Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Roos v. Loeser | 183 P. 204 (Cal.App.1.Dist.,1919) | 41 Cal.App. 782 (Cal.App.1.Dist.,1919) |
This is an action for damages alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff by reason of the killing of her dog, of the variety known as Pomeranian, by an Airedale belonging to the defendant. In 1919, a California court determined damages to be limited to the veterinary expenses connected with the injury to the animal. In the opinion, the court lovingly discusses the value of the animal. Notwithstanding these words of praise for the small animal, the court decided that the value was limited to the fair market value and related expenses. |
Case |
| Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Norton | 496 F.Supp.2d 1330 (M.D.Fla., 2007) | 2007 WL 2172785 (M.D.Fla.) |
The plaintiffs charge in that the Secretary of the Interior, in contravention of statutory duty, has failed to conduct the nondiscretionary, five-year status reviews of species listed as endangered or threatened in the Federal Register. Plaintiff seeks an order declaring that Defendants have violated the Endangered Species Act and that the failure to conduct the status reviews constitutes agency action “unlawfully withheld” in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Defendants argue that their failure to conduct the mandatory status reviews is not an agency action that is reviewable under the APA. Defendants therefore assert that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's suit to compel agency action to the extent that it arises under the APA. Although not addressed by Defendants and although there is little authority on the issue, Defendants' failure to comply with a mandatory duty falls within the first category of actions reviewable under the APA as an agency action, or inaction, “made reviewable by statute” because the ESA explicitly “provides a private right of action." Defendants assert that budgetary and resource constraints precluded the Secretary from fulfilling the obligation imposed by Congress. However, the court stated that defendants ". . . should take up such constraints with Congress rather than let mandatory deadlines expire with inaction." |
Case |
| Cardenas v. Swanson | 531 P.3d 917 (Wyo., 2023) | 2023 WY 67, 2023 WL 4344196 (Wyo. July 5, 2023) | The Cardenas family (Appellants) owned three St. Bernard dogs. Appellants lived on a home adjacent to large tracts of state land, and would allow the dogs to roam the land unleashed, but the dogs would return each night. One afternoon, the dogs were let outside to run, but one dog did not return. Appellants found the dog caught in a snare, where it died from a broken neck. Appellants attempted to free the dog from the snare, and one of the Cardenas children was injured in the process. While appellants were attempting to free their dog from the snare, the other two dogs were also caught in snares, and died from their injuries. Appellants filed suit against the trapper who set the snares (Appellee), asserting claims of negligence, willful and wanton misconduct, violation of statutes, infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights violations. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted and denied in part, finding that appellee’s conduct was not willful and wanton and that appellants could not recover emotional damages for the loss of the dogs. On appeal, the court considered: (1) whether the members of the Cardenas family can recover damages for emotional injuries for the loss of their dogs, and (2) whether this court should allow the recovery of emotional distress damages for the loss of a pet. The court held that (1) emotional injuries for the loss of property are not recoverable, under this court’s precedent emotional damages are only recoverable for certain limited situations. Dogs are considered personal property under state law, and damage to personal property is not one of the situations in which emotional damages are recoverable. Next, the court held that (2) it would not create a precedent to allow people to recover emotional distress damages when animate personal property is harmed, as that change would be best suited for the legislature to make. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the case. | Case |
| SD - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 40-38. Protection of Animal Facilities | S D C L § 40-38-1 - 5 | SD ST § 40-38-1 - 5 | This chapter comprises South Dakota's animal enterprise interference laws. Under the section, it is illegal for a person to intentionally damage or destroy an animal facility, an animal, or property in or on the animal facility; exercise control over the animal facility or an animal located therein; enter the animal facility with the intent to commit prohibited acts; enter an animal facility and remain concealed with the intent to commit prohibited acts; or intentionally release an animal on an animal facility. Violation is a misdemeanor of varying degrees if the damaged property value is less than $1,000 and a Class 4 felony if above $1,000. Any person who violates subdivisions 40-38-2(2) to (5), inclusive, is guilty of a Class 4 felony. | Statute |
