Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Northern Ireland - Wildlife - Wildlife and Natural Environment Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 | 2011 Chapter 15 | This Act provides various protections to certain wild animals, and prohibits facilitating, attending or participating in hare coursing events. | Statute | ||
| Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools | 137 S.Ct. 743 (U.S., 2017) | 2017 WL 685533 (U.S., 2017) |
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) offers federal funds to States in exchange for “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) to children with certain disabilities. The Act also establishes formal administrative procedures for resolving disputes between parents and schools. When trained service dog, Wonder, attempted to join Plaintiff E.F. in kindergarten, officials at Ezra Eby Elementary School refused. Plaintiff E.F. is a child with severe cerebral palsy; Wonder assists her with various daily life activities. E.F.'s parents, Plaintiffs Stacy and Brent Fry, removed E.F. from the school and filed a complaint with the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR). The Plaintiffs claimed that the exclusion of E.F.'s service dog violated her rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. OCR agreed, and school officials invited E.F. to return to the school. Yet, the Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court against the Defendants, Ezra Eby's local and regional school districts, and the principal, (collectively, the school districts). In the federal suit, Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants violated Title II and § 504 and sought declaratory and monetary relief. The Defendant school districts filed a motion to dismiss. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the motion. The Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit where the District Court's motion to dismiss was affirmed. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court of the United States vacated and remanded. The Supreme Court held that, on remand, the Appeals Court should: (1) establish whether (or to what extent) the plaintiff parents invoked the IDEA's dispute resolution process before bringing this suit; and (2) decide whether Plaintiffs' actions reveal that the gravamen of their complaint is indeed the denial of FAPE. The court reasoned that Exhaustion of the IDEA's administrative procedures is unnecessary where the gravamen of the Plaintiffs' suit is something other than the denial of the IDEA's core guarantee of a FAPE. |
Case | |
| Kitchin ex rel. Kitchin v. Halifax County | 665 S.E.2d 760 (N.C.App.,2008) |
In this North Carolina case, defendant dog owners appealed from a decision of the County Board of Health that ruled their dog could not be returned home because of the dog's potential exposure to rabies as result of attacking a raccoon (the dog was scheduled for euthanization). After the Board denied the owners' appeal, they filed a complaint against county which contained motions for preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent dog's quarantine and for class certification. The Court of Appeals held that the owners' appeal of Board's decision to quarantine dog was moot because dog had already been returned home. The action against the animal control officers was dismissed because the officers were shielded by governmental immunity. |
Case | ||
| US - Endangered Species - Part 81. Conservation of Endangered and Threatened Species | 69 FR 4557 | 50 C.F.R. § 81.1 to .15 |
These ESA (Endangered Species Act) regulations relate to agreements with the states, or signed documented statements