Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WI - Importation - Wildlife, Chapter 10. Animal Diseases and Movement. | Wis. Adm. Code s ATCP 10.01 - 10.09; 10.80 - 10.85 | WI ADC s ATCP 10.01 - 10.09; 10.80 - 10.87 | In this set of Wisconsin regulations, "wild animal" does not include a domestic animal identified in s. ATCP 10.02 (livestock, poultry, and other domestic animals). The majority of the regulations here concern disease detection, inoculation, and prevention in domestic herds. However, a person who imports an animal must comply with importing requirements including obtaining a permit under ATCP 10.07. Importation of specific species (dog, cats, exotic ruminants, camelids, elephants, etc.) are covered in 10.80 - 10.86. | Administrative | |
| Kennedy House, Inc. v. Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations | 143 A.3d 476 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 11, 2016) | 2016 WL 3667992 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 11, 2016) |
In this case, Kennedy House appealed the lower court’s decision in finding that it had violated Section 9–1108 of the Philadelphia Fair Practice Ordinance when it denied Jan Rubin’s request for a housing accommodation in the form of a waiver of its no-dog policy. Rubin applied for a housing accommodation at Kennedy House because she suffered from multiple physical aliments. In a meeting with Kennedy House, Rubin did state that her dog was not a trained service animal that helped with her physical and mobility issues but rather helped with reminding her to take medication and getting out of bed. The lower court determined that Rubin had satisfied her burden of proving that her dog was necessary in helping with her medical issues. After reviewing the lower court’s decision, the Commonwealth Court held that the lower court had erred in its decisions. Ultimately, the court found that because Ms. Rubin's physician described a disability related to her mobility, and there was no evidence establishing a nexus between her mobility-related needs and the requested assistance animal, Ms. Rubin did not meet her burden necessary for Kennedy House to waive its no-dog policy. As a result, the court reversed the lower court’s decision. |
Case | |
| Larry Ciaccio, Appellant v. City of Port St. Lucie Animal Control Department, Appellee |
The following documents concern the appellant's request to release his dog from the Port St. Lucie, Florida Humane Society. At the time of the petition, the dog was kept in a "quarantine" area of the shelter and had not been let out of his cage for exercise or socialization since he was seized 8 months prior. Appellant asks the court to either let him securely confine the dog at his home or board him at the Safe Harbor Animal Sanctuary until the dangerous dog determination is resolved. |
Pleading | |||
| SENTELL v. NEW ORLEANS & C. R. CO. | 166 U.S. 698 (1897) | 17 S.Ct. 693, 41 L.Ed. 1169 (1897) |
This was an action originally instituted by Sentell in the civil district court for the parish of Orleans, to recover the value of a Newffoundland bitch, known as 'Countess Lona,' alleged to have been negligently killed by the railroad company. The company answered, denying the allegation of negligence, and set up as a separate defense that plaintiff had not complied either with the requirements of the state law, or of the city ordinances, with respect to the keeping of dogs, and was therefore not entitled to recover. Recognizing that an owner has only a conditional interest in a dog as a form of property, the Supreme Court held that the Louisiana law was within its police power, and the judgment of the court of appeals against plaintiff was therefore affirmed. |
Case | |
| ME - Horsemeat - § 2163. Sale of horsemeat | 22 M.R.S.A. § 2163 | ME ST T. 22 § 2163 | This Maine statute provides that a person, firm, corporation or officer, agent or employee thereof within the State may not transport, receive for transportation, sell or offer for sale or distribution any equine meat or food products thereof or serve, expose or offer for sale or distribution, either in any public place or elsewhere, any equine meat or products containing equine meat. | Statute | |
| MN - Declaw - 504B.114. Pet declawing and devocalization prohibited | M.S.A. § 504B.114 | MN ST § 504B.114 | This Maine law, effective January 1, 2024, prohibits a landlord who allows an animal from: (1) advertising the availability of a real property for occupancy in a manner designed to discourage application for occupancy of that real property because an applicant's animal has not been declawed or devocalized; (2) refusing to allow the occupancy of a real property, refusing to negotiate the occupancy of a real property, or otherwise making unavailable or deny to another person the occupancy of a real property because of that person's refusal to declaw or devocalize an animal; or (3) requiring a tenant or occupant of real property to declaw or devocalize an animal allowed on the premises. | Statute | |
| State v. Nix | 283 P.3d 442 (Or.App., 2012) | 2012 WL 3105223 (Or.App., 2012); 251 Or.App. 449 (2012) |
Upon receiving a tip that animals were being neglected, police entered a farm and discovered several emaciated animals, as well as many rotting animal carcasses. After a jury found the defendant guilty of 20 counts of second degree animal neglect, the district court, at the sentencing hearing, only issued a single conviction towards the defendant. The state appealed and argued the court should have imposed 20 separate convictions based on its interpretation of the word "victims" in ORS 161.067(2). The appeals court agreed. The case was remanded for entry of separate convictions on each guilty verdict.
