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Displaying 21 - 30 of 6822
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Map of Equine Activity Liability Statutes |
The above map details states that have Equine Activity Liability Laws. |
State map | |||
| Friends of Animals v. United States Bureau of Land Management | 548 F. Supp. 3d 39 (D.D.C. 2021) | 2021 WL 2935900 (D.D.C. July 13, 2021) | This case involves a motion for a preliminary injunction by the group Friends of Animals to prevent the Bureau of Land Management from gathering and removing excess horses inside and adjacent to the Onaqui Mountain Herd Management Area (“Onaqui Mountain HMA”) to reduce the number of horses to the low end of the appropriate management level (“AML”). The BLM contends such an accelerated removal is necessary because of the historic drought that has gripped the American West. The court first examined the language and legislative history of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (WHA), noting that the overarching goal of the act is provide balance between the horses and ecological impact on the lands. The WLA requires the Secretary to strike this balance by setting appropriate management levels and deciding on how to deal with excess animals. In addition, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is also implicated with decisions to gather horses which is done primarily through the Environmental Assessment (EA) process. The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction finding the advocacy organizations were unlikely to succeed on merits. | Case | |
| Elliot v. Hurst | 817 S.W.2d 877 (Ark., 1991) | 307 Ark. 134 (1991) |
This tort case involves appellee's suit against appellant for appellant's conversion of appellee's wolf hybrid dog named Rambo. The appellee in this case had placed an ad stating that he had a certain breed of dogs for sale. When appellant went to see the dogs, she noticed a serious leg infection. After consulting with the local prosecutor’s office and an animal organization, she returned to the owner’s home to take the dog in for treatment. The consulting veterinarian determined that the leg had to be amputated. The court held that the recovery was limited to the market value at the time prior to the amputation. |
Case | |
| Peru - Biodiversity - Resolución Legislativa 26181, 1992 | Resolución Legislativa 26181, 1992 | This legislative resolution adopts the Convention on Biological Diversity signed in Rio de Janeiro in June 5, 1992. The CBD strives for the conservation and sustainability of biodiversity and its components. | Statute | ||
| Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) | 2002 SCC 76 | [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 |
The respondent applied for a patent on an invention entitled “transgenic animals”. In its patent application, the respondent seeks to protect both the process by which the "oncomice" are produced and the end product of the process, i.e. the founder mice and the offspring whose cells contain the oncogene. The process and product claims extend to all non‑human mammals. The process claims were allowed by the Patent Examiner, while the product claims were rejected. The appellant Commissioner confirmed the refusal of the product claims. The Federal Court, Trial Division, dismissed the respondent’s appeal from the appellant’s decision. At the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held the appeal should be allowed. A higher life form is not patentable because it is not a “manufacture” or “composition of matter” within the meaning of “invention” in s. 2 of the Patent Act . |
Case | |
| SD - Licenses - 40-34-5. Running at large prohibited by county--County license or tax on dogs | S D C L § 40-34-5 | SD ST § 40-34-5 | This South Dakota statute provides that the board of county commissioners of each of the counties shall have the power to regulate, restrain or prohibit the running at large of dogs and to impose a license or tax on all dogs not licensed or taxed under municipal ordinance, owned or kept by any person within the county. | Statute | |
| State v. Peck | 93 A.3d 256 (Me. 2014) | 2014 ME 74 | Defendant appealed a judgment entered in the District Court after a bench trial found she committed the civil violation of cruelty to animals. Defendant contended that the court abused its discretion in quashing a subpoena that would have compelled one of her witnesses to testify; that the cruelty-to-animals statute is unconstitutionally vague; and that the record contains insufficient evidence to sustain a finding of cruelty to animals and to support the court's restitution order. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, however, disagreed and affirmed the lower court's judgment. | Case | |
| OR - Primates - 603-011-0381 Importation of Nonhuman Primates | OR ADC 603-011-0381 | OAR 603-011-0381 | This Oregon regulation provides that no person shall ship, move, or import into this state any nonhuman primates (including, but not limited to, monkeys, baboons, gibbons, chimpanzees, and marmosets) without first obtaining a permit from the Department. Further, all nonhuman primates shipped, moved, or imported into this state shall also be accompanied by a Certificate of Veterinary Inspection certifying that said animals are free from the following human pathogenic agents | Administrative | |
| MO - Wildlife - Chapter 252. Department of Conservation--Fish and Game. | V. A. M. S. 252.040 | MO ST 252.040 | No wildlife shall be pursued, taken, killed, possessed or disposed of except in the manner, to the extent and at the time or times permitted by such rules and regulations; and any pursuit, taking, killing, possession or disposition thereof, except as permitted by such rules and regulations, are hereby prohibited. Any person violating this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor except that any person violating any of the rules and regulations pertaining to record keeping requirements imposed on licensed fur buyers and fur dealers shall be guilty of an infraction and shall be fined not less than ten dollars nor more than one hundred dollars. At least one case has held this statute to be applicable to dogs chasing deer. | Statute | |
| Dallas Safari Club v. Bernhardt | 453 F. Supp. 3d 391 (D.D.C. 2020) | 2020 WL 1809181 (D.D.C. Apr. 9, 2020) | Individual elephant sport hunters and their hunting organizations (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (the “Service”) seeking to import their sport-hunted elephant trophies from Africa into the United States. The Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the Service to process pending and subsequently filed permit applications. The African Elephant is listed as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and is also a species that is regulated by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”). All African elephant trophy imports require the Service to make an enhancement finding, meaning that the killing of the trophy animal will enhance the survival of the species, and issue an ESA permit. Additionally, certain African elephant trophy imports require a non-detriment finding and a CITES import permit. Historically, the Service made periodic countrywide enhancement and non-detriment findings, however, this came to a halt due to a Presidential tweet surrounding media criticism over the Service’s decision to lift the suspension on Zimbabwe’s ESA enhancement finding. The Court found that injunctive relief was not warranted because the Plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm as to any Plaintiff. The individual Plaintiffs argued that they had suffered both emotional harm and economic harm. However, the Plaintiffs were on notice that their applications could take a significant amount of time to process. Additionally, the emotional distress claimed by the Plaintiffs would be alleviated when the Service issues a decision either granting or denying their permit applications, therefore, the harm that the Plaintiffs were claiming was not irreparable. The Court found that the individual hunter Plaintiffs’ alleged emotional and economic injuries were insufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction. The organizational Plaintiffs argued that they each were suffering irreparable harm derivatively because the Service’s delay in processing permit applications would decrease the popularity of sport hunting in Africa and cause a decrease in funding for conservation efforts. The problem was that the organizational Plaintiffs offered no proof to substantiate this argument. The Court ultimately held that in light of the disruptions caused by COVID-19 and the diminished capacity of the Service to process permit applications during this unprecedented time, it would be unwise and not in the public interest to order the expeditious processing of sport trophy permit applications. The Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. | Case |