Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bess v. Bracken County Fiscal Court | 210 S.W.3d 177 (Ky.App.,2006) |
The primary issue in this Kentucky case is whether a Bracken County ordinance which bans the possession of pit bull terriers is inconsistent with the state law that addresses dangerous dogs. The lower court denied the plaintiff's motion and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the ban of breed was a legitimate exercise of police power and did not deny dog owners procedural due process. Further, the ordinance did not infringe on constitutional right to travel because traveling with a pet is not a fundamental right and the ordinance does not treat residents and non-residents differently. |
Case | ||
| US - Lacey Act - Lacey Act Implementation Plan; Definitions for Exempt and Regulated Articles | FR Doc. 2013-16463 |
In response to recent amendments to the Lacey Act, we are establishing definitions for the terms “common cultivar” and “common food crop” and several related terms. The amendments to the Act expanded its protections to a broader range of plant species, extended its reach to encompass products, including timber, that derive from illegally harvested plants, and require that importers submit a declaration at the time of importation for certain plants and plant products. Common cultivars and common food crops are among the categorical exclusions to the provisions of the Act. The Act does not define the terms “common cultivar” and “common food crop” but instead gives authority to the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Department of the Interior to define these terms by regulation. Our definitions specify which plants and plant products will be excluded from the provisions of the Act, including the declaration requirement. |
Administrative | ||
| Gilreath v. Smith | 797 S.E.2d 177 (Ga. Ct. App., 2017) | 340 Ga. App. 265, 2017 WL 660590 (Ga. Ct. App., 2017) |
While pet sitting for Defendants Bruce and Jodi Smith, Plaintiff Josephine Gilreath was attacked and injured by the Smiths' rooster, which caused a serious infection with long-term consequences. Plaintiff Gilreath filed suit, but the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on the ground that Gilreath assumed the risk. Gilreath appealed to the Court of Appeals of Georgia. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and reasoned that Gilreath assumed the risk of injury based on the state statutes of owners of land under OCGA § 51-3-1, as keepers of a vicious or dangerous animal under OCGA § 51-2-7, and as required by a Roswell city ordinance. The Court reasoned that at prior pet-sittings at the Defendants home, Gilreath had been warned that the rooster would attack and that a garbage can lid was useful for controlling the rooster. Second, Gilreath has not raised an issue of fact regarding whether the Smiths had superior knowledge of the risks associated with the danger. Gilreath, a professional pet sitter with at least nine years of experience, admitted that she had a responsibility to educate herself about the animals she takes care of yet she failed to do so for roosters. Third, Gilreath admitted that she chose to take the job knowing that she had been told that the rooster would attack. Gilreath also contends that the Smiths violated a Roswell city ordinance, but she failed to introduce a certified copy of the ordinance and thus failed to prove this claim. |
Case | |
| VA - Liens - § 43–32 Lien of keeper of livery stable, marina, etc. | Va. Code Ann. § 43-32 | VA Code Ann. § 43-32 | Every keeper of a livery stable, hangar, tie-down, or marina, and every person pasturing or keeping any horses or other animals, boats, aircrafts, or harness, will have a lien for the amount that would be due for towing, storage, recovery, keeping, supporting, and care. The lien will be removed once the amount is paid. | Statute | |
| NE - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | Neb. Rev. St § 14-102; § 15-218 - 220; § 16-206; 16-235; § 17-526, 17-547; § 25-21,236; § 37-525; § 37-705; § 54-601 - 616; § 54-617 - 624; § 54-625 - 650; § 71-4401 - 4412 | NE ST § 14-102; § 15-218 - 220; § 16-206; 16-235; § 17-526, 17-547; § 25-21,236; § 37-525; § 37-705; § 54-601 - 616; § 54-617 - 624; § 54-625 - 650; § 71-4401 - 4412 | These Nebraska statutes comprise the state's dog laws. Among the provisions include the municipal authority to regulate dogs at large and licensing, rabies control, and dangerous dog laws. The set of laws relating to commercial pet dealers and breeders is also provided. | Statute | |
| KY - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes | KRS § 525.125 - 137; KRS § 436.600 - 610 | KY ST § 525.125 - 137; KY ST § 436.600 - .610 | These Kentucky statutes represent the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. Under the law, animal cruelty in the first-degree (a class D felony) occurs when a person causes four-legged animals to fight for pleasure or profit. Exclusions under this section include, among others, the killing of animals when hunting, fishing, or trapping; as incident to the processing as food or for other commercial purposes; or for veterinary, agricultural, spaying or neutering, or cosmetic purposes. | Statute | |
| Malloy v. Cooper | 592 S.E.2d 17 (N.C. 2004) | 2004 WL 190267 (N.C. 2004) |
Plaintiff owned a Gun Club and sponsored a pigeon shoot. He challenged the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the intentional wounding or killing of animals. Held: unconstitutionally vague. |
Case | |
| Brinkley v. County of Flagler | 769 So. 2d 468 (2000) |
Appellee county sought to enjoin appellant from mistreating animals by filing a petition against her under Fla. Stat. ch. 828.073 (1997). The animals on appellant's property were removed pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 828.073, a statute giving law enforcement officers and duly appointed humane society agents the right to provide care to animals in distress. The entry onto appellant's property was justified under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement for searches. The hearing after seizure of appellants' animals was sufficient to satisfy appellant's due process rights. |
Case | ||
| MN - Hospitals and pets - § 144A.30. Pets in nursing homes | M.S.A. § 144A.30 | Minn. Stat. Ann. § 144A.30 (West) | This Minnesota statute states that animal nursing homes must be "reasonable" in their care, type, and maintenance of pets. | Statute | |
| Velzen v. Grand Valley State University | 902 F.Supp.2d 1038(W.D. Mich. 2012) | On March 30, 2012, Plaintiff and the Fair Housing Center of West Michigan (“FHCWM”) brought suit against Defendants, a university, alleging unlawful discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), Federal Rehabilitation Act, and Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”), for denying Plaintiff’s request to keep an emotional support animal in on-campus housing. All claims brought against the individual defendants were brought against them in their official capacities as university administrators. Plaintiffs sought both injunctive and compensatory relief. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The District Court decided the following would be dismissed: (1) all claims under the PWDCRA against all defendants; (2) all claims for compensatory damages under the FHA brought against all defendants; (3) all claims for injunctive relief under the FHA brought against the institutional defendants; (4) all claims for relief under the Rehabilitation Act by the FHCWM; and (5) all claims for relief under the Rehabilitation Act by Plaintiff that depended on disparate treatment. The following claims remained: (1) Plaintiff and the FHCWM's claims under the FHA seeking injunctive relief from the individual defendants; and (2) Plaintiff's claims against all defendants for compensatory damages and injunctive relief under the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to the failure to accommodate theory. | Case |