Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Miles ex rel. Miles v. Rich | 347 S.W.3d 477 (Mo.App. E.D., 2011) | 2011 WL 1564030 (Mo.App. E.D.) |
In this Missouri case, the plaintiff filed an action against defendant dog owner for damages after defendant's dog bit the plaintiff's child. Defendant dog owner then filed a third-party petition against the Humane Society of Missouri from which defendant had adopted the dog, seeking contribution under a theory of common law negligence. Defendant appeals the lower court's dismissal, specifically contending that the Humane Society breached 1) its duty to prevent the adoption of the dog by doing tests it knew would have identified the dog's dangerous propensity to bite ; and 2) its duty to fully inform defendant of the risks of keeping a dog who has bitten in the past. The appellate court found that the Humane Society did not own, possess, harbor or control the dog when it bit Ms. Miles; thus, it had no duty under common law negligence principles to prevent the harm. |
Case | |
| Canada - New Brunswick Provincial Dog Regulations - N.B. Reg. 84-85 | Agency Citation |
In this province the main legislation governing dog husbandry and the penalties for dog misbehaviour or running at large are in the form of regulations pursuant to the provincial Municipalities Act. |
Administrative | ||
| Historical Materials |
The Animal Legal & Historical Center contains a collection of historical materials related to animal law. Most notable, is a copy of the introduction from William Nelson’s book, The Laws Concerning Game, published in 1753. The book itself reviews game laws in England from 1066 to the 1700s. |
Basic page | |||
| Pacific Ranger, LLC v. Pritzker | 211 F. Supp. 3d 196 (D.D.C. 2016) | 2016 WL 5676276 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2016) | Pacific Ranger, LLC, a deep-sea commercial fishing vessel, filed suit arguing that a decision made by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) should be set aside by the court. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) filed an action against Pacific Ranger for violating the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) after the vessel set its fishing net on whales during five tuna-fishing expeditions. After the hearing, the ALJ determined that Pacific Ranger had violated the MMPA and was liable for $127,000 in civil penalties. Pacific Ranger argued that these penalties should be set aside because the MMPA was unconstitutionally vague about what was considered an “incidental” taking and the ALJ’s findings could not be supported by substantial evidence. Ultimately, the court reviewed the arguments made by Pacific Ranger and found them to be without merit. First, the court determined that the MMPA was not vague with regard to incidental takings. The court held that incidental takings under the MMPA were restricted to takings that occurred without any knowledge and that this provision needed to be read narrowly in order to give effect to Congress’ intent that maintaining the “healthy populations of marine animals comes first.” The court found that because Pacific Ranger had knowledge that whales were in the area at the time that they were fishing, the taking that occurred could not be considered incidental. Lastly, the court reviewed Pacific Ranger’s argument that the ALJ’s decision could not be supported by substantial evidence. The court rejected this argument, pointing to expert testimony that said that there was no possible way for the Pacific Ranger not to have seen that whales were in the area at the time the takings occurred. As a result, the court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. | Case | |
| OH - Nongame - Chapter 1533. Hunting; Fishing. Special Hunting Area; Nongame Birds; Scientific Permits. | R.C. § 1533.06 - 1533.09 | OH ST § 1533.06 - 1533.09 | This Ohio statute prohibits the injuring, killing, pursuing, possessing, or exposing to commerce of all nongame birds. The statute further prohibits the killing or possession at any time of bald or golden eagles, except for the educational or zoological possession by government affiliated agencies. Notably, each possession or taking of a bird or bird part constitutes a separate offense. | Statute | |
| MI - Service Animal - Chapter 750. Michigan Penal Code. The Michigan Penal Code. | M.C.L.A. 750.50c | MI ST 750.50c | This statute outlines the penalty for the intentional physical harm or interference with a police dog or horse. The statute provides for a misdemeanor in the case of interference to the animal and a five-year felony where the animal was killed or seriously physically injured. If the interference was committed during the commission of another felony, then the penalty rises to a potential two-year imprisonment. | Statute | |
| People v. Bootman | 72 N.E. 505 (N.Y. 1904) |
This is one of the first cases to construe the issue of interstate commerce with regard to state game laws and the Lacey Act. Defendant purchased game birds that were killed outside of New York and brought them into the state when it was lawful to possess them. The court stated it was required by the rule of stare decisis to hold that the Legislature did not intend to make criminal the possession during the closed season of game killed and brought here during the open season. The court notes that the passage of the New York legislation occurred three months before the passage of the Lacey, thus having no effect. The court does go on to note the Legislature has now made it clear that it is well within state police power to regulate wildlife. |
Case | ||
| State v. Marsh | State v. Marsh, 823 P.2d 823 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) |
Without defendant's consent or knowledge, a state animal inspector surveyed defendant's property on two occasions. Without prior notice to or consent of defendant, the State seized all of defendant's dogs. The court stated that warrantless searches and seizures had to be limited by order, statute, or regulation as to time, place, and scope in order to comport with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Because the Act and the order failed to so limit the search, the court concluded that it was unreasonable and unlawful. |
Case | ||
| US - Wolf - Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Reinstatement of Protections for the Gray Wolf in the Western Great L | 2009 WL 2947315 (F.R.) | Docket No. FWSR3ES20090063; 9222011130000; C6 |
We, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service), are issuing this final rule to comply with a court order that has the effect of reinstating the regulatory protections under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended (ESA), for the gray wolf (Canis lupus) in the western Great Lakes. This rule corrects the gray wolf listing in our regulations which will reinstate the listing of gray wolves in all of Wisconsin and Michigan, the eastern half of North Dakota and South Dakota, the northern half of Iowa, the northern portions of Illinois and Indiana, and the northwestern portion of Ohio as endangered, and reinstate the listing of wolves in Minnesota as threatened. This rule also reinstates the former designated critical habitat for gray wolves in Minnesota and Michigan and special regulations for gray wolves in Minnesota. |
Administrative | |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Thomas J. Vilsack | Slip Copy, 2017 WL 627379 (D.D.C., 2017) |
In this case, the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) sought to intervene on a proceeding dealing with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and a family owned-zoo in Iowa for alleged violations of the Animal Welfare Act. The USDA was seeking enforcement of the Animal Welfare Act against the Iowa zoo and the ALDF sought to intervene because it has long criticized the zoo's care and handling of its animals. The ALDF was prevented from intervening by the administrative law judge (ALJ) that was presiding over the matter. The ALJ did not allow the ALDF to intervene in the matter on the basis that the “ALDF’s stated interests were beyond the scope of the proceeding.” The ALDF filed suit challenging this decision according to Section 555(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which allows “interested persons” to participate in agency proceedings “so far as the orderly conduct of the public business permits.” The court found that the ALDF should have been allowed to intervene in the proceeding according to 555(b) because the ALDF’s "demonstrated interest in the welfare of the zoo's animals falls squarely within the scope of the USDA enforcement proceeding.” The court also found that there was no evidence to suggest that having ALDF intervene would "impede the orderly conduct of the public business permits.” As a result, the court held in favor of the ALDF’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the case back the case back to USDA for further consideration of ALDF's motion to Intervene. |
Case |