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Case | |
| Hogan v. Hogan | 199 So. 3d 50 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) | 2015 WL 7889623 (Ala. Civ. App. Dec. 4, 2015) | This case is an appeal of a judgment granting an Alabama divorce. With regard to animal law, the husband argues on appeal that the trial court erred in awarding the wife the couple's two dogs. Specifically, the husband argues that one of the dogs was given to him as a gift and is therefore his separate property. He also suggests that because the dogs lived with him since his wife moved out of the marital property (from 11/2012 until 02/2015), he is the "proper owner" of the dogs. While this court noted that evidence concerning ownership was disputed at trial, the evidence is undisputed that the wife entered the marriage with one of the dogs. The second dog was given to both parties by the wife's niece. In examining Alabama law, the court observed that it has long been held that dogs are property. Thus, evidence of ownership can come from documentary title (like a dog license or registration) or possession. Here, the court was persuaded by the testimony that when the wife moved out, she moved into an apartment and was unable to take the dogs with her. No evidence was presented that the wife's circumstances changed to allow her to keep the dogs, and there was no showing that the wife sought court intervention to regain possession of the dogs. Thus, the court stated the following: "Based on the presumption stated in Placey, supra, that the ownership of a pet is presumed to be in the person who possesses it, and given the wife's failure to present evidence indicating that she was in a position to take the dogs, we conclude that the evidence does not support the trial court's decision to award the dogs to the wife. Accordingly, that portion of the judgment awarding the dogs to the wife is reversed." | Case | |
| KS - Prairie Village - Breed - 2-105 PIT BULL DOG KEEPING PROHIBITED | PRAIRIE VILLAGE, KS., CITY CODE § 2-105 | In Prairie Village, Kansas, it is unlawful to own, harbor, shelter, keep, control, manage, or possess within the corporate limits of the City, any pit bull dog. This includes the Staffordshire Bull Terrier breed of dog, the American Pit Bull Terrier breed of dog, the American Staffordshire Terrier breed of dog, or any dog having the appearance and characteristics of being predominately of the breeds of Staffordshire pit bull terrier, American pit bull terrier, American Staffordshire bull terrier; or a combination of any of these breeds. | Local Ordinance | ||
| IN - Humane Slaughter - Chapter 5. Meat and Poultry Inspection; Humane Slaughter Act | I.C. 15-17-5-1 to 31 | IN ST 15-17-5-1 to 31 | This Indiana statutory section comprises both the state's meat processing laws and humane slaughter provisions. The state board responsible for carrying out this Act are empowered to adopt rules governing humane methods to make livestock or poultry insensible to pain before incision of an instrument for severance of the carotid arteries. The rules must conform as far as applicable to the regulations promulgated under the Federal Humane Slaughter Act. Most of the laws in this section pertain to inspection of commercial livestock facilities and the labeling of postmortem and antemortem animals. However, violation of the humane slaughter provisions appear to result in a Class B misdemeanor where there has been a "reckless violation." | Statute |