Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PA - Equine - Chapter 13. Equine Activity. | 4 P.S. § 601 - 607 | PA ST 4 P.S. § 601 - 607 | These statutes comprise Pennsylvania's Equine Activity Act, which sent into effect on February 21, 2006. Under the law, liability for negligence shall only be barred where knowing voluntary assumption of risk is proven in a particular case. However, the Act provides immunity only where a sign that states, "You assume the risk of equine activities pursuant to Pennsylvania law," is conspicuously posted on the premises in two or more locations. | Statute |
| Friends of Animals v. Clay | 811 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2016) | 2016 WL 305359 (2d Cir. Jan. 26, 2016) | Friends of Animals (“FOA”) appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees William Clay in his official capacity as a Deputy Administrator in the Department of Agriculture-APHIS and the FWS. FOA challenged FWS's issuance of a “depredation permit” to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey authorizing the emergency “take” of migratory birds that threaten to interfere with aircraft at JFK Airport. FOA argues that FWS's own regulations unambiguously prohibit it from issuing such a permit and that the permit should therefore be set aside as the product of agency action that was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” The District Court granted summary judgment for defendant FWS. On appeal, this court affirmed that ruling. FOA pointed out that the "emergency take" regulation at 50 C.F.R. § 21.41 does not authorize FWS to issue a permit that allows the emergency take of a migratory bird irrespective of its species, but instead requires a "species-specific" inquiry. However, this court disagreed, finding that "§ 21.41 does not place Port Authority officials in the untenable position of having to choose between violating federal law and deliberately ignoring serious threats to human safety." Further, the court found the specific requirements in § 21.41 concern only applicants seeking a permit and not the FWS itself. In this situation, the court found the 2014 permit's emergency-take provision satisfied § 21.41. The District Court's order was affirmed. | Case |
| SuiÁa | impetraram este HABEAS CORPUS REPRESSIVO, em favor da chimpanzÈ "SuiÁa" (nome cientifico anthropopithecus troglodytes), macaca que se encontra enjaulada no Parque Zoobot‚nico Get˙lio Vargas (Jardim ZoolÛgico de Salvador), situado na Av. Ademar de Barros | Case | ||
| Lockett v. Hill | 51 P.3d 5 (Or.App.,2002) | 182 Or.App. 377 (Or.App.,2002) |
In this Oregon case, plaintiff sued defendant after defendant's pit bulls mauled plaintiff's cat to death while they were running loose on plaintiff's property. The trial court found that defendant was negligent and awarded plaintiffs $1,000 in compensatory damages but denied plaintiffs' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of companionship. Plaintiff sought appeal of the trial court's denial of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) and loss of companionship. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the cat owner was not entitled to recover damages for emotional distress. |
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| UT - Impound - Chapter 46. Animal Welfare Act. Part 1. General Provisions | U.C.A. 1953 § 11-46-101 - 104 | UT ST § 11-46-101 - 104 | Under this act, animal control officers must hold stray animals in safe and humane custody for a minimum of 5 business days prior to making any final disposition of the animal. A stray animal may be euthanized prior to the completion of the 5-day period to prevent unnecessary suffering due to serious injury or disease. | Statute |
| NY - Fur - Chapter 20. Of the Consolidated Laws. | McKinney's General Business Law § 399-aaa | NY GEN BUS § 399-aaa | Makes it illegal for any person, firm, partnership or corporation to knowingly import, sell at retail or manufacture clothing with fur which is not properly labeled as containing "faux fur" or "real fur." Defines appropriate labeling by adding the appropriate description to the permanent tag attached to the clothing, a temporary tag to identify the clothing, or by affixing a sticker with the description in a conspicuous place on the clothing. Sets the maximum punishment to not exceed a $500 fine for the first violation and not to exceed $1000 for each subsequent violation. | Statute |
| Puppies 'N Love, v. City of Phoenix | 116 F. Supp. 3d 971 (D. Ariz. 2015) | 2015 WL 4532586 (D. Ariz., 2015) | Defendant City of Phoenix passed an ordinance that prohibited pet stores from selling dogs or cats obtained from persons or companies that bred animals; pet stores could only sell animals obtained from animal shelters or rescue organizations. Puppies 'N Love operated a pet store in Phoenix that sold purebred dogs obtained from out-of-state breeders. Puppies 'N Love and its owners sued the City, claiming primarily that the Ordinance violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution by closing the Phoenix market to out-of-state breeders and giving an economic advantage to local breeders. All parties, including Intervenor Humane Society of the United States (“HSUS”), filed motions for summary judgment. The District Court granted the Intervenor’s and the city’s motions, but denied Puppies ‘N Love’s motion, thereby upholding the ordinance. | Case |
| State v. Smith | 223 P.3d 1262 (Wash.App. Div. 2, 2009) | 2009 WL 5108382 (Wash.App. Div. 2) |
In this Washington case, defendant Smith appealed his conviction for first degree animal cruelty following the death of his llama. Smith claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to (1) discover information before trial that may have explained the llama's death and (2) seek a lesser included instruction on second degree animal cruelty. This court agreed. It found that defense counsel's "all or nothing strategy" was not a legitimate trial tactic and constituted deficient performance where counsel presented evidence to call into question the State's theory on starvation, but not evidence related to the entire crime. The court found that the jury was "left in an arduous position: to either convict Smith of first degree animal cruelty or to let him go free despite evidence of some culpable behavior." The case was reversed and remanded. |
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| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter | 44 F. Supp. 3d 1009 (D. Idaho 2014) | 2014 WL 4388158 (D. Idaho, 2014) | In a ‘hold your tongue and challenge now’ First Amendment challenge to an Idaho statute that criminalizes undercover investigations and videography at “agricultural production facilities,” the Animal Legal Defense Fund, as well as various other organizations and individuals, (collectively, “ALDF”), brought suit. The State defendants, Governor Butch Otter and Attorney General Lawrence Wasden, moved to dismiss the ALDF's claims. The claims against the Governor were dismissed under 11th Amendment immunity because the ALDF failed to explain the requisite connection between the Governor and enforcement of section 18–7024. The court also found that since the ALDF failed to allege a concrete plan to violate subsection (e), it lacked standing to challenge section 18–7042(1)(e) and the claim in regards to that provision was therefore dismissed. However, the ALDF’s First Amendment, bare animus Equal Protection, and preemption claims survived the motion to dismiss. | Case |
| People v. Tohom | 969 N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.,2013) | 109 A.D.3d 253; 2013 WL 3455673 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.); 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 05234 |
This case, as a matter of first impression, considers whether a trial court was authorized to allow a "therapeutic comfort dog" to be present on witness stand for a 15-year-old-girl who was the victim in a predatory sexual assault and child endangerment case. Prosecutors sought to allow a Golden Retriever named Rose to accompany the child on the witness stand while she testified at the defendant’s trial. Prosecutors cited Criminal Procedure Law provisions regarding special witnesses and pointed to Executive Law §642-a, which allows a person supportive of a special witness to be “present and accessible” during testimony by such a witness. On appeal, defendant again argued that the dog would prejudice the jury against the defendant and would convey to the jury that the witness was under stress as a result of testifying and that this stress resulted from telling the truth. In finding that the comfort dog did not violate defendant's right to a fair trial, the appellate court agreed that the trial court's interpretation of Executive Law § 642-a "special witness" provision was correct. Further, the defendant failed to show that the dog Rose's presence was inherently prejudicial. |
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