Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WI - Endangered Species - 29.604. Endangered and threatened species protected | W. S. A. 29.604, 29.977, 29.983 | WI ST 29.604, 29.977, 29.983 | This Wisconsin statute embodies the legislative view that certain wild animals and wild plants are endangered or threatened and are entitled to preservation and protection as a matter of general state concern. Violation of the Act with regard to protected animal species may result in a $500-2,000 for a taking, and a $2,000-5,000 fine with 9 months imprisonment for an intentional taking. Both incur the suspension of hunting license privileges. Incidental takings may be allowed through permit if steps are taken to establish and file a "conservation plan." | Statute |
| Hoaward Stein, Susan Stein, Steven Glasser, Gail Glasser, Joel Hodes, Netiva Caftori, Eric Cooper, Norman Cooper v. Dr. Todd Pri | This Illinois action brings forth the claims of four sets of plaintiffs for various claims against defendant-veterinarian. While the specific facts concerning the alleged wrongdoings are not provided, it appears that defendant was a veterinarian who operated a medical center and animal boarding facility. Plaintiffs all raise four counts against defendant (breach of contract, negligence, malpractice, and bailment) for the deaths of their dogs. From each set of facts, the various plaintiffs allege that their dogs were in good health prior to boarding their dogs at defendant’s facility, and each dog subsequently died in its cage. In the negligence and malpractice counts, the plaintiffs note that defendants failed to provide an adequate environment to ensure the dogs’ safety, failed to provide adequate ventilation, failed to sterilize the boarding area after sick animals had been housed there, and then failed to properly preserve the companion animals to ensure accurate necropsies, among other things. All plaintiffs sought both actual damages for the loss of their companions as well as damages related to their “reasonable sentimental value.” | Pleading | ||
| Friesen v. Saskatchewan Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals | 2008 CarswellSask 438 | 2008 SKQB 150 |
An animal protection officer received a complaint that two dogs were not receiving proper care. Officer Barry Thiessen, an animal protection officer employed by the S.S.P.C.A., observed that dogs appeared malnourished and in distress from lack of food and water. Upon returning the next day, Thiessen determined that the conditions were unchanged and the dogs were then seized pursuant to the warrant. The appellant dog owner brought an application for declaration that the officer seized dogs in contravention of an owner's rights under s. 8 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and in excess of officer's authority. In dismissing his application, the court found that the warrant was lawfully obtained pursuant to provisions of the Animal Protection Act, 1999. The officer had a legitimate reason to come to property of the dog owner to investigate after he received a complaint, and it was there that he saw the dogs’ condition in "plain view" according to the court. |
Case |
| People v. Berry | 1 Cal. App. 4th 778 (1991) | 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 416 (1991) |
In a prosecution arising out of the killing of a two-year-old child by a pit bulldog owned by a neighbor of the victim, the owner was convicted of involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b)), keeping a mischievous animal (Pen. Code, § 399), and keeping a fighting dog (Pen. Code, § 597.5, subd. (a)(1)). The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that an instruction that a minor under the age of five years is not required to take precautions, was proper. The court further held that the trial court erred in defining "mischievous" in the jury instruction, however, the erroneous definition was not prejudicial error under any standard of review. The court also held that the scope of defendant's duty owed toward the victim was not defined by Civ. Code, § 3342, the dog-bite statute; nothing in the statute suggests it creates a defense in a criminal action based on the victim's status as a trespasser and on the defendant's negligence. |
Case |
| Jakubaitis v. Fischer | 33 Cal. App. 4th 1601 (1995) | 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39 (1995) | This case, as an issue of first impression, considers whether Civil Code section 3051 or 30801 governs a dispute involving a veterinary lien for services rendered to a horse. In 1994, Frank and Tara Jakubaitis took their blood-bay horse to Chino Valley Equine Hospital for emergency medical care. Theodore Fischer is the veterinarian that treated the horse, who was hospitalized from February of 1994 to early March of 1994. A letter was sent to the Jukabaitises stating that they had an outstanding balance due of $9,751 and that the horse would not be released until the balance was paid. The letter also informed them that if no payment was made within 10 days, the horse would be sold. The Jukabaitises did not pay for the veterinary services within 10 days, however, the veterinary hospital’s attempts to sell the horse were unsuccessful and the horse remained in the possession of Fischer. The Jakubaitises then sued the hospital, seeking injunctive relief and alleging conversion, claim, and delivery and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court had ordered Fisher to return the horse to the Jakubaitises upon them posting a $500 bond. Fischer then brought this appeal. The case came down to the interpretation of various sections of California law. The trial court impliedly found section 3080 of the California Code to be controlling and sections 3051 and 3052 to be inapt. Section 3051 recognizes veterinary proprietors’ and veterinary surgeons’ lien rights for compensation in caring for, boarding, feeding, and medically treating animals. Section 3052 permits the lienholder, after giving notice to the debtor, to sell the animal at public auction. Section 3080 and 3080.01 govern liens applying to livestock servicers. Essentially, a veterinarian’s services could fall under either of the sections because the term “livestock service” in section 3080 included the term “veterinary services.” Eventually the legislature revised the definition of livestock services in section 3080 and deleted the reference to veterinary services. The Court concluded that the legislature’s intent was clear. Section 3051 continues to govern veterinarian proprietors’ and veterinary surgeons’ lien rights. Section 3080 governs all other livestock service providers. The Court ultimately reversed the trial court’s decision, ordered the horse to be returned to Fischer, the veterinarian, and discharged the bond that was to be paid by the Jakubaitises. | Case |
