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Displaying 141 - 150 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| In re Pajarito American Indian Art, Inc. | 7 B.R. 343 (Bkrtcy.Ariz., 1980) |
A trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding sought turnover of Sioux Indian Ghost Dance Shield containing eagle feathers. The court observed that normally the laws of the UCC would prevail and the merchants to whom the item was entrusted would have legitimate title to transfer, but since the BGEPA prohibits the sale of eagle artifacts, only the original owner had title to the shield, not the bankrupt who allegedly tried to sell the shield nor the potential purchasers. The court held that the underlying public policy outlined in Allard weighed heavily in the decision to invalidate what it termed an illegal contract. For further discussion on commerce in eagle parts under the BGPEA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act . |
Case | ||
| ND - Rabies - 48.1-13-01-01. Importation requirements - Certificate of veterinary inspection | ND ADC 48.1-13-01-01 | N.D. Admin. Code § 48.1-13-01-01 | This North Dakota regulation states that any dog, cat, or ferret over three months of age imported into the state must have a certification of a current rabies vaccination. It also provides other requirements for dog, cat, and ferret importation into the state. | Administrative | |
| Ivory Education Institute v. Department of Fish and Wildlife | 28 Cal. App. 5th 975 (Ct. App. 2018), as modified (Nov. 5, 2018), review denied (Jan. 16, 2019) | 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606 (Ct. App. 2018) | The Legislature passed Assembly Bill 96 which took effect July 1, 2016 as Fish & Game Code section 2022. The bill imposed new restrictions on the sale and importation of ivory and rhinoceros horn. The Ivory Education (the Institute) sued the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (the Department) in order to block implementation of the law. The institute alleged that the statute was unconstitutional on multiple grounds including vagueness, federal preemption, the takings clause, and the commerce clause. The trial court entered judgment for the Department and the intervenor defendants (the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Center for Biological Diversity, the Humane Society of the United States, the International Fund for Animal Welfare, and the Wildlife Conservation Society). The Institute appealed and abandoned all other issues raised and limited its challenge to the void-for-vagueness doctrine. "The Institute contend[ed] that section 2022 [was] unconstitutionally vague for two reasons: 1) while it allows for the sale or import of ivory insofar as it is allowed by federal law, differences in what federal law allows make it nearly impossible to tell what would qualify for the exemption provided by section 2022(c)(c); and 2) there are no guidelines by which to determine the permissible volume of ivory in either musical instruments or antiques." The Court of Appeals stated that a statute is not vague if its meaning can be determined by looking at other sources of information. Those who wish to comply with section 2022 have a duty to locate and examine statutes or whatever else necessary to determine the scope of the exemption provision. "Section 2022 has a single purpose—to prevent the sale or importation of ivory and rhinoceros horn. Both of those terms are defined. The Institute has 'not demonstrated that attempts to give substance and meaning' to the three disputed exceptions 'would be fruitless.'" As for the Institute's second contention, the Court of Appeals stated that because musical instruments and antiques are tangible objects that occupy a verifiable amount of three-dimensional space, the percentage of any such object that has ivory in it can be readily determined. The Court of Appeals held that the statute was not vague. The Court affirmed the holding of the trial court. | Case | |
| Journal of Animal & Natural Resource Law Vol. 10 |
Published by the students of Michigan State University College of LawJournal of Animal & Natural Resource Law Vol. X (2014)The table of contents is provided below. |
Policy | |||
| WA - Health - Chapter 16.36. Animal Health | West's RCWA 16.36.005 - 160 | WA ST 16.36.005 - 160 | These laws set forth the laws for importation and health requirements of certain imported animals. It also allows the director to establish inspection procedures for the transportation of animals. A section provides that it is unlawful for a person to bring an animal into Washington state without first securing a certificate of veterinary inspection, reviewed by the state veterinarian of the state of origin, verifying that the animal meets the Washington state animal health | Statute | |
| U.S. v. Top Sky | 547 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1976) |
Defendant alleged that his treaty-based hunting rights incorporate a right to sell eagles. The court disagreed, finding such an interpretation of those treaty rights contrary to Indian custom and religion. Court also holds that defendant lacks standing to raise a religious challenge to the BGEPA based on the religious rights of others. Court is likewise unpersuaded by defendant's overbreadth claim. For further discussion on the abrogation of Indian treaty rights under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act . |
Case | ||
| Texas Attorney General Letter Opinion 94-071 | Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. LO 94-071 |
Texas Attorney General Opinion regarding the issue of whether staged fights between penned hogs and dogs constitutes a criminal offense. The Assistant Attorney General deemed these staged fights as violating the criminal cruelty laws. |
Case | ||
| NY - Rehabilitators, wildlife - Part 184. Wildlife Rehabilitators. | 6 NY ADC 184.1 - 7 | 6 NYCRR 184.1 - 7 | These New York regulations concern the qualifications for appointment as a state wildlife rehabilitator. Section 184.1 first states that, "The purpose of this Part is to establish a specially trained group of individuals, collectively called wildlife rehabilitators, to provide for the care of injured and debilitated wildlife so that such wildlife may be returned to the wild." Under the chapter, "wildlife rehabilitation" means the practice of providing care for injured or debilitated wildlife, including their capture, housing, feeding, emergency treatment and release to the wild. | Administrative | |
| People v. Brinkley | --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2019 WL 3226728 (N.Y. App. Div. July 18, 2019) | Defendant was convicted of aggravated cruelty to animals. The Defendant appealed the judgment. Defendant and his nephew had purchased a puppy and continually used negative reinforcement, such as paddling or popping the dog on the rear end with an open hand, for unwanted behavior. On one occasion, when the dog was approximately 15 months old, the Defendant’s nephew found that the dog had defecated in the apartment. The nephew attempted to paddle the dog and the dog bit the nephew’s thumb as a result. When the Defendant had returned home, the nephew explained to him what had happened. The Defendant proceeded to remove the dog from his crate, put the dog’s face by the nephew’s injured thumb, and told him he was a bad dog. The dog then bit off a portion of the Defendant’s thumb. The Defendant attempted to herd the dog onto the back porch, but the dog became aggressive and continued to bite him. As a result, the Defendant repeatedly kicked the dog and used a metal hammer to beat the dog into submission. The dog later died due to his injuries. The Defendant argued that he had a justifiable purpose for causing the dog serious physical injury. The Defendant testified that he was in shock from the injury to his thumb and that he was trying to protect himself and his nephew. However, other evidence contradicted the Defendant's testimony. The dog was in a crate when the Defendant got home, and the Defendant could have left him there rather than take the dog out to discipline him. The Defendant was at least partially at fault for creating the situation that led him to react in such a violent manner. The Court reviewed several of the Defendant’s contentions and found them all to be without merit. The judgment was ultimately affirmed. | Case | ||
| AFADA habeas corpus Cecilia | EXPTE. NRO. P-72.254/15 | “Abogados y Funcionarios de defensa Animal” (AFADA) brought a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Cecilia, a 30 year old chimpanzee that lived in the Mendoza Zoo alleging that the chimpanzee had been illegitimately and arbitrarily deprived of her right to ambulatory freedom and right to have a dignified life on the part of authorities of the Zoo of the City of Mendoza, Argentina. The court granted habeas corpus to Cecilia, ruling that Cecilia was a living being with rights and instructing defendants to immediately free her and to relocate her to the Great Ape Project Sanctuary in Brazil. Until this moment, only humans illegally detained had been granted this writ. | Case |