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Title Citation Alternate Citation Agency Citation Summary Type
Honeycutt v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 890 So.2d 756 (2nd Cir. 2004)

A driver hit a cow standing in the road and the driver brought suit against the cow's owner and the owner's insurance agency.  The trial court held in favor of the driver and the Court of Appeals affirmed based upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor.

Case
VA - Ordinances - § 3.2-6537. Ordinances; penalties (pet shops) Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6537 VA ST § 3.2-6537 This Virginia statute provides that the governing body of any county, city or town may, by local ordinance, require a person operating a pet shop or operating as a dealer in companion animals to obtain a permit. It further outlines the specific requirements the ordinance may provide, including record-keeping and penalties. Statute
OH - Cruelty - Chapter 1717. Humane Societies. County Humane Societies R.C. § 1717.01 - 1717.18 OH ST § 1717.01 - 1717.18 This chapter relates to the formation and powers of humane societies in Ohio. Under the chapter, a county humane society organized under section 1717.05 of the Revised Code may appoint agents, who are residents of the county or municipal corporation for which the appointment is made, for the purpose of prosecuting any person guilty of an act of cruelty to persons or animals. Such agents may arrest any person found violating this chapter or any other law for protecting persons or animals or preventing acts of cruelty. Statute
MN - Minneapolis - Title 4: Animals and Fowl (Chapter 76 - Stables) and Title 13 - LICENSES AND BUSINESS REGULATIONS (CHAPTER 303. HORSE AND CARRIAGE LIVERY SERVICES) Minneapolis, Minnesota Code of Ordinances §§76.10 - 76.90, 303.10-303.160

In these Minneapolis, Minnesota ordinances, a stable or assembly/transfer facility is used exclusively for the purposes of keeping horses used in a licensed horse and carriage livery service. Any horse kept in a stable or an assembly/transfer facility must be registered with the Department of Licenses and Consumer Services and must meet the standards of a veterinary examination and certification. Requirements for the construction and operations of a stable or assembly/transfer facility are also provided, as are the provisions for the operations of a horse and carriage livery service.

Local Ordinance
United States v. Bengis 2006 WL 3735654 (S.D. N.Y. 2006)

Defendants were caught illegally over-fishing off the coast of South Africa and selling the fish in the United States, in violation of the Lacey Act. The United States Government could not seek compensation for South Africa under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act because the fish were not property belonging to South Africa. However, the United States Government may be able to seek restitution for the South African Government under the discretionary Victim and Witness Protection Act.  Opinion Vacated and Remanded by: U.S. v. Bengis, 631 F.3d 33 (2nd Cir., 2011).

Case
US - Whales - Whaling Provisions; Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Quotas FR Doc. 05-2001 Docket No. 050114009-5009-01; I.D. 011105B

NMFS announces the aboriginal subsistence whaling quota for bowhead whales, and other limitations deriving from regulations adopted at the 2002 Special Meeting of the International Whaling Commission (IWC). For 2005, the quota is 75 bowhead whales struck. This quota and other limitations will govern the harvest of bowhead whales by members of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC).

Administrative
Jones v. State 473 So. 2d 1197 (Ala. App. 1985)

Defendant was convicted of unlawfully owning, possessing, keeping or training a dog or dogs with intent that such dog or dogs be engaged in an exhibition of fighting with another dog, and he appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that: (1) dogfighting statute was not unconstitutionally vague; (2) testimony of animal cruelty investigator was sufficient for jury to conclude that defendant owned dogs after effective date of antidog-fighting statute; (3) evidence as to poor conditions of dogs and their vicious propensities exhibited while lodged at animal shelter was relevant to issue of defendant's intent to fight the dogs; and (4) evidence gained by police officer pursuant to search warrant was not inadmissible.

Case
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds 297 F.Supp.3d 901 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 27, 2018) 2018 WL 1151000 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 27, 2018) In 2012, Iowa passed a statute (Iowa code § 717A.3A) that criminalized gaining access to agricultural facilities under false pretenses and making a false representation on a job application for those facilities. Plaintiffs in this case (animal rights groups including the Animal Legal Defense Fund and PETA) brought suit alleging that the statute was unconstitutional and sought to enjoin the Defendants (governor of Iowa) from enforcing it. Their complaint alleged that the statute violates the First Amendment as discrimination on the basis of content, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by targeting animals rights groups, and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by burdening the freedom of speech. This case decides the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ complaint based on lack of standing and failure to state a claim because the outlawed conduct is not protected by the First Amendment as false statements and is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of protecting private property, thereby not violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The court denies Defendants' motion with respect to the First Amendment, concluding that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the intent to suppress their message because of their viewpoint. However, the court grants the motion to dismiss for the claim of a Fourteenth Amendment violation because the statute in fact serves a legitimate government purpose in protecting private property. Case
Horen v. Commonwealth 479 S.E. 2d 553 (Va. 1997)

Native American medicine woman and her husband convicted of illegally possessing wild bird feathers in violation of Virginia statute.  The Virginia Court of Appeals held that the statute violates RFRA because it does not provide a scheme to possess feathers for religious purposes, as it does for other purposes.  Thus, the statute was not religiously neutral because it discriminated based on content and the state did not employ the least restrictive means in advancing its compelling interest.  For further discussion on the federal Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act .

Case
Banks v. Adair 251 S.E.2d 88 (Ga.App., 1978) 148 Ga.App. 254 (Ga.App., 1978)
In this Georgia dog bite case, plaintiffs appealed a directed verdict for the defendant. The Court of Appeals held that the verdict was properly directed for defendant where there was no evidence that established the defendant's knowledge of his dog's propensity to bite or injure humans.
Case

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