Results
Title |
Author | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Burgess v. Taylor | 44 S.W.3d 806 (Ky. 2001) | 91 A.L.R.5th 749 (Ky. 2001) |
Owner of pet horses sued boarders of horses who sold them for slaughter, asserting tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court held that: (1) element of tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, requiring outrageous and intolerable conduct depends on conduct of wrongdoer, not subject of conduct; (2) boarders' actions constituted tort of outrage; and (3) award of $50,000 compensatory damages and $75,000 punitive damages was not excessive. |
Case | |
| Burgess v. Taylor |
Taylor v. Burgess is a landmark case in Kentucky allowing non-economic damages for an animal. Judy Taylor's two horses were stolen and sold for slaughter. Taylor then successfully sued for non-economic damages. |
Pleading | |||
| Burgess v. Shampooch Pet Industries, Inc. | 131 P.3d 1248 (Kan.App., 2006) | 2006 WL 908691 (Kan.App.), 35 Kan.App.2d 458 (2006) |
This Kansas case presents an issue of first impression as to the proper measure of damages recoverable for injury to a pet dog. The plaintiff's dog, a 13-year old dog of negligible market value, suffered a dislocated hip after being groomed at defendant's establishment. The appellate court found the lower court's award of damages based on the veterinary bills was proper where the bills were not disputed and represented an easily ascertainable measure. Specifically, the court held that when an injured pet dog with no discernable market value is restored to its previous health, the measure of damages may include, but is not limited to, the reasonable and customary cost of necessary veterinary care and treatment. The court was unconvinced by defendant's "hyperbolic" claim that such an award would lead to a floodgate of high-dollar litigation on behalf of animals with low market values. |
Case | |
| Bundorf v. Jewell | 142 F.Supp.3d 1133 (D.Nevada,2015) | 2015 WL 6636806 (D.Nevada,2015) | Plaintiffs, individuals and environmental organizations, challenged a decision by the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) to authorize two rights-of-way for the Searchlight Wind Energy Project (“Project”) in southern Nevada (on BLM land) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). After the District Court remanded to the BLM for further explanation, the plaintiffs moved for a permanent injunction. Plaintiffs raised claims that the activity violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), among other federal statutes. In effect, the plaintiffs argue that when the Court remanded for further explanation, it essentially reached the merits of their NEPA and ESA claims "by identifying explanatory gaps in the Remand Order." This then necessitated vacatur of the Record of Decision (“ROD”), Final Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”), and the Biological Opinion (“BiOp”). On appeal, the Court agreed with plaintiffs that clarification of the Remand Order is appropriate to include the ROD, the FEIS, and the BiOp with vacatur. Otherwise, the court notes, the Federal Defendants would get "two bites at the same apple . . . to fill the analytical gaps the Court identified in the Remand Order." The Federal Defendants must address the gaps related to: "(1) the density of desert tortoises, the adverse effects on desert tortoise habitat due to noise, and the remuneration fees and blasting mitigation measures for desert tortoises; (2) the status of FWS's recommendations regarding eagle take permitting and an Eagle Conservation Plan; and (3) BLM's conclusions about risks to bald eagles, protocols for golden eagle surveys, and risks to and mitigation measures for bat species." | Case | |
| BULLHOOKS AND THE LAW: IS PAIN AND SUFFERING THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM? | Trevor J. Smith | 19 Animal L. 423 (2013) | In the United States, violent use of “bullhooks”—sharpened, steel-tipped rods—on captive elephants at carnivals, circuses, and zoos is all too routine. Yet animal-welfare advocates struggle to protect elephants from the (mis)use of bullhooks under the current regulatory regime. At the federal level, advocates cannot consistently rely on either the Animal Welfare Act or the Endangered Species Act, due to these statutes’ narrow provisions, standing limitations, and inconsistent enforcement. State animal-protection laws are equally deficient, as only two states have defined suffering and abuse clearly enough in their statutes to enable effective prosecution of elephant mistreatment, and plaintiffs in even these states frequently fail for lack of standing. Ultimately, the most effective solution to the problem of bullhooks may lie with local lawmaking authorities. Many counties and municipalities have begun to protect captive elephants by enacting ordinances that expressly ban these devices within their jurisdictions. These local laws, which are growing increasingly popular, could offer the most effective protections against elephant abuse to date. | Article | |
| Building our Future | Joyce Tischler | 15 Animal L. 7 (2008) |
As the introduction to Volume 15 of Animal Law, the author reflects on 30 years of progress in the animal law arena. |
Article | |
| Building housing night monkeys used in malaria research at FUCEP. | Slideshow Images | ||||
| Buffalo Field Campaign v. Zinke | 289 F.Supp.3d 103 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2018) | 2018 WL 646887 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2018) | Plaintiffs Buffalo Field Campaign and other environmental groups petitioned the Fish and Wildlife Service ("Service") to add the Yellowstone bison population to the federal endangered species list. After the Service made a threshold “90–day” determination that Buffalo Field's petition failed to present sufficient scientific evidence that listing the bison may be warranted, Buffalo Field brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging that the Service's determination was arbitrary and capricious. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the Service applied an improper standard when evaluating Buffalo Field's petition, granted Buffalo Field's motion for summary judgment, denied the Service's cross-motion, and remanded the case for the agency to conduct a new 90–day finding using the proper standard. In particular, the court observed that the Service "simply picked a side in an ongoing debate in the scientific community," thereby in inappropriately heightening the standard of evaluation for a 90-day petition. Because of that, the court agreed with the Service that remand is the appropriate remedy as opposed to to directing the Service to begin a 12-month review. | Case | |
| Bueckner v. Hamel | 886 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App. 1994). |
Texas law allows persons to kill without liability dogs that are attacking domestic animals. However, the attack must be in progress, imminent, or recent. This defense does not apply to the killing of dogs that were chasing deer or non-domestic animals. |
Case | ||
| Bucking the Trend: Why Maryland Does Not Need an Equine Activity Statute and Why It May Be Time to Put All of These Statutes Out to Pasture | Jennifer D. Merryman | 36 U. Balt. L.F. 133 (Spring 2006) |
Part I of this comment shows the impetus behind equine activity statutes. Part II shows why the need for equine statutes no longer exists based on the doctrine of primary implied assumption of risk. Lastly, Part III surveys Maryland law to show that Maryland will not benefit from an equine activity statute and therefore should not adopt one. |
Article |