|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|Levine v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation||80 F. Supp. 3d 29 (D.D.C. 2015)||2015 WL 674073 (D.D.C., 2015)||This action arose from plaintiff’s experience of bringing her service dog on Amtrak trains. Plaintiff brought claims on her own behalf and on behalf of a putative class of other disabled passengers against Amtrak pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act. Each claim related to Amtrak′s alleged practice of storing luggage in its train's “mobility aid” seating areas. Amtrak argued, amongst other things, that plaintiff lacked Article III Constitutional Standing because she had not suffered an injury in fact. The district court agreed and granted Amtrak′s motion to dismiss. The case was dismissed in its entirety.||Case|
|DE - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws||16 Del.C. § 3041F - 3059F; 16 Del.C. § 3071F - 3081F; 3 Del.C. § 8201 - 8213; 16 Del.C. §§ 3010F - 3021F; 6 Del.C. § 4001 - 4011; 7 Del.C. § 570; 7 Del.C. § 1701 - 1740; 22 Del.C. § 116||
These statutes comprise Delaware's dog laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning hunting field trials, and the dangerous dog subchapter.
|Hoctor v. Dept of Agriculture||82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996)||
A dealer raised exotic animals (mainly big cats), and USDA ordered that the dangerous ones be fenced, with fencing being a minimum of eight-feet high. However, the animal housing standard only required that the fencing be sturdy enough to prevent the animals from escaping. The eight-foot rule established by USDA was considered arbitrary, and it did not have to be followed.
|Warren v. Delvista Towers Condominium Ass'n, Inc.||49 F.Supp.3d 1082 (S.D. Fla. 2014)||In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s accommodation request under the Federal Fair Housing Act (the “FHA”) to modify Defendant's “no pet” policy was unreasonable because Plaintiff's emotional support animal was a pit bull and pit bulls were banned by county ordinance. In denying the Defendant’s motion, the District Court found that changing a no pets policy for an emotional support animal was a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. The court also found that enforcing the county ordinance would violate the FHA by permitting a discriminatory housing practice. However, in line with US Department of Housing and Urban Development notices, the court found genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the dog posed a direct threat to members of the condominium association, and whether that threat could be reduced by other reasonable accommodations.||Case|
|US - Importation - Subpart F. Wildlife Declarations||50 C.F.R. § 14.61 to .64||
Except as otherwise provided by the regulations of this subpart, importers or their agents must file with the Service a completed Declaration for Importation or Exportation of Fish or Wildlife (Form 3-177), signed by the importer or the importer's agent, upon the importation of any wildlife at the place where Service clearance under section 14.52 is requested.
|Trautman v. Day||273 N.W.2d 712 (N.D. 1979)||
In Trautman v. Day, 273 N.W. 2d 712 (N.D. 1979), defendant shot plaintiff’s dog when it ran through defendant’s herd of cows. The court affirmed a verdict of $300 for plaintiff’s dog. In addition, the Court declined to apply the defense of immunity based on a statute concerning the “worrying of livestock.
|MD - Pet Sales - Pet Purchaser Protection||MD Code, Business Regulation, § 19–701 to 19–707||This statute regulates retail pet stores that sell dogs. According to this statute, a purchaser is allowed remedies if, within two weeks after the purchase of a dog from a pet store, a veterinarian certifies that a dog suffers from or has died from a disease or illness that existed at the time of purchase. The purchaser may also be entitled to remedies if, within three months after the purchase of a dog from a pet store, a veterinarian certifies that the dog possesses or has died from a congenital or hereditary disease the adversely affects the dog's health, requires hospitalization or a non-elective surgical procedure. This statute also discusses a retail pet store's obligations to the purchaser, the limitations to obtaining these remedies, and provides the seller with an opportunity to contest the consumer's demand for remedies.||Statute|
|CA - Horse slaughter - § 597o. Humane transportation of equine to slaughter; vehicle requirements;||West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597o||CA PENAL § 597o||
This statute outlines the requirements for transporting equine to slaughter, including, but limited to, proper ventilation, sufficient space for equine to stand, and the use of ramps and floors with nonskid surfaces.
|Davis v. Animal ControlCity of Evansville||948 N.E.2d 1161 (Ind., 2011)||2011 WL 2493762 (Ind.)||
Dog attack victim sued city and its animal control department, seeking damages for injuries he sustained from a dog attack in his neighborhood. The victim claimed that the city failed to enforce its animal control ordinance. The Supreme Court held that city and its animal control department had law enforcement immunity because the Tort Claims Act provided immunity to governmental entities for any loss due to failure to enforce a law.
|Wyno v. Lowndes County||331 Ga. App. 541, 771 S.E.2d 207 (2015), cert. denied (June 15, 2015)||2015 WL 1318263 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)||Victim was attacked and killed by her neighbor's dog. Victim's husband, acting individually and as administrator of his wife's estate, brought action against dog owners and several government defendants, whom he alleged failed to respond to earlier complaints about the dog. The trial court dismissed the action against the government for failure to state a claim, concluding that sovereign and official immunity or, alternatively, the Responsible Dog Ownership Law (OCGA § 4–8–30), barred action against the government defendants. Husband appealed. The appeals court held the trial court did not err in dismissing the action against the county and its employees in their official capacities. The former version of OCGA § 4–8–30, effective at the time of the attack, provided immunity to local governments and their employees from liability for all injuries inflicted by dangerous or potentially dangerous dogs. The appeals court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the action against the employees in their individual capacities based on official immunity, however. By applying the former OCGA § 4–8–30 (2012) to dismiss the action against the employees in their individual capacities, the trial court implicitly rejected the husband’s constitutional challenge to the statute. Judgment was therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court to enter a ruling specifically and directly passing on the husband’s constitutional challenge.||Case|