Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Born Free USA v. Norton | 278 F. Supp 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2003) | 278 F. Supp 2d 5; 57 ERC 1529 |
The zoo sought to import wild elephants from a foreign country, but advocates contended that the officials did not follow CITES properly for the import. The court held that the advocates failed to show a likelihood of success to warrant preliminary injunctive relief, since no overall detriment to the species was shown. |
Case |
| Northern Ireland - Wildlife - Conservation (Natural Habitats etc.) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1995 | 1995 No. 380 | These Regulations prohibit the deliberate taking, injuring, killing, disturbing, possession, or trading of certain wild species (as scheduled) in Northern Ireland. It is also an offence to take the nests or eggs of wild birds. | Statute | |
| WY - Veterinary - Chapter 30. Veterinarians | W. S. 1977 §§ 33-30-101 to 225 | WY ST §§ 33-30-101 to 225 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |
| SC - Leash - § 50-11-780. Dogs engaged in hunting not required to be constrained by leash. | Code 1976 § 50-11-780 | SD ST § 50-11-780 | This South Carolina statute provides that no dog is required to be constrained by a leash while it is actually engaged in hunting game and under supervision. As used in this section "supervision" means that the owner of the dog or his designee is either in the vicinity of the dog or in the process of trying to retrieve the dog. | Statute |
| Animal Protection Institute of America, Inc. v. Hodel | 671 F.Supp. 695 (D.Nev.,1987) | 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,398 |
In this case, animal protection groups sued the Secretary of the Interior to enjoin or restrain him from allowing the adoptions of wild horses and burros under circumstances where the defendants know the horses are being adopted for commercial slaughter or exploitation. Defendants opposed the motion and and argued that the Secretary has duly promulgated regulations permitting adoptions of such animals and provided that the animals are humanely cared for during the one year period provided for in 16 U.S.C. § 1333(c). This Court granted plaintiffs' motion, enjoining the Secretary from transferring the titles of wild free-roaming horses and burros to individuals who have, prior to the expiration of the one year “probationary period” expressed to the Secretary an intent to use said animals for commercial purposes. |
Case |
| ME - Transport - § 2087. Transporting dogs in open vehicle regulated | 29-A M. R. S. A. § 2087 | ME ST T. 29-A § 2087 | This Maine law regulates the transporting of dogs in open vehicles (like pick-up trucks or convertibles). Under the law, a person driving an open vehicle may not transport a dog in the open portion of that vehicle on a public way unless the dog is protected in a manner that prevents the dog from falling or jumping or being thrown from the vehicle. The law excludes transportation of a dog by a farmer engaged in agricultural activities involving the dog or a hunting dog that is between transported between hunting sites by a licensed hunter. | Statute |
| State v. Peabody | 343 Ga. App. 362, 807 S.E.2d 107 (2017) | 2017 WL 4801538 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2017) | This Georgia case involves a former police lieutenant who was indicted on two counts of aggravated cruelty to animals after he left his K-9 named Inka locked in his police vehicle while he attended to tasks inside his home. The dog died after being left inside the vehicle, which had all doors and windows closed with no A/C or ventilation running. The state appeals the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to quash the indictment. Specifically, the state argues that OCGA § 17-7-52 (a law that requires at least a 20-day notice prior to presentment of a proposed indictment to a grand jury when a peace officer is charged with a crime that occurred in the performance of his or her duties) is inapplicable. The state did not send defendant a copy of the proposed indictment before it presented the case to the grand jury. The state contends defendant "stepped aside" from his police-related duties and was therefore not afforded the protections of OCGA § 17-7-52. This court disagreed with that assessment. Since Peabody was responsible for the care and housing of Inka as her K-9 handler, leaving her unattended, albeit in an illegal manner, was still in performance of his police duties. As such, Peabody was entitled to the procedural protections of the statute according to the appellate court. The trial court's motion to quash his indictment was affirmed. | Case |
| VT - Assistance animal - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws | 13 V.S.A. § 355; 9 V.S.A. § 4502 - 4507; 23 V.S.A. § 1057 | VT ST T 13 § 355; VT ST T 9 V§ 4502 - 4507; VT ST T 23 § 1057 | The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws. | Statute |
| OK - Ordinances - § 43. Counties over 200,000 population--Regulation and control of dogs running at large--Penalties | 4 Okl. St. Ann. § 43 | OK ST T. 4 § 43 | This Oklahoma statute provides that the board of county commissioners of any county with a population of two hundred thousand (200,000) or more may regulate or prohibit the running at large of dogs and may impound and dispose of such dogs. The board of county commissioners may also regulate and provide for taxing the owners and harborers of dogs, and authorize the humane killing or disposal of dogs, found at large, contrary to any ordinance regulating the same. Any person, firm or corporation who violates any rule or regulation made by such board of county commissioners under the authority of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished as provided by the laws of this state. | Statute |
| Cetacean Community v. Bush | 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004) | 59 ERC 1257, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,120, 4 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9331, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,791 |
In this case, the court was asked to decide whether the world's cetaceans have standing to bring suit in their own name under the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the National Environmental Protection Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Cetaceans challenge the United States Navy's use of Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System Low Frequency Active Sonar ("SURTASS LFAS") during wartime or heightened threat conditions. In finding that the Cetaceans lacked standing, the court here agreed with the district court in Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc., that "[i]f Congress and the President intended to take the extraordinary step of authorizing animals as well as people and legal entities to sue, they could, and should, have said so plainly." 836 F.Supp. at 49. In the absence of any such statement in the ESA, the MMPA, or NEPA, or the APA, the court concluded that the Cetaceans do not have statutory standing to sue. |
Case |