Results

Displaying 5941 - 5950 of 6638
Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
Protocol of Amendment to the European Convention for the Protection of Animals kept for Farming Purposes The following are the additional protocol to the European Convention on Farm Animals. The definition of "intensive stock farming systems" has been elaborated on. Additions concerning the confines of artificial breeding and the feeding of harmful things to animals through food or drink are also included. Treaty
Hines v. Quillivan 982 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2020) This case asks whether a veterinarian in Texas has a right to engage in telemedicine for a pet he has not physically examined. The plaintiff challenged Texas' physical-examination requirement that prohibits veterinarians from offering individualized advice to pet owners unless the vet previously examined the animal. Dr. Ronald Hines, a licensed veterinarian in Texas, stopped practicing in-person veterinary medicine in 2002 due to his age and other ailments. He then transitioned to a practice based remotely through the Internet. In 2012, the Texas State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners (the Board) investigated Hines and found he had violated state law. The Board ordered him to cease providing veterinary advice electronically without first physically examining the animal. In 2013, Dr. Hines filed suit against the Board members claiming that the physical-examination requirement violated his First Amendment, equal-protection, and substantive-due-process rights. The district court then granted the motion to dismiss by the Board and the Court of Appeals found Hines failed to state a claim on appeal. Since that 2015 opinion, Texas revised its medical doctor laws, allowing them to engage in telemedicine, but did not do the same for veterinary practice laws. In addition to that change, a United States Supreme Court held that statements made by medical doctors could now be deemed "professional speech" (the "NIFLA" case). As a result of these changes, Hines brought the present suit arguing that the changes in Texas' telemedicine laws and the NIFLA case enabled him to pursue a new equal-protection claim and First Amendment claim. With regard to his protected speech claim, this Court found that subsequent caselaw does entitle Hines' claim to greater judicial scrutiny than his previous case allowed. Thus, remand to the district court to make the initial evaluation of whether Hines' conduct or speech is being regulated is required. On the equal-protection argument, the court found that Hines presents an argument slightly different than his previous one. In essence, Hines argued in the prior appeal that the he physical-examination requirement treated veterinarians engaging in telemedicine differently than other veterinarians. Here, Hines argues that changes to the medical doctor licensing laws treats medical doctors differently than veterinarians in the state with respect to telemedicine. Using a rational-basis review, the court held that it is rational to distinguish between human and animal medicine because of the differences in training, schooling, and overall practice of the professions. The court found the state's proffered reason that animals cannot communicate their symptoms as humans can ordinarily was a persuasive rational basis (although both Hines and the Dissent note that some humans like infants are unable to speak similar to animals and yet are allowed to be treated via telemedicine). The court found the services provided by both professions are not interchangeable and thus, the physical-examination requirement is not a protectionist measure for medical doctors. Ultimately, the court left it to the Texas legislature to expand any telemedicine changes to the veterinary practice code. The action was affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. Case
AL - Dog Fighting - Activities relating to fighting of dogs prohibited; violations; confiscation; Ala. Code 1975 § 3-1-29 AL ST § 3-1-29 This Alabama statute constitutes the state's dogfighting law. Under the law, it is a class C felony for any person to own, possess, keep or train any dog with the intent that such dog shall be engaged in an exhibition of fighting with another dog; for amusement or gain, to cause any dog to fight with another dog, or cause any dogs to injure each other; or to permit any of the above acts. The law also makes it a class C felony to knowingly be present or be a spectator at dogfights. Statute
Animal Law Volume 13 Part 2 Index

 

 Policy
Benningfield v. Zinsmeister 367 S.W.3d 561 (Ky.,2012) 2012 WL 2361778

An 8-year-old boy and his sister were walking down a street when they were approached by a Rottweiler. Scared, the boy ran and was attacked by the dog, which caused the boy to suffer serious injuries. As a result, the mother of the child sued the owner of the dog and the landlord of the house where the dog resided under a Kentucky dog bite statute. The landlord won at both the trial and the appellate court level. Upon granting discretionary review for the case, the Kentucky Supreme Court investigated whether or not a landlord could be held strictly liable under the dog bite statute. The Court ruled that a landlord could, but only if the landlord permitted the dog to stay on or about the premises. Since the attack did not occur on or about the premises, the landlord was not found liable under the dog bite statute.

