Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kimball v. Betts | 99 Wash. 348 (1918) | 169 P. 849 (1918) |
In an action for conversion of household goods kept for use and not for sale, it is not necessary to prove that such goods have no market value as a condition precedent to the right to introduce proof of actual value. If they have no market value, the measure of damages for their conversion is their value to the owner based on the actual money lost. |
Case | |
| Thurber v. Apmann | 91 A.D.3d 1257 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2012) | 2012 WL 225395 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.); 936 N.Y.S.2d 789 |
In 2007, the plaintiff and defendant were walking their respective dogs when one of defendant's two dogs, a retired K-9 dog, attacked the plaintiff's dog. Plaintiff sued defendant for damages she received as a result. While each dog did received "handler protection" training (where a K-9 dog is trained to react to an aggressive attack on defendant while on duty), that situation had never arisen because the dogs acted in passive roles as explosive detection dogs. Plaintiff countered that the severity of the attack coupled with the dogs' breed and formal police training should have put defendant on notice of the dogs' vicious propensities. In affirming the summary judgment, this court found that the formal police training was not evidence of viciousness and there was no support to plaintiff's assertion that defendant kept the dogs as "guard dogs." |
Case | |
| Secretary of State for The Home Office v. BUAV and the Information Commissioner | [2008] EWHC 892 (QB | Appeal concerning the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and experiments involving animals. The BUAV had made an information request in respect of five research project licenses issued under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986. The Home Office released limited summary information, relying on exemptions under FOIA to reason this; namely under section 24(1) which would prohibit information from being disclosed that had been given “in confidence.” The Court of Appeal upheld the decision that the Home Office was entitled to refuse BUAV’s information request. | Case | ||
| RI - Humane Slaughter - Chapter 17. Humane Slaughter of Livestock | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-17-1 to 7 | RI ST § 4-17-1 to 7 | This section comprises Rhode Island's humane slaughter provisions. It begins first by declaring it to be the policy of the state that the slaughter of all livestock and the handling of livestock, in connection with slaughter, be carried out only by humane methods. A "humane method" is defined as a method through which the animal is rendered insensible to pain by mechanical, electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and effective before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut; or a method in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith or any other religious faith through which the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain. Any person who violates any provision of this chapter shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred ($500) dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than one year. | Statute | |
| NC - Licenses - § 130A-192. Animals not wearing required rabies vaccination tags | N.C.G.S.A. § 130A-192 | NC ST § 130A-192 | This North Carolina statute provides that the Animal Control Officer shall canvass the county to determine if there are any dogs or cats not wearing the required rabies vaccination tag. If the animal is wearing an owner identification tag, or if the Animal Control Officer otherwise knows who the owner is, the Animal Control Officer shall notify the owner in writing to have the animal vaccinated against rabies and to produce the required rabies vaccination certificate within three days. If the animal is not wearing an owner identification tag and the Animal Control Officer does not otherwise know who the owner is, the Animal Control Officer may impound the animal. The duration of the impoundment of these animals shall be established by the county board of commissioners, but the duration shall not be less than 72 hours. During the impoundment period, the Animal Control Officer shall make a reasonable effort to locate the owner of the animal. | Statute | |
| Commonwealth v. Lee | 2007 WL 4555253 (Pa. Super. 2007) |
Sheriffs removed Defendant's starving dog from his garage and took it to a shelter for hospitalization. Following a conviction and sentencing for animal cruelty and an order of restitution payable to the shelter, Defendant appealed. The Superior Court remanded for re-sentencing and vacated the order of restitution, holding that the shelter was not a victim of Defendant's actions, and that restitution is only payable to humans. |
Case | ||
| Oak Creek Whitetail Ranch, L.L.C. v. Lange | 326 S.W.3d 549 (Mo.App. E.D., 2010) | 2010 WL 4751676 (Mo.App. E.D.) |
A Missouri statute places liability on a dog owner where such dog kills or maims a sheep or "other domestic animal" of another. On December 10, 2006, three dogs of Defendant Glendon Lange entered Oak Creek’s deer breeding farm and killed 21 of Oak Creek's "breeder deer." The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, disagreed with the trial court, finding that "domestic" should have been interpreted by the "plain meaning" of the word, which therefore includes Oak Creek’s breeder deer. |
Case | |
| Australia - Animal Cruelty - Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Animal Trades) Regulation 1996 | Agency Citation |
This Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Animal Trades) Regulation 1996 identifies certain businesses as animal trades for the purposes of POCTAA, and prescribes Codes of Practice relevant to the conduct of those businesses. It also creates offences relating to the conduct of businesses classed as 'animal trades'. |
Administrative | ||
| Red Wolf Coalition v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service | 210 F. Supp. 3d 796 (E.D.N.C. 2016) | 2016 WL 5720660 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 2016) | The plaintiffs, Red Wolf Coalition, filed suit against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) alleging that USFWS had violated Sections 4, 7, and 9 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and also failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) when it allowed for the lethal or non-lethal taking of red wolves on private land. In response to the plaintiffs’ claim, USFWS asked the court to limits its review to the administrative record arguing that any discovery outside the administrative record would violate the Administrative Procedure Act’s scope and standard or review. The court decided not to limit the scope of review, stating that the plaintiffs’ claims fell under the citizen suit provision of the ESA and those types of law suits allow for discovery. Also, plaintiffs made a motion for a preliminary injunction to stop USFWS from conducting or authorizing the take of wild red wolves on private land whether or not the wolf has been a threat to humans, pets, or livestock. In order for the plaintiffs’ to succeed on this motion, the plaintiffs needed to make a clear showing of four elements: (1) plaintiffs’ are likely to succeed on the merits of the claim, (2) plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in plaintiffs’ favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. The court found that the plaintiffs’ were able to establish the first element because plaintiffs demonstrated that USFWS failed to adequately provide for the protection of red wolves by allowing for the taking of red wolves on private land, which may jeopardize the population’s survival in the wild. Next, the court held that plaintiffs’ were able to establish the irreparable harm requirement based on the fact that the threat to the red wolf population would clearly decrease their ability to enjoy red wolves in the wild and the possibility of the “decline or extinction of the species would cause them to suffer irreparable harm.” Lastly, the court found that granting the preliminary injunction would be in the public interest because “the equitable scales are always tipped in favor of the endangered or threatened species.” For those reasons, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. | Case | |
| OH - Falconry - Chapter 1533. Hunting; Fishing. Falconry. | R.C. § 1533.05, 1533.051 | OH ST § 1533.05, 1533.051 | This Ohio statute regulates falconry in the state. It specifically excludes bald eagles from the listed species of raptors for use in falconry. | Statute |