Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Friends of Animals v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. | 879 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2018) | 85 ERC 2227, 18 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 411, 2018 Daily Journal D.A.R. 359, 2018 WL 343754 (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 2018) | Friends of Animals, a non-profit animal advocacy organization, sued the United States Fish and Wildlife Service when the Service began issuing permits that allowed the scientific taking of barred owls, both lethally and non-lethally, for the purpose of preserving the habitat of the northern spotted owl, a threatened species. The two species compete with each other in the same territory within Oregon and Northern California. Friends of Animals alleges that these permits are a violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), which limits the removal of birds from their habitat only for scientific purposes. The theory set forth by the plaintiff is referred to as the ‘same-species theory,’ meaning that the removal of a bird must be for the scientific purposes pertaining to the very species that was taken. This theory is based on language found in the Mexico Convention which is referenced in the MBTA. The lower court granted FWS' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that the plain text of the MBTA and Mexico Convention do not demand the same-species theory in the removal of a bird. Specifically, the court concluded that the “used for scientific purposes” exception in Article II(A) of the Mexico Convention includes taking birds to study whether their absence benefits another protected bird species. | Case | |
| Jurewicz v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture | 891 F.Supp.2d 147 (D.D.C, 2012) | 2012 WL 4130515 (D.D.C, 2012) |
Using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the United States Humane Society requested that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) disclose a certain Animal Welfare Act form. Arguing that two FOIA exemptions prevented the USDA from releasing certain information on this form (the number of dogs that they buy and sell each year and their annual revenue from dog sales), three Missouri dog breeders and dealers sought to prevent this information’s disclosure. After finding that the public interests in disclosing the information outweighed the privacy concerns for the breeders, the district court granted the USDA's and the U.S. Humane Society's motion for summary judgment.
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| Defenders of Wildlife v. Tuggle | 607 F.Supp.2d 1095 (D.Ariz.,2009) | 2009 WL 942833 (D.Ariz.) |
In this case, the Plaintiffs, WildEarth Guardians and the Rewilding Institute (Guardians) and the Defenders of Wildlife (Defenders) challenged procedures for wolf control actions as part of the Mexican wolf reintroduction project within the Blue Range Recovery Area (BRWRA) by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Plaintiffs claims centered on NEPA and ESA violations based on USFWS' adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding in 2003(MOU) and issuance of Standard Operating Procedure 13 (SOP). USFWS filed motions to dismiss these claims for lack of jurisdiction because they argued that neither the MOU nor SOP 13 was a final agency action. Here, the rights and responsibilities of the interested parties were spelled out in the 2003 MOU and SOP 13, similar to if USFWS had issued an interpretive rule covering wolf control measures. Thus, the Court found that the 2003 MOU and SOP 13 "mark the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process in respect to wolf control measures." The Court also found that the plaintiffs presented duplicate claims under the ESA and APA. USFWS's motion to dismiss was also denied as were the duplicative claims. |
Case | |
| State v. Pierce | State v. Pierce, 7 Ala. 728 (1845) |
The Defendant was charge with cruelty to animals for the killing of a certain spotted bull, belonging some person to the jurors unknow. The lower court found the Defendant guilty. The Defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court seeking review of whether the defense of provocation could be used. The Court determined the answer to be yes. Thus the Court reversed and remanded the case. |
Case | ||
| SD - Trap - 41-8-28. Trap robbing or injury as misdemeanor | S D C L § 41-8-28 | SD ST § 41-8-28 | This South Dakota law provides that any person who steals, damages or destroys a trap of another, or who steals, damages, or destroys animals, animal carcasses, or the pelts thereof, held fast by such traps, is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| U.S. v. Todd | 735 F.2d 146 (C.A. Tex. 1984) |
Larry Todd and James Short appeal their convictions for conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act which prohibits the sale of wildlife taken or possessed in violation of federal law--here, The Airborne Hunting Act, 16 U.S.C. § 742j-1 (1976). The court held that the judge's failure to give instructions related to the dates of the alleged acts constituting the conspiracy did not raise an ex post facto challenge since the facts allege only two overt acts that occurred prior to the effective date of the Lacey Act amendments; all of the other acts occurred during the effective period of the amendments and most of the evidence focused on events that occurred within the effective date of the amendments. The appellants also contend that the government failed to establish that the game taken had a market value in excess of $350. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support Short's conviction under the substantive violation of the Lacey Act because the government offered no evidence that the value of the dead eagle, deer, or javelina exceeded $350. |
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| Wilhelm v. Flores | 95 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. 2006) | 2006 WL 1566461 (Tex.), 49 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 709 |
In this Texas case, a deceased worker's estate and his four adult children brought a negligence action against the beekeeper and others, after the worker died from anaphylactic shock caused by bee stings. On petition for review, the Supreme Court held that beekeeper did not owe worker, a commercial buyer's employee, any duty to warn him of dangers associated with bee stings or to protect worker from being stung. |
Case | |
| NV - Exotic Animals - Possession, Transportation, Importation, Exportation and Release of Wildlife | NV ADC 503.108 - 140 | NAC 503.108 - 140 | These Nevada regulations concern the restrictions on importation, transportation and possession of certain species. Under 503.110, the importation, transportation or possession of the species of live wildlife or hybrids thereof including, but not limited to, freshwater sharks, piranhas, alligators and caimans, mongooses and meerkats, coyotes, and wild dogs is prohibited. Exemptions include zoos, aquariums, limited duration entertainment or commercial photography, research or scientific use, and a tax-exempt nonprofit organization that exhibits wildlife solely for educational or scientific purposes. Some animals may be possessed, transported, imported and exported without a permit or license issued by the Department such as monkeys and other primates, elephants, all felines, except mountain lions and bobcats, and wolves, among others. | Administrative | |
| In re Tavalario | 901 A.2d 963 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) | 386 N.J. Super. 435, 2006 WL 1735225 (N.J.Super.A.D.) |
This appeal presents a challenge by Anthony Tavalario to the manner in which the State Agricultural Development Committee (SADC) determines whether keeping horses on property constitutes a "commercial" agricultural operation that exempts the property from local zoning and other land use restrictions as the result of the preemptive force of the Right to Farm Act, N.J.S.A. 4:1C-1 to -10.4. The SADC found that Tavalario's use of the land did not qualify for protection under the Act, because he could not demonstrate that, as of July 3, 1998, his operation produced "agricultural or horticultural products worth $2,500 or more annually" as required by the definitional section of the Act. Tavalario contends on appeal that the SADC erred because it failed to consider as income in 1998 uncollected stud fees, the imputed value of a horse sold as a broodmare in 2002 for $8,000 and another horse sold in 2003 for $5,400, and race winnings of an undisclosed amount allegedly awarded at an unspecified time after 1998. The court found no grounds for reversal of the SADC's interpretation of the production requirements of the definition of "commercial farm" found in N.J.S.A. 4:1C-3 or its application to Tavalario's case. |
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| OK - Ecoterrorism - G-1. Farm Animal, Crop, and Research Facilities Protection Act | 2 Okl. St. Ann. § 5-103 to 107 | OK ST T. 2 § 5-103 to 107 | This article is known as the “Oklahoma Farm Animal, Crop, and Research Facilities Protection Act." A person commits an offense if, without the consent of the owner, the person acquires or otherwise exercises control over an animal facility, an animal from an animal facility, or other property from an animal facility with the intent to deprive the owner of such facility, animal, or property and to disrupt or damage the enterprise conducted at the animal facility. Violation is a felony and results in a fine of up to $10,000 and/or 3 years imprisonment. | Statute |