Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| People v. Cumper | 268 N.W.2d 696 (Mich. 1978) | 83 Mich. App. 490 (Mich. 1978) |
Defendant was convicted under MCL 750.49 for being a spectator at a dog fight. He argued on appeal that the statute was impermissibly vague and unconstitutionally overbroad, for punishing an individual for mere presence at a dog fight. The court disagreed, finding that the statute was neither vague nor overbroad because it did not punish the mere witnessing of a dog fight, but attendance as a spectator to a legally prohibited dog fight. For more, see Detailed Discussion . |
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| TX - Service animals - § 434.029. Service Dog Pilot Program for Certain Veterans | V.T.C.A., Government Code § 434.029 | TX GOVT § 434.029 | The commission by rule shall establish a pilot program for veterans to assist in mitigating the symptoms of military service-related post-traumatic stress disorder, traumatic brain injury, or military sexual trauma through the provision of a service dog. | Statute | ||||||||
| In re: JUDIE HANSEN | 57 Agric. Dec. 1072 (1998) | 1998 WL 872492 (U.S.D.A.) | Recommendations of administrative officials charged with responsibility for achieving congressional purpose of statute are highly relevant to any sanction to be imposed and are entitled to great weight in view of experience gained by administrative officials during their day-to-day supervision of regulated industry; however, recommendation of administrative officials as to sanction is not controlling, and in appropriate circumstances, sanction imposed may be considerably less, or different, than that recommended by administrative officials. | Case | ||||||||
| Friends of Animals v. Ashe | 808 F.3d 900 (D.C. Cir. 2015) | 2015 WL 9286948 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2015) | Friends of Animals, a non-profit animal advocacy organization, filed suit against the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service ("the Service") in 2013, after the Service issued no initial or final determinations for 39 species of sturgeon the organization petitioned as endangered or threatened. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires that the Service must make a determination within 90 days for an initial determination or 12 months for a final determination after a petition is received from an interested party. However, there is also a provision in the ESA that the plaintiff must give the Service 60-days notice before filing suit. The District Court held that Friends of Animals did not give the Service adequate notice before filing suit and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, this court agreed, finding that Friends of Animals "did not wait until after the issuance of the positive initial determinations to provide 60 days' notice of the allegedly overdue final determinations." In dicta, the Court noted that "[t]he Service's approach may not be the most efficient," but the deadlines are mandatory in the statutes. Thus, its suit to compel the final determination on the listings was barred and the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. | Case | ||||||||
| IN - Dog - Consolidated Dog Laws | I.C. 15-17-6-1 - 14; 25-38.1-4-8 ; 15-20-2-1 - 7; 15-17-21-1; 6-9-39-1 - 9; 35-46-3-15; 15-20-3-1 - 4; 14-22-11-1; 14-8-2-89 | IN ST 15-17-6-1 - 14; 25-38.1-4-8 ; 15-20-2-1 - 7; 6-9-39-1 - 9; 35-46-3-15; 15-20-3-1 - 4 ; 14-22-11-1; 14-8-2-89; 15-17-21-1 | These Indiana statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Included are provisions on rabies, liability of owners for dog bites or damage to livestock, and taxation and registration laws, among others. | Statute | ||||||||
| CO - Dangerous Dog- Article 9. Offenses Against Public Peace, Order, and Decency. | C. R. S. A. § 18-9-204.5; C. R. S. A. § 35-42-115 | CO ST § 18-9-204.5; CO ST § 35-42-115 | This Colorado statute defines a "dangerous dog" as one that has inflicted bodily or serious bodily injury upon or has caused the death of a person or domestic animal; or has demonstrated tendencies that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the dog may inflict injury upon or cause the death of any person or domestic animal; or has engaged in or been trained for animal fighting as described by statute. Owners found guilty under the provisions will be subject to misdemeanor penalties if their dogs cause bodily injury or felonies if their dogs cause the death of a person. Section 35-42-115 mandates that the bureau create a a statewide dangerous dog registry consisting of a database of information concerning microchip types and placement by veterinarians and licensed shelters in dangerous dogs. | Statute | ||||||||
| People v. Peters | 79 A.D.3d 1274(N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.,2010) | 911 N.Y.S.2d 719, 2010 WL 4977555 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.,2010) |
A veterinarian was convicted of animal cruelty and sentenced to three years of probation based upon his alleged unjustifiable failure under Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 to provide a mare and her foal with necessary sustenance, food and drink in September 2005. After conviction by jury, the lower court denied defendant-veterinarian's motion to vacate judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division found that while defendant failed to preserve his challenge for sufficiency of the evidence, the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence. In particular, the court found that the expert testimony contradicted the evidence that the foal was mistreated. |
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| Derecho Animal Volume 5 Núm 2 |
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| Pless v. State | 648 S.E.2d 752 (Ga. App. 2007) | 286 Ga.App. 235 (2007) |
In this Georgia case, the defendant was convicted by a jury in the trial court of two counts of failure to keep an animal under restraint and one count of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the defendant's conviction with the exception of that portion of his sentence requiring him to reimburse the county for his court-appointed attorney fees. The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, reversed the appellate court's holding and ruled that the trial court was authorized to impose the reimbursement of attorney fees as part of the sentence. On remand, the appellate court vacated that portion of its opinion that reversed the imposition of attorney fees and adopted the Supreme Court's opinion as its own; all other respects of the appellate decision, Pless v. State, 633 S.E.2d 340 (Ga. App., 2006), remain undisturbed. |
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| VA - Exotic Pets - Chapter 30. Definitions and Miscellaneous | 4 VA ADC 15-30-5 to 60 | 4 VAC 15-30-5 to 60 | The following regulations implement Virginia's exotic pet laws. | Administrative |