Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TX - Domestic Violence - § 85.021-.022 Protective Orders | V.T.C.A., Family Code § 85.021 -.022 | TX FAMILY § 85.021 - 022 | In a protective order in Texas, the court may prohibit a party from removing a pet, companion animal, or assistance animal, as defined by Section 121.002, Human Resources Code, from the possession of a person named in the order. Furthermore, in a protective order, the court may prohibit the person found to have committed family violence from harming, threatening, or interfering with the care, custody, or control of a pet, companion animal, or assistance animal that is possessed by or is in the actual or constructive care of a person protected by an order or by a member of the family or household of a person protected by an order. | Statute |
| AL - Irondale - Breed - Sec. 3-90 - Pit Bulls | IRONDALE, AL., CODE OF ORDINANCES, § 3-90, 3-91 |
In Irondale, Alabama, it is unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess any pit bull dog. However, pit bull dogs registered on the date of publication may be kept within the city subject to certain requirements. These requirements include proper confinement, the use of a leash and muzzle, the posting of “Beware of Dog” signs, the taking of identification photographs, and the maintenance of liability insurance ($50,000). Failure to comply may result in the seizure of the dog, a fine up to $500 and/or imprisonment up to 30 days. The city also bans Presa Canario dogs.
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Local Ordinance | |
| Texas Attorney General Opinion No. JC-0552 | 2002 Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. JC-0552 |
Texas Attorney General Opinion clarifying a new provision in Chapter 822 of the Texas Health & Safety Code that requires all dangerous wild animals to be registered in the county in which they're located. Otherwise, possession of these animals is unlawful. |
Case | |
| England - Farming - The Use of Closed Circuit Television in Slaughterhouses (England) Regulations 2018 | 2018 No. 556 | These Regulations introduce requirements on operators of slaughterhouses in England to install and operate a closed circuit television (CCTV) system in all areas where live animals are present. CCTV footage and associated data must be retained for a period of 90 days. Inspectors are given powers to require compliance with these Regulations. This includes powers of inspection and seizure where an inspector has entered premises for the purposes of executing and enforcing the 2015 Welfare of Animals at the Time of Killing (England) Regulations, and powers to issue enforcement notices. | Statute | |
| Sentencia T-095, 2016 | Sentencia T-095/16 | In this decision, the court drew a line between the concept of animal welfare and the concept of animal rights. The court continues to see animal protection from a moral perspective when it states animals do not necessarily have rights, even though they should be treated with respect and should not be abused. The Plaintiff brought an action of ‘tutela’ (Constitutional mechanism that is preferential and summary, created for the sole purpose of protection of fundamental rights) against ‘la Personería Local of Fontibón’, the local Mayor’s office of Fontibon, the District Secretary of Health, the Zoonosis Center and the Distril Secretary of the environment of Bogota. The Plaintiff argued that these governmental entities had violated his fundamental right to petition and the right to animal welfare of twenty five dogs, when the authorities ordered the confiscation the canines that were located in the District Ecological Park of the Wetland of Capellanía and who were cared for by volunteers. The Plaintiff argued that the Defendants did not respond to his request to provide funds to build a shelter and provide food and veterinary assistance of the dogs or funds to relocate them. The Plaintiff sought a response from governmental authorities on the petition and to provide the funds to save the animals, thereby avoiding the Zoonosis Center to assume their care, who would euthanize the sick animals that were not adopted after five days of being up for adoption. The lower court denied the protection of the fundamental right to petition, as it found that the authorities responded to the petition of the Plaintiff in a clear and timely matter by denying the request to fund the Plaintiff to relocate the dogs or build a shelter for them. In regards to the right to animal welfare, the lower court considered it was a legal rather than a constitutional issue, therefore the action of ‘tutela’ was not the appropriate mechanism as its purpose is to guarantee the protection of fundamental rights. The court held that there was a constitutional duty of animal protection that derives from the duty to protect the environment. However, this duty to guarantee the well-being of animals as sentient beings is not absolute and may be subject to exceptions. The court determines that the mandate to protect the environment, which includes sentient beings, does not translate into a right to animal welfare, and for that reason such duty is not enforceable through an action of tutela. The duty to protect animals presumes an obligation to care and prohibits maltreatment and cruelty against animals, unless these actions come from one of the limits stipulated in the constitution. The court affirmed the lower court decision to deny the protection to the right to petition and declared the inadmissibility of the action of tutela for the protection of animal welfare. | Case | |
| PA - Veterinary - Chapter 14A. Veterinary Medicine Practice. | 63 P.S. § 485.1 - 35 | PA ST 63 P.S. § 485.1 - 35 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |
| Richard v. Hoban | 1970CarswellNB126 | 3 N.B.R. (2d) 81, 16 D.L.R. (3d) 679 |
The child plaintiff was attacked and bitten by a chained German Shepherd after she put her arm around the dog's neck to hug or play with it; she sustained scarring lacerations of her head, cheek and eyelid that required 5 days' hospitalization after plastic surgery. The trial judge earlier held that because the dog, had two months previously, bitten a young boy on the face and ear in an unprovoked attack, the owner had prior knowledge of the dog's propensity to bite children, yet he kept the dog regardless. The owner was thus strictly liable under the doctrine of scienter. The Court of Appeal reversed this holding, with two judges finding that the boy in the earlier attack had been injured accidentally by the dog's dew-claw, rather than being bitten, so that there was insufficient notice to the dog's owner of any vicious propensity; thus he was not strictly liable in scienter. |
Case |
| Boling v. Parrett | 536 P.2d 1272 (Or. 1975) | 21 Or.App. 823 (Or. 1975) |
This is an appeal from an action claiming conversion when police officers took animals into protective custody. Where police officers acted in good faith and upon probable cause when a citation was issued to an animal owner for cruelty to animals by neglect, then took the animals into protective custody and transported them to an animal shelter, there was no conversion. |
Case |
| NY - Licenses - Chapter 69. Of the Consolidated Laws | McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 109 | NY AGRI & MKTS § 109 | This New York statute provides that the owner of any dog reaching the age of four months shall immediately make application for a dog license. Certain villages and other municipalities may provide for differing licensure regulations as described in this statute. The statute outlines the specific application procedures for obtaining a license, including a purebred license. | Statute |
| Sligar v. Odell | 233 P.3d 914 (Wash.App. Div. 1, 2010) | 2010 WL 2674037 (Wash.App. Div. 1), 156 Wash.App. 720 (2010) |
In this Washington case, plaintiff Sligar was bitten on the finger by the Odells' dog after Sligar's finger protruded through a hole in the six-foot high chain link fence that separated their two properties. The court found the dispositive question was whether, pursuant to RCW 16.08.040 and .050 (a law that defines when entry onto the property of the dog owner is for a lawful purpose) Sligar's finger was “lawfully in or on ... the property of the” Odells at the time of the dog bite. The court found that the statute provides that consent may not be presumed where the property is fenced. Concerning the common law negligence claim, Sligar contends that the Odells were negligent in failing to protect her from harm because they failed to erect a solid fence on the property boundary until after the bite occurred. However, the court had previously found that it is not unreasonable to keep a dog in a fenced backyard where the dog has not shown any dangerous propensities. |
Case |