| R v. Shand | R. v. Shand, 2007 ONCJ 317 | In R v Shand 2007 ONCJ 317 (CanLII), the court examined the necessary elements required to established the “willful” mens rea component present in Canadian Federal Criminal Statute s. 429. The accused was charged with three counts of animal cruelty contrary to s.446 of the Criminal Code in relation to a dog in her care. The court found that on two of the counts that the accused was had acted "wilfully" because she was either "reckless or indifferent as to her dog's condition." | Case | |
| NH - Hunting - Interference with Hunting, Trapping or Fishing. 207:57 Harassment. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 207:57 | NH ST § 207:57 | This represents New Hampshire's hunter harassment law. The law provides that no person shall purposely obstruct or impede the participation of any individual in the lawful activity of hunting, fishing or trapping while that individual is in a designated hunting area on public lands. The section does not apply to any incidental interference arising from the lawful and normal activities of public land users. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a violation. | Statute |
| Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc. | 860 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (W.D. Wash. 2012) rev'd, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2013) and rev'd, 725 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2013) | The Institute of Cetacean Research, a Japanese whaling group, sued the direct action environmental protection organization Sea Shepherd, claiming that Sea Shepherd’s actions taken against the whaling group’s vessels in the Antarctic are violent and dangerous. The Institute claimed that Sea Shepherd had rammed whaling ships, thrown dangerous objects on to the ships, attempted to prevent them from moving forward, and navigated its vessels in such a way as to endanger the Japanese ships and their crews. The Institute’s request for an injunction was denied when the Court held that the Institute did not establish the necessary factors. The Court did state, however, that though Sea Shepherd’s acts did not constitute piracy, it did not approve of the organization’s methods or mission. | Case | |
| Dyess v. Caraway | 190 So.2d (666 La.App., 1966) |
Plaintiff claimed damages for the death of five pedigreed Norwegian Elkhound puppies resulting from the negligence of defendant, Hugh L. Caraway, a duly licensed veterinarian. Specifically, defendant allegedly failed to make proper diagnostic tests, failed to give proper treatment for coccidia from which the puppy died, although the defendant had professional knowledge that the puppy was suffering from that disease, and failed to exercise the standard of care required by the average prudent veterinarian in the community. The court first noted the difficulty in diagnosing distemper. It also found the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in applicable in the instant case, primarily for the reason that the instant case involves a question of diagnosis and treatment of a professional nature which in itself requires judgment. |
Case | |
| WILDEARTH GUARDIANS vs. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE | 703 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. Ct. App.,2013) | 2013 WL 93169 (10th Cir. Ct. App.,2013) |
In this case, the WildEarth Guardians brought a suit against the National Park Service for violating the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Rocky Mountain National Park Enabling Act (RMNP)'s ban on hunting. The district court and the appeals court, however, held that the NPS did not violate NEPA because the agency articulated reasons for excluding the natural wolf alternative from its Environmental Impact Statement. Additionally, since the National Park Service Organic Act (NPSOA)'s detrimental animal exception and the RMNP's dangerous animal exception apply to the prohibition on killing, capturing, or wounding—not the prohibition on hunting, the use of volunteers to cull the park’s elk population did not violate the RMNP or the NPSOA. |
Case |
| DE - Domestic Violence - § 1045. Relief available; duration of orders, modification and termination | 10 Del.C. § 1045 | DE ST TI 10 § 1045 | Delaware amended its law on protection orders in domestic violence situations to include protection of pets in 2023. Per subsection (a)(12), a court may "[g]rant the petitioner the exclusive care, custody, or control of any companion animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by the petitioner, the respondent, or a minor child residing in the residence or household of the petitioner or respondent and order the respondent to stay away from the companion animal and forbid the respondent from taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, harming, or otherwise disposing of the companion animal." | Statute |