Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GREEN v. LECKINGTON | 236 P.2d 335 (Or. 1951) | 192 Or. 601 (Or. 1951) |
In this Oregon case, defendant appeals a judgment of $700 in damages obtained against him after he shot plaintiff’s dog. The dog had gone onto to defendant’s property and was chasing his chickens. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that because it was a general verdict, there was no way to determine a basis for the jury’s verdict; specifically, whether erroneous instructions on exemplary damages and the proper measure of damages influenced the verdict. Because the Court had the whole record before it (and in the interest of “harmony between neighbors”), the Court fixed the damages at the true market value of the dog ($250). |
Case |
| Hatfield v. Bd. of Supervisors of Madison Cty. | 235 So.3d 18 (Miss. Aug. 10, 2017) | 2017 WL 3452426 (Miss. Aug. 10, 2017) | This Mississippi Supreme Court decision considers the construction of a zoning ordinance that prohibits the "keeping or raising poultry" in the "R-1 Residential District" of Madison County. The property owner, Hatfield, was found to be violating R-1 by the Madison County Board of Supervisors after county officials found around 60 "ducks, geese and other fowl" on this property. Hatfield appealed this decision to the Circuit Court as arbitrary and capricious based on an unconstitutionally vague ordinance section. The Circuit Court, as the reviewing appellate body for the ordinance violation, found the Board's decision was supported by evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. On appeal by Hatfield, the Supreme Court first observed that there are two districts in appellant's subdivision: Agricultural and Residential. In the Agricultural Districts, breeding, raising, and feeding fowl is an expressly permitted use. Appellant lives the zoned Residential Estate District. While the R-1 zoning allows "livestock" and "grazing livestock" on tracts of land one acre or greater, it does not allow the breeding, raising, and feeding chickens, ducks, or other fowl as a permitted use. Hatfield suggested that grazing/livestock section (Section 601) could be interpreted to include poultry, fowl, and/or birds. However, the Supreme Court found that position unreasonable since the examples listed in the code section are "obviously limited to large, four-legged, hoofed animals." This is further supported by the fact raising fowl is expressly permitted in one district, but not the other. Thus, the Ordinance was sufficiently clear and not manifestly unreasonable. The circuit court's decision was affirmed. | Case |
| UT - Endangered Species - Chapter 20. Enforcement--Violations and Penalties | U.C.A. 1953 § 23A-5-309 - 314 | UT ST § 23A-5-309 - 314 | This Utah statute criminalizes the intentional or reckless abandonment of a carcass or killing of wildlife for pecuniary gain. The statute lists the restitution value of species protected under the code (bald eagles $1,000 and golden eagles $500). Further, the statute proscribes mandatory incarceration for felony convictions (aggregate value of species taken over $500) where the motive of the individual was pecuniary gain. | Statute |
| NY - Eagles - Chapter 43-B. Of the Consolidated Laws. | N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11-0537 | NY ENVIR CONSER § 11-0537 | New York makes it illegal to "knowingly or with wanton disregard for the consequences" take, transport, possess, or engage in commerce of bald eagles or their parts without a valid permit. This incorporates the exact language of the federal act. | Statute |
| Moody v. State | 253 Ga. 456 (1984) | 253 Ga. 456 (1984) |
Fifty-nine defendants appealed a judgment, which overruled a motion quash an indictment charging defendants with violating the dogfighting statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-12-37 . The court ruled the statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad, and that it required knowing and consensual involvement in dogfighting, therefore intent. The court further ruled that the law prohibited participation by gambling on the act, and the statute did not infringe on constitutionally protected conduct. |
Case |
| United States v. Bengis | 2006 WL 3735654 (S.D. N.Y. 2006) |
Defendants were caught illegally over-fishing off the coast of South Africa and selling the fish in the United States, in violation of the Lacey Act. The United States Government could not seek compensation for South Africa under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act because the fish were not property belonging to South Africa. However, the United States Government may be able to seek restitution for the South African Government under the discretionary Victim and Witness Protection Act. Opinion Vacated and Remanded by: U.S. v. Bengis, 631 F.3d 33 (2nd Cir., 2011). |
Case | |
| State v. Overholt | 193 P.3d 1100 (Wash. App. Div. 3,2008) |
Defendant was convicted of several counts of second degree unlawful hunting of big game after a game agent (“agent”) followed vehicle tracks to Defendant’s home upon finding fresh cow elk gut piles, and Defendant showed the agent two cow elk carcasses hanging in Defendant’s shed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3 found that because the agent was in fresh pursuit of criminal activity and did not enter Defendant’s property with the intent to obtain consent to search in order to evade a search warrant, the agent was not obligated to issue Ferrier warnings, and that suppressing the seized carcasses from evidence would not have altered the outcome of the case in light of the substantial evidence obtained prior to seizing the carcasses. |
Case | |
| RSPCA v. McCormick | [2016] EWHC 928 (Admin) | It was held that for an animal fight to have taken place, contrary to Section 8 of the Animal Welfare Act, the following must have occurred: a "protected animal" must have been placed with another animal in an environment where the ability of both to escape is restricted and controlled by some person or persons connected with that activity or by some artificial restraint. ‘Placed with’ is to be construed as a ‘matter of normal language.’ | Case | |
| RI - Spay/Neuter - Chapter 19. Animal Care. § 4-19-18. Penalties for violations | Gen.Laws 1956, § 4-19-18 | RI ST § 4-19-18 | This Rhode Island statute provides that violations of Sec. 4-19-16, relating to the mandatory spay/neuter agreement from a licensed releasing agency. Violations of the written agreement executed pursuant to § 4-19-16 by an adopting party are punishable by a fine of fifty dollars ($50.00) for the first offense, one hundred fifty dollars ($150) for the second offense and four hundred dollars ($400) for the third and subsequent offenses. Second and subsequent offenses may constitute grounds for seizure and forfeiture of the dog or cat. | Statute |
| NC - Exotic pets - Chapter 153A. Counties. | N.C.G.S.A. § 153A-131; N.C.G.S.A. § 160A-187 | NC ST § 153A-131; NC ST § 160A-187 | These two North Carolina statutes provide that a city or county may by ordinance regulate, restrict, or prohibit the possession or harboring of animals which are dangerous to persons or property. | Statute |