Further, the court found the specific requirements in § 21.41 concern only applicants seeking a permit and not the FWS itself. In this situation, the court found the 2014 permit's emergency-take provision satisfied § 21.41. The District Court's order was affirmed. | Case |