Case
Mahan v. State 51 P.3d 962, 963 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) 2002 Alas. App. LEXIS 148 Mahan had over 130 animals on her property. Alaska Equine Rescue went to check on the condition of the animals at the request of her family members. The animals were in poor health and were removed by Alaska State Troopers and the Rescue. The animals were then placed in foster homes. The defendant's attorney requested a writ of assistance to require law enforcement to assist and force the foster families to answer a questionnaire. The appellate court held that the families were under no legal obligation to answer the questionnaire unless the court were to issue a deposition order and the families were to be properly subpoenaed. The district court's denial of the writ was upheld. Mahan's attorney also asked for a change of venue due to the publicity the case garnered. The court held the defendant was not entitled to a change of venue when 15 jurors had been excused and there was no reason to doubt the impartiality of the jurors who were left after the selection process. There was no indication that the jurors were unable to judge the case fairly. Mahan's attorney also filed a motion to suppress a majority of the evidence, claiming that the Rescue and law enforcement unlawfully entered the property. The judge stated he would rule on the motion if it was appropriate to do so. The judge never ruled on the motion. To preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must obtain an adverse ruling, thus it constituted a waiver of the claim. Mahan was also prohibited from owning more than one animal. She offered no reason why this condition of probation was an abuse of the judge's discretion, therefore it was a waiver of this claim. Lastly, although the Rescue received donations from the public to help care for the animals, that did not entitle Mahan to an offset. Restitution is meant to make the victims whole again and also to make the defendant pay for the expense caused by their criminal conduct. Case
IN - Cattle Slaughter - THE HIMACHAL PRADESH PROHIBITION OF COW SLAUGHTER ACT, 1979 11 OF 1979 The law, specific to the state of Himachal Pradesh, prohibits the slaughter of cows. No person may export cows for the purpose of slaughter. The law bans the sale of beef. Committing an offence under this Act may lead to imprisonment or fines. Statute
VT - Lost dog - Article 2. Killing Unlicensed Dogs; Subchapter 5. Control of Rabies 20 V.S.A. § 3621 - 3626; 20 V.S.A. § 3806 - 3809 VT ST T. 20 § 3621 - 3626; VT ST T. 20 § 3806 - 3809 These Vermont statute provide the law for seizure, confinement of, and destruction of dogs and domestic wolf-hybrids. It also includes a warrant form necessary for local authorities to seize and impound an offending dog or wolf-hybrid. Statute
ASSOCIACAO SANTUARIO DE ELEFANTES BRASIL 1001993-45.2019.8.11.0024 This case from Brazil concerns the elephant named "Ramba." Ramba is a former circus elephant who spent more than 30 years at circuses in Chile and Argentina. On October 18, 2019, she arrived at Santuário de Elefantes do Brasil (Brazil Elephants Sanctuary) after a 73 hour trip all the way from Chile. Before Ramba was transferred, Judge Leonísio Salles de Abreu Junior, from the 1st Civil Court at Chapada dos Guimarães, the region where the sanctuary is located in Mato Grosso , Brazil, made a ruling changing her status from a mere "good." The judge prohibited the local Government from charging the sanctuary R$ 50.000 (approximately US $ 13.00) in a tax on movement of goods finding that Ramba is not a thing, and is not a subject to importation good tax. According to an article at https://www.ambientesecom.net/2019/10/24/groundbreaking-decision-of-brazilian-judge-for-captive-elephant, the judge said further, "Her position, far from being a commodity (as she was in the life of exploitation to what she was submitted to by her former owners), is now that of a guest, who seeks for a new destination on the margins of what human evil has already caused her." Attached case is in Portuguese. Case
CR - Welfare - BIENESTAR DE LOS ANIMALES (Law 7451 on Animal Welfare) Law 7451

(Text in Spanish). The law that regulates animal welfare in Costa Rica; its terms are based on the results of the OIE conference in Australia in 1994.

Statute

Pages