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Displaying 5931 - 5940 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IA - Endangered Species - WILDLIFE CHAPTER 481B. ENDANGERED PLANTS AND WILDLIFE | I. C. A. § 481B.1 - 10 | IA ST § 481B.1 - 10 | Iowa law sets out the definitions related to endangered species. It also provides a list of prohibited acts related to these species, including any taking, transporting, purchasing or selling of the species or their parts. An exception is listed for damage to property or human life, provided a permit is secured first. | Statute |
| Authorities' temporary closure of malaria labs | Slideshow Images | |||
| OK - Disaster - Chapter 17. Care and Disposition of Disaster Animals Act | 4 Okl.St.Ann. § 701 - 707 | Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 701 - 707 | This chapter of laws deals with the holding and care of animals that are rescued from a disaster area. The animals that are rescued are kept for a certain amount of time depending on what type of disaster are they are taken from. During the holding period, the animal shelter is responsible for caring for the animal and making all necessary veterinarian decisions. Any violations relating to this chapter of laws may be enforced by the State Board of Agriculture. | Statute |
| Cordoves v. Miami-Dade Cnty | 92 F. Supp. 3d 1221 (S.D. Fla. 2015) | 2015 WL 1131684 (S.D. Fla. 2015) | This case arises out of an incident at the Dadeland Mall, during which plaintiff had a confrontation with security personnel that ended with her arrest. The incident was precipitated by the presence of a small dog plaintiff was toting in a stroller while shopping with her mother and daughter. Plaintiff alleged discrimination in public accommodations under the ADA, and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment under § 1983. Defendants moved for summary judgment.The District Court denied the motion in part and granted the motion in part, finding that an issue of material fact existed as to whether the dog was a service animal; that the patron was precluded from bringing negligence claim premised on intentional torts; that officer's use of force in arresting patron was de minimis; and that the right to be free from officer's application of force was not clearly established. | Case |
| Physicians Committee For Responsible Medicine v. Tyson Foods, Inc. | 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 926 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.,2004) | 119 Cal.App.4th 120, 04 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4705, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6501 (Cal.App. 1 Dist.,2004) |
In this California case, PCRM, a nonprofit health-advocacy organization, filed suit for injunctive relief against Tyson alleging that the company made false and deceptive representations about chicken products that it sold to consumers in California. The complaint alleges that Tyson engaged in two advertising campaigns, which disseminated false and deceptive statements about its products in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17500. Tyson filed a motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) statute. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the amendment to the anti-SLAPP statute, which was enacted while the appeal was pending did not apply to actions against sellers of goods as to the representations about or promotions of those goods. Further, by holding that Tyson was not entitled to invoke the anti-SLAPP remedy, the court stated that it did not compromise or prejudice Tyson’s right to raise First Amendment issues in defense of PCRM's suit . |
Case |
| MA - Fur - Chapter 131. Inland Fisheries and Game and Other Natural Resources. | M.G.L.A. 131 § 80A | MA ST 131 § 80A | Massachusetts law provides that a person may not use or possess any trap for capturing furbearing mammals except for common mouse and rat traps, nets, and box or cage traps. Traps designed to capture and hold a furbearing mammal by gripping the mammal's body, or body part are prohibited, including steel jaw leghold traps, padded leghold traps, and snares. This prohibition does not apply to federal, state, or municipal departments for the protection from threats to human health and safety (e.g., beaver or muskrat caused flooding or damage). | Statute |
| US - Elephant - African Elephant Conservation Act | 16 USC 4201 - 4246 | A U.S. federal law that reaffirms the endangered status of African elephants and allocates money toward conservation efforts. | Statute | |
| Ley de Protección y Bienestar Animal de Tlaxcala-Mexico | Ley de Protección y Bienestar Animal de Tlaxcala-Mexico | This law seeks to promote animal welfare by providing proper care, suitable living conditions, fostering their natural development, and maintaining their health. It also seeks to protect their natural behavior, guaranteeing public health. Article 3, IV defines animal as a “multicellular living being with a developed nervous system, which feels and moves voluntarily or by instinct.” It includes various definitions, but it does not define animal cruelty. | Statute | |
| Nuijens v. Novy | 144 Misc. 2d 453 (Just. Ct. 1989) | 543 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Just. Ct. 1989) | Plaintiff brought this action in Small Claims Court for the recovery of $254.63 after purchasing a dog from the Defendant. At the time of purchase, the Defendant gave a five day guarantee to the Plaintiff that if a veterinarian found anything wrong with the dog, the dog could be returned and the Plaintiff would receive a refund. The Plaintiff took the dog to a vet within five days and although she was told that the dog had a urinary infection, the Plaintiff kept the dog. Within 14 days of the sale, the Plaintiff learned that the infection was serious, and she contacted the Defendant requesting a refund under article 35-B of the General Business Law. The Court stated that Plaintiff's cause of action under the General Business Law failed: because it did not give the Plaintiff the right to recover damages, since the statute only covered "pet dealers" or "breeders" who sold more than one litter of animals per year. There was no evidence to indicate that the Defendant sold more than one litter of puppies. Also, because the Plaintiff chose not to return the dog for a refund within five days after learning about the infection, she could not seek recovery for breach of an express warranty (UCC 2-313). Lastly, because the Defendant was not a “merchant" the Plaintiff could not recover for the breach of an implied warranty (UCC 2-314). | Case |
| Longhi v. APHIS | 165 F3d 1057 (6th Cir. 1999) |
APHIS was unsuccessful in asserting that an applicant who is part of one license as a partnership can not apply for another as a corporation. |
Case |