Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Putnam County Humane Society v. Marjorie Duso d/b/a/ Oakwood Kennels, Putnam County Florida |
The Putnam County (Florida) Humane Society brought an action seeking permanent custody of 41 dogs from Marjorie Duso, the operator of a kennel. The PCHS is a not-for-profit corporation that is devoted to the prevention of cruelty to animals pursuant to Florida law. Under that authority, the PCHS seized and took custody of the dogs after an investigation led to the discovery of neglect and mistreatment of the dogs at the kennel. The PCHS seized and took custody of the dogs after an investigation led to the discovery of neglect and mistreatment of the dogs at the kennel. The Putnam County Court granted the PCHS custody of the dogs (except for Ms. Duso’s personal pet dog, which the PCHS was given the right to check on at least once a month). Further, the court enjoined Ms. Duso from owning, possessing, or breeding dogs except those kept as personal pets. |
Pleading | ||
| ID - Lien - § 45-805. Liens for services on or caring for property | I.C. § 45-805 | ID ST § 45-805 | This Idaho law deals with liens livery or boarding or feed stable proprietors and others pasturing livestock who have a lien. If the liens are not paid within sixty days after the work is done, service rendered, or feed or pasturing supplied, the person in whose favor such special lien is created may proceed to sell the property at a licensed public livestock auction market, or if the lien is on equines, to sell the animals at a sale offered to the public, after giving ten days' notice to the owner or owners of the livestock and the state brand inspector. Requirements for proper notice are provided in the law. | Statute |
| People v. Schneider | 2004 WL 2191322 (Ca. App. 3 Dist.) | 2004 WL 2191322 (Ca. App. 3 Dist.) |
Defendant's dogs escaped from Defendant's yard and attacked and killed a six-year-old boy. The trial court convicted Defendant of owning a mischievous animal that causes death and involuntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's conviction for owning a mischievous animal that causes death due to erroneous jury instructions. |
Case |
| UT - Impound - (Repealed) § 77-24-1.5. Safekeeping by officer pending disposition--Records required | U.C.A. 1953 § 77-24-1.5 (§§ 77-24-1 to 77-24-5. Repealed by Laws 2013, c. 394, § 40, eff. July 1, 2013) | Sections 77-24-1 to 77-24-5. Repealed by Laws 2013, c. 394, § 40, eff. July 1, 2013 (Formerly: this Utah statute, amended in 2011, states that each peace officer shall hold all "property" in safe custody until it is received into evidence or disposed of as provided in this chapter. He or she must also maintain a record that identifies it. Note that the provisions related to specifically to animal impoundment/euthanasia were removed.) | Statute | |
| KS - Roeland Park - Breed - 2-211 Pit Bulls | ROELAND PARK, KS., CITY ORDINANCE § 2-211 | On January 1, 2018, the prohibition on the keeping of more than one pit bull on any property in the City of Roeland Park, Kansas officially expired. Before this 2015 ordinance that made the possession of more than one pit bull unlawful, the city had a complete pit bull ban that prohibited the keeping, harboring, or owning a pit bull dog, including Staffordshire bull terrier, American pit bull terrier, American Staffordshire terrier, or any dog that has the appearance and characteristics of being one of those breeds. Now, unless the city enacts another ordinance related to pit bulls, the ban has ended. | Local Ordinance | |
| State v. Avella | --- So.3d ----, 2019 WL 2552529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 2019) | The Defendant was charged with practicing veterinary medicine without a license and for cruelty to animals. The Defendant made a homemade device attempting to treat his dog for a problem because he did not have the money to take his dog to the vet. The home treatment ended up injuring the dog and he took the dog to a veterinarian for treatment. The veterinarian stated that the dog needed to be taken to an advanced care veterinary facility, however, the Defendant could not do so due to lack of funds. The trial court dismissed the charges brought against the Defendant and the State of Florida appealed. Florida law forbids a person from practicing veterinary medicine without a license. The Defendant was not a veterinarian. The Defendant relied upon statutory exemptions in Florida’s statue that permit a person to care for his or her own animals and claims that he was just trying to help his dog, Thor. The Defendant also argued that the purpose of the statute was to prevent unlicensed veterinary care provided to the public rather than to criminalize the care an owner provides to his or her animals. The Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Count I for unlicensed practice of veterinary medicine given the stated purpose of the statute and the statutory exemptions. As for Count II, animal cruelty, the State argued that the Defendant’s conduct in using a homemade tool to remove bone fragments from the dog’s rectum and then failing to take the dog to an advanced care clinic fits under the Florida animal cruelty statute. Although the Defendant argued that he had no intention of inflicting pain upon his dog and was only trying to help him, the Court agreed with the State’s argument that “the statute does not require a specific intent to cause pain but punishes an intentional act that results in the excessive infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering.” Ultimately the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Count I, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Count II and remanded for further proceedings on the animal cruelty charge. | Case | |
| Saenz v. DOI (vacated by U.S. v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001)) | (no West citation. Docket No. 00-2166) |
(This case was vacated by United States v. Hardman, 260 F.3d 1199(10th Cir. 2001). Appellant was descended from the Chiricahua tribe of Apache Indians, and, although originally recognized as a tribe, it is not presently recognized. The court affirmed the vacating of defendant's conviction for possessing eagle parts, holding that the present test under RFRA with regard to whether a tribe has been formally recognized bears no relationship whatsoever to whether one sincerely practices Indian religions and is substantially burdened when prohibited from possessing eagle parts. For discussion of Eagle Act, see Detailed Discussion . |
Case | |
| WY - Feral animals - Chapter 48. Feral Livestock | W. S. 1977 § 11-48-101 to 102 | WY ST § 11-48-101 to 102 | This Wyoming chapter deals with feral livestock. Under the chapter, "feral" means a domestic animal that is not under the control of nor cared for by a person and which has returned to a wild or semi-wild state. Before livestock can be declared feral, an attempt must be made to locate the owner. If the owner cannot be located, the director of the Wyoming livestock board or state veterinarian can then capture or dispose of any feral livestock damaging public or private property, and destroy any feral livestock thought to be infected with disease. The owner of feral livestock is responsible for costs associated with this chapter for damage or care of the feral livestock. | Statute |
| SC - Impound - § 47-3-540. Destruction of identifiable dog by animal control officer; prior notification of owner | Code 1976 § 47-3-540 | SC ST § 47-3-540 | This South Carolina statute provides that animal control officers must not destroy any positively identifiable dog until they have notified the owner at his or her last known address by registered mail that they have the dog in their possession. The owner then has two weeks to reclaim his or her dog, after which the animal may be destroyed. | Statute |
| Phillips v. San Luis Obispo County Dept. | 228 Cal.Rptr. 101 Cal.App. (2 Dist.,1986) | 183 Cal.App.3d 372 (1986) |
In this case, the owners of dog petitioned for writ of mandamus requesting vacation of destruction order and declaration that ordinances under which the dog was seized were unconstitutional. The Court of Appeal held that due process required that owners have hearing prior to seizure of or destruction of dog (a property interest) and that a "courtesy hearing" did not satisfy due process requirements. Further, the court concluded that the ordinances here were unconstitutional for failing to provide for notice and a hearing either before or after the seizure of an uncontrollable biting or vicious dog. |
Case |