| Berardelli v. Allied Services Institute of Rehabilitation Medicine | 900 F.3d 104 (3d Cir., 2018) | 2018 WL 3849363 (3d Cir. Aug. 14, 2018) | This case presents an issue of first impression in the Court of Appeals: whether regulations on service animals, which technically apply only to reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), require that individuals with disabilities be allowed to be accompanied by their service animals under the Rehabilitation Act (RA). The facts involve an elementary student with dyslexia and epilepsy who sought to be accompanied by her service dog to school. The dog was trained to respond to her epileptic seizures and was recommended by her pediatric neurologist. The student was attending a new school after having attended a different school with her service animal who recently died. After receiving a new service animal (after being placed on a waiting list), the principal of the new school refused access for the service animal, asserting for the first time that the dog was "too much of a distraction." As a consequence of the denial, the student missed school when her seizures were too severe. After more than a year of disrupted attendance, the student's mother sought to have the seizure alert dog accompany the child to fifth grade, and the principal said he would "look into" it. Frustrated with the equivocation, the mother attempted to bring the service animal with the child and the principal prevented entrance, now saying another child had an allergy to dogs. Eventually, the dog was allowed to accompany the child with a "therapeutic shirt designed to decrease allergens," but the shirt interfered with the service animal's performance of disability-related tasks. In the end, the mother withdrew the child from this particular school. The child's parent subsequently sued the school, arguing that the school had failed to accommodate the child under Section 504 of the RA. The school moved for summary judgment on all claims. Important to the claim of discrimination under the RA, the District Court instructed the jury that on a claim for failure to accommodate, the plaintiff needed to prove that that the requested accommodations were reasonable and necessary to avoid discrimination based on disability. The jury was confused at the instructions and the child's attorney urged the court to instruct the jury on ADA service animal regulations. The Court refused saying it had “g[iven] them the law that relates to this case” and would not “go look for some new law to tell them about or some different law or something that’s not been already submitted or given to them.” The jury subsequently returned a verdict for the school. On appeal here, appellants argue that, because the subjective standards for liability under the RA and ADA are the same, the service animal regulations of the ADA should apply to the RA. The Court of Appeals first examined the history and relationship of the ADA and its precursor, the RA. Based on the overarching goal of both laws - to ensure equal opportunity and inclusion - the requirements of reasonable accommodations and reasonable modifications are inextricably intertwined. Regardless of the differing entities the statutes cover, they both impose the same liability standard based on this concept of "reasonableness." The Court also found this echoed in case law dealing with a failure to accommodate under both laws. As to the service animal regulations under the ADA, the Court held that, logically, the service animal regulations are relevant to the RA even though they technically interpret the ADA. This is supported by agency guidance in other contexts from HUD, the Dept. of Justice, and the Dept. of Labor. The Court found the school's counter arguments unpersuasive especially considering the legal principle that an anti-discrimination statute like the RA must be interpreted broadly to carry out its broad remedial purpose. In essence, the Court now holds that a covered actor must accommodate the use of a service animal by an individual with a disability under the RA just as it must do under the ADA. While the "reasonableness" of that accommodation will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, the request to be accompanied by a service animal is per se reasonable. Applying that holding to these facts, the Court found that the District Court did not correctly instruct the jury on the relevant law. The error was not harmless, and, despite the school's claim, there was not a high probability that the jury would have ruled in its favor if properly instructed. The judgment was vacated on the RA claim, reversed on the dismissal of the state discrimination claim, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. | Case |
| VA - Hunting - § 29.1-521. Unlawful to hunt, trap, possess, sell or transport wild birds and wild animals except as permitted; e | Va. Code Ann. § 29.1-521 | VA ST § 29.1-521 | This statute makes it a Class 3 misdemeanor to take listed wild animals. In 2014, Virginia prohibited hunting or killing any deer or bear with a gun, firearm, or other weapon with the aid or assistance of dogs on Sundays. This statute also provides a procedural mechanism for registered Virginia Native Americans to obtain wild animal parts (i.e., eagle feathers) for ceremonial religious use. | Statute |
| KS - Spring Hill - Breed - 2-402. PROHIBITED ANIMALS - GENERALLY (Pit Bull Ordinance) | SPRING HILL, KS., CITY CODE §§ 2-401 - 2-404 (2008) |
Spring Hill, Kansas, considers pit bull dogs to be inherently dangerous and makes it unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess any pit bull dog. Any dog in violation may be immediately seized and impounded. even killed if necessary. A violation may result in a $500 - $2,000 fine and imprisonment for up to 179 days. The dog will also have to be removed from the city.
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Local Ordinance | |
| Williams v. McMahan | 2002 WL 242538 (Wa. 2002) | 110 Wash.App. 1031 (2002) |
The plaintiff sued for damages as a result of the wrongful spaying of her purebred dog, which she intended to breed. The court found that damages should be measured by the fair market value of the dog. |
Case |
| In the Matter of: Richard O'Barry | 1999 NOAA LEXIS 1 | 1999 NOAA LEXIS 1 |
In 1999, civil penalties in the amount of $59,500 were assessed for the release of two dolphins from captivity. The dolphins were not prepared to survive in the wild and sustained life-threatening injuries as a result of their release. An administrative law judge found that the release of two dolphins without providing them with the necessary skills for survival resulted in harassment and injury to them, and therefore, constituted a violation of the MMPA. |
Case |