Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RI - Cats - Chapter 22. Cat Identification Program and Chapter 24. Permit Program for Cats | Gen.Laws 1956, § 4-22-1 - 10; § 4-24-1 - 13 | RI ST § 4-22-1 - 10; § 4-24-1 - 13 | These Rhode Island section is entitled the "Cat Identification Program." Under this law, cats are required to display some form of identification (tag, tattoo, etc.) in an effort to reduce the feral/stray cat problem. The law reduces the retention period for cats impounded without some form of identification. | Statute |
| MT - Lost Property - RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF FINDERS GENERALLY | MCA 70-5-101 to 70-5-107 | MT ST 70-5-101 to 70-5-107 | This section comprises Montana's lost property provisions. | Statute |
| Shelvey v. Bicknell | 1996CarswellBC1131 |
Both plaintiff (appellant) Shelvey and the defendant (respondent) dog owners were guests of an unnamed third party at that party's beach cabin, where the defendants left their Rottweiler unrestrained on the cabin's deck overnight. The friendly dog jumped over the deck railing to follow the plaintiff to the beach where she was walking; the large, energetic dog bumped her legs while playfully chasing a seagull, knocking her down and leaving her unconscious. The dog had previously knocked its owner and a child down at one time due to its large size and weight. A trial judge earlier found that the defendant owners were not liable to the plaintiff in negligence as the freak accident was not reasonably foreseeable; the Court of Appeal concurred, finding no negligence. Scienter was not argued or discussed at either level. |
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| State v. Griffin | 684 P.2d 32 (Or. 1984) | 69 Or.App. 199 (1984) |
Appeal of a conviction in district court for cruelty to animals. Defendant was convicted of cruelty to animals after having been found to have recklessly caused and allowed his dog to kill two cats, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals held that forfeiture of defendant's dog was an impermissible condition of probation. |
Case |
| Young v. California Fish and Game Commission | 24 Cal. App. 5th 1178 (Ct. App. 2018), reh'g denied (July 20, 2018), review denied (Sept. 26, 2018) | 235 Cal. Rptr. 3d 366 (Ct. App. 2018), reh'g denied (July 20, 2018), review denied (Sept. 26, 2018) | Kele Young operated a wildlife preserve called Magic Jungle. Young received her first permit from the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (the Department) in 1990 which was renewed each year thereafter. On August 8, 2013, Young filed her restricted species permit renewal application. On the application, Young stated that she was exempt from payment of the permit fee, application fee, and the inspection fee. Young’s permit was set to expire on November 9, 2013. The Department notified Young on July 14, 2014 that her renewal application was incomplete because the fee had not been paid. The Department agreed to waive the $56.14 permit fee and the $56.65 application fee, but the Department stated that she still had to pay the $227.91 inspection fee. Young was given 30 days to pay the fee. The Department ultimately denied Young’s renewal application. Young appealed to the Commission. The Commission found for the Department. Young then sought a writ of mandate to require the Department to perform its duty to determine whether justified reasons existed to grant or deny Young’s request for a waiver of certain restricted species permitting fees. The trial court denied Young’s writ and this appeal followed. Young failed to support many of her arguments by reference to the record or legal authority, therefore, the only issues that were reviewed were whether the Wildlife Agencies could refuse to waive the inspection fee without consideration of the justified reasons or whether it was in the best interests of the public to waive the fee and if reversal was warranted due to the trial court failing to issue a statement of decision. The Court of Appeals found that no statement of decision was required by the trial court because a statement of decision is only required as to issues of fact and the trial court stated that it was only deciding issues of law and that there was no dispute as to the facts. As for the inspection fee, the Court found that the regulations specifically provided for a waiver of the permit fee but did not contain any other language that would allow for a waiver of the inspection fee. The permit fee was separate from the inspection fee and nothing in the regulations entitled her to a waiver of the inspection fee nor granted the Department the authority to waive such fee. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the petition for writ of mandate. | Case |
| State Animal Anti-Cruelty Laws |
This map contains links to the animal anti-cruelty laws for all 50 states. Each state's set of laws contains a collection of relevant cruelty laws, including dogfighting, intentional cruelty, neglect/abandonment, and bestiality. |
State map | ||
| NY - Exotic - Chapter 43-B. Of the Consolidated Laws. | McKinney's E. C. L. § 11-0917 | NY ENVIR CONSER § 11-0917 | This New York laws begin by stating that wild game and other wildlife may only be possessed if lawfully taken in compliance with the Fish and Wildlife Law and the accompanying regulations. Skunk, bobcat, mink, raccoon and muskrat may be bought and sold alive during their respective open seasons. No live wolf, coyote, coydog, fox, skunk, venomous reptile or raccoon shall be possessed or transported, except under a license or permit issued by the department. Every such license or permit shall contain a prominent notice warning the licensee or permittee of his or her duty to exercise due care in safeguarding the public from attack; failure to do so is a crime under section three hundred seventy of the agriculture and markets law. | Statute |
| MI - Hunting - Chapter 324. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. | M. C. L. A. 324.41701 - 41712 | MI ST 324.41701 - 41712 | These sections set out the guidelines for private shooting preserves, including the species of wild animals and birds permitted to be hunted. | Statute |
| State v. Dye | 309 P.3d 1192 (Wash.,2013) |
The Defendant appealed his conviction for residential burglary. The victim in the case was an adult man with significant developmental disabilities. At trial, the State obtained permission to allow a dog named "Ellie" to sit at the victim's feet during testimony. On appeal of the Court of Appeal's decision, the Supreme Court held that defendant failed to establish that his rights to a fair trial were violated (283 P.3d 1130 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2012)). Further, any prejudice that resulted from Ellie's presence was minor and largely mitigated by the limiting instruction that the trial court gave. The Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and the Court of Appeals decision was affirmed. |
Case | |
| Hammer v. American Kennel Club | 304 A.D.2d 74 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,2003) | 758 N.Y.S.2d 276, 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 11491 (2003) |
Plaintiff Jon Hammer is the owner of a pure-bred Brittany Spaniel which has a natural, undocked tail approximately ten (10) inches long. He contends that tail docking is a form of animal cruelty, and that the practical effect of defendant American Kennel Club's tail standards for Brittany Spaniels is to effectively exclude his dog from meaningfully competing shows unless he complies with what he perceives as an unfair and discriminatory practice. Specifically, his amended complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the complained-of standard (1) unlawfully discriminates against plaintiff by effectively precluding him from entering his dog in breed competitions, (2) is arbitrary and capricious, (3) violates Agriculture and Markets Law § 353, and (4) is null and void as in derogation of law; he further seeks an injunction prohibiting defendants from applying, enforcing or utilizing the standard. The court held that plaintiff lacked standing to obtain any of the civil remedies he sought for the alleged violation of Agriculture and Markets Law Section 353. The Legislature's inclusion of a complete scheme for enforcement of its provisions precludes the possibility that it intended enforcement by private individuals as well. The dissent disagreed with the majority's standing analysis, finding that plaintiff's object is not to privately enforce § 353, insofar as seeking to have the defendants' prosecuted for cruelty. Rather, plaintiff was seeking a declaration that the AKC's standard for judging the Brittany Spaniel deprives him of a benefit of membership on the basis of his unwillingness to violate a state law and, thus, he wanted to enjoin defendants from enforcing that standard against him. The dissent found that whether tail docking for purely cosmetic reasons violates § 353 is solely a question of law and entirely appropriate for a declaratory judgment. Cosmetic docking of tails was wholly unjustifiable under the law in the dissent's eyes. While plaintiff pointed out that docking may serve some purposes for hunting dogs, it is not a justification for docking the tails of non-hunting dogs, such as plaintiff's, for purposes of AKC competitions. |
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