Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ID - Predator - Chapter 58. Protection of Natural Resources (wolf declaration) | I.C. § 67-5801 - 5807 | ID ST § 67-5801 - 5807 |
The purpose of Chapter 58 is to provide an orderly, comprehensive plan for the protection of the natural resources of the state and for the suppression of dangers or threats. Section 5806 the Idaho legislature finds and declares that the state's citizens, businesses, hunting, tourism and agricultural industries, private property and wildlife, are immediately and continuously threatened and harmed by the sustained presence and growing population of Canadian gray wolves in the state of Idaho. The legislature states that "a disaster emergency is in existence as a result of the introduction of Canadian gray wolves, which have caused and continue to threaten vast devastation of Idaho's social culture, economy and natural resources." |
Statute | |
| Trager v. Thor | 516 N.W.2d 69 (Mich.,1994) | 445 Mich. 95 (Mich.,1994) |
In this Michigan case involving an action for damages after personal injury, the father of the dog’s owner was visiting his son's home when he agreed to supervise the dog while his son and daughter-in-law went shopping. The n eighbor’s child was subsequently bitten by the dog, which had been put by defendant into a bedroom. This court held that the defendant, as a temporary caretaker of the dog, could not be held to the strict liability standard of an owner keeper, but could be liable under theory of negligence. Thus, a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether the father was negligent in fulfilling his duty of care in supervising the dog, which precluded summary judgment in a negligence action. |
Case | |
| Humane Soc. of U.S. v. Lujan | 768 F.Supp. 360 (D.D.C.,1991) |
This case was brought the Humane Society of the United States and various coalitions of homeowner/citizens against the United States Secretary of the Interior and the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service to prevent the implementation of defendants' decision to permit limited public deer hunting on a national wildlife refuge in Fairfax County, Virginia. On cross motions for final judgment on the record, the District Court held that the suit under Endangered Species Act was precluded by failure to give proper presuit notice. The court stated that the ESA clearly states that “written notice” of the violation must be given to the Secretary and to the violator as a condition precedent to suit. The court also found that the FWS's decision took account of relevant factors and thus was not arbitrary or capricious. |
Case | ||
| State v. Newcomb | 359 Or 756 (2016) | In this case, the Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed a case in which defendant accused the State of violating her constitutional rights by taking a blood sample of her dog without a warrant to do so. Ultimately, the court held that the defendant did not have a protected privacy interest in the dog’s blood and therefore the state did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights. Defendant’s dog, Juno, was seized by the Humane Society after a worker made a visit to plaintiff’s home and had probable cause to believe that Juno was emaciated from not receiving food from plaintiff. After Juno was seized and taken into custody for care, the veterinarian took a blood sample from Juno to confirm that there was no other medical reason as to why Juno was emaciated. Defendant argued that this blood test was a violation of her constitutional rights because the veterinarian did not have a warrant to perform the test. The court dismissed this argument and held that once Juno was taken into custody, defendant had “lost her rights of dominion and control over Juno, at least on a temporary basis.” Finally, the court held that because Juno was lawfully seized and Juno’s blood was “not ‘information’ that defendant placed in Juno for safekeeping or to conceal from view,” defendant’s constitutional rights had not been violated. | Case | ||
| US - Meat Inspection - Labeling (Historical) | 9 C.F.R. 317 | These former Federal Meat Inspection Act regulations detail the law surrounding labeling, marking, and containing packaged food prior to 2014. Read an Animal Welfare Institute petition to amend section 317.4 of labeling regulations under the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA). The new regulations went into effect in 2014. | Administrative | ||
| US - Horses - Sale of Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros | PL 108-447 |
These amendments to the Wild Horses Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1333, amended by Public Law 108-447, allow for the sale of animals for commercial purposes in some circumstances, specifically when the excess animal is more than 10 years old, or has been unsuccessfully offered for adoption on at least 3 occasions. Once the excess animal is sold, it will no longer be considered a wild free-roaming horse or burro according to this Act. |
Statute | ||
| Demeo v. Manville | 68 Ill.App.3d 843 (1979) | 386 N.E.2d 917 (Ill.App. 2 Dist., 1979) |
This is an Illinois' small claims action involving the death of plaintiffs' show dog. Plaintiff alleged that defendant ran over the dog while it was tied up near the driveway. Defendant denied plaintiff’s allegations that defendant ran over the dog and used a cover-up story. The court upheld an award of five-hundred dollars although the purchase price was two-hundred. Plaintiff testified that he paid $200 for his dog when it was a puppy, but it had appeared in four shows, winning first prize in each. Evidence was considered for commercial value and special qualities in that case. |
Case | |
| Brower v. Evans | 257 F.3d 1058 (2001) |
The district court held that the Secretary's Initial Finding, triggering a change in the dolphin-safe label standard, was not in accordance with the law and constituted an abuse of discretion because the Secretary failed to (1) obtain and consider preliminary data from the congressionally mandated stress studies and (2) apply the proper legal standard to the available scientific information. We affirm. |
Case | ||
| Sierra Club v. Morton | 405 U.S. 727 (U.S.Cal. 1972) | 92 S.Ct. 1361, 3 ERC 2039, 31 L.Ed.2d 636, 1 Envtl. L. Rep. 29,001, 2 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,192 (U.S.Cal. 1972) |
The Petitioner, the Sierra Club, brought this action for a declaratory judgment and an injunction to restrain federal officials from approving an extensive skiing development in the Mineral King Valley in the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club did not allege that the challenged development would affect the club or its members in their activities, but rather argued that the project would adversely change the area's aesthetics and ecology. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the club lacked standing and had not shown irreparable injury. On grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the Sierra Club, which asserted a only special interest in conservation of natural game refuges and forests, lacked standing under Administrative Procedure Act to maintain the action because it could not demonstrate that its members would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by the proposed project. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Gibert | 677 F.3d 613 (4th Cir. 2012) | The primary question in this appeal was whether Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in enacting a criminal prohibition against animal fighting. Defendants were indicted, in violation of the Animal Welfare Act, for their roles in organizing, operating, and participating in “gamefowl derbies,” otherwise known as “cockfighting.” Upon the 4th Circuit’s review of the parties' arguments, it held that the animal fighting statute was a legitimate exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. It also held that the statute did not require the government to prove the defendants' knowledge regarding the particular venture's nexus to interstate commerce. Accordingly, the district court’s decision was affirmed. | Case |