Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PA - Rabies - § 459-301. Quarantines | 3 P.S. § 459-301 | PS ST 3 P.S. § 459-301 | This Pennsylvania statute outlines the procedures and regulations relative to the state rabies quarantine procedure for dogs. It also provides that any police officer or state dog warden may humanely kill any dog running at large in a rabies quarantined area without any liability for damages for such killing. | Statute | |||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 11 Núm 2 |
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Policy | |||||||||
| Rural Export & Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v Hahnheuser | (2009) 177 FCR 398 | [2009] FCA 678 |
The respondent placed ham in food to be fed to sheep prior to live export. This action resulted in delay of live export and constituted a breach of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) without falling under the defence of 'environmental protection'. The second applicant was entitled to damages from the respondent falling under the following heads: purchasing sheep; transport; killing fees; processing fees; freezer storage fees; cost of resale; and travel expenses. The total loss was calculated at $72,873.73. |
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| U.S. v. Dion | 476 U.S. 734 (1986) |
The legislative history surrounding the passage of the BGEPA as well as the plain language of the Act evinces an intent by Congress to abrogate the rights of Indians to take eagles except as otherwise provided by statute. Defendant, a member and resident of the Yankton Sioux Tribe and Reservation, was charged with violations of the BGEPA and ESA after shooting several eagles on the reservation and selling eagle parts. The Court held that any other interpretation would be inconsistent with the need to preserve the species. For further discussion on the abrogation of Indian treaty rights under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
Case | ||||||||
| Chile - Farm animals - Decreto Supremo 240,1993 | Decreto Supremo 240,1993 | General regulation for the transportation of cattle and meat by land, rail, water, and air transportation. | Statute | ||||||||
| Smith v. City of Detroit | Slip Copy, 2017 WL 3279170 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 2, 2017); [Reversed and Remanded by 751 F. App'x 691 (6th Cir. 2018)] | [Reversed and Remanded by Smith v. City of Detroit, Michigan, 751 F. App'x 691 (6th Cir. 2018)] This case stems from the killing of three dogs by Detroit Police Officers in 2016. Plaintiff-dog owners brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based on unlawful seizure their dogs in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In addition, plaintiffs raised Monell municipal liability claims and state laws claims for conversion and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Before this court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. The shooting of the dogs occurred during a drug raid pursuant to a search warrant (the marijuana charges were eventually dismissed due to the failure of police officers to appear at trial). One of the dogs escaped his barricade in the basement and was shot after allegedly charging the officers. The other dog "opened and closed the bathroom door by himself" according to testimony of the officers in their depositions, information that was absent from initial police reports according to the court. The last dog was shot as she began "charging" up the basement stairs while officers were at the top of the stairs. Depositions statements also reveal that none of the officers received any specific training on handling animal encounters during raids and one of the officers indicated he had shot at least 69 animals and another had shot 39. In analyzing the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment interests in their dogs, the court held that because plaintiffs failed to properly license their dogs under Michigan law, they did not have a "legitimate possessory interest protected by the Fourth Amendment." Thus, plaintiffs' claims based on the Fourth Amendment were dismissed. Specifically, the court stated, "in the eyes of the law it is no different than owning any other type of illegal property or contraband." As to the violation of a clearly established constitutional right for the seizure of the dogs under the Fourth Amendment against the police department, the court found the Detroit Police Department's plan did not violate the Fourth Amendment, especially where the informant said there was only a "small dog" present at the residence. The individual officers' actions were also found to be reasonable based on the "imminent threat" of the dogs. As to the Monell claim, plaintiffs failed to establish a pattern of violations showing deliberate indifference that is sufficient to establish municipal liability. Finally, on the IIED claim, the court relied on the fact that there is no precedent in Michigan to permit recovery for damage to property (to wit, a dog). Similarly, plaintiffs' conversion claim also failed where the court found the unlicensed status removed any "legitimate interest" in the dogs. The court subsequently granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. | Case | ||||||||
| UT - Hunting - § 23-20-4.5. Illegal taking, possession, or wanton destruction of protected wildlife | U.C.A. 1953 § 23A-5-312 (formerly cited as U.C.A. 1953 § 23-20-4.5) | UT ST § 23A-5-312 (formerly cited as UT ST § 23-20-4.5) | This statute lists the restitution amounts for the illegal killing of certain species (including bald and golden eagles) of wildlife, with enhanced monetary penalties for "trophy" animals. These funds are used in educational and wildlife enforcement activities by the state. | Statute | |||||||
| NY - Endangered Species - Chapter 43-B. Of the Consolidated Laws. | N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11-0535 | NY ENVIR CONSER § 11-0535 | The New York code for endangered species defines endangered species as any species which meets one of the following criteria: native species in imminent danger of extirpation or extinction in New York; or species listed as endangered by the United States Department of the Interior in the Code of Federal Regulations (50 CFR part 17). | Statute | |||||||
| PETA v. Tri-State Zoological Park | 424 F. Supp. 3d 404 (D. Md. 2019), aff'd, 843 F. App'x 493 (4th Cir. 2021) | PETA brought this action against defendants Tri-State Zoological Park of Western Maryland, Inc., Animal Park, Care & Rescue, Inc., and Robert Candy (collectively, “Tri-State”). Prior to this lawsuit, Tri-State was home to two lemurs, five tigers, and two lions which are all protected under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). More than half of the protected species housed at Tri-State died. PETA alleged violations of the ESA. PETA contended that the animals were subjected to harm and harassment and that Tri-State committed a “take” as defined by the ESA as a result of unsanitary living conditions, poor diets, and inadequate shelter and enrichment. The district court found that PETA had standing to bring suit. The court also found that each of the respective animals had been subjected to a take under the ESA. The court ultimately held that it would enter a separate order declaring that the Defendants violated the ESA by unlawfully taking the remaining big cats and maintaining possession of them. The Court permanently enjoined the Defendants from ever owning or possessing any endangered or threatened species and terminated the Defendants’ ownership and possessory rights to the animals. The Defendants’ motion to stay was denied. | Case | ||||||||
| In re Knippling | 183 P.3d 365 (Wash.App. Div. 3,2008) |
The Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court in Spokane County, Washington of second degree assault and first degree animal cruelty. The Defendant requested that he receive credit against his term of community custody for the extra 24 months' confinement time he served before he was re-sentenced. The Court of Appeals held that the Defendant was entitled to 24 months credit against his term of community custody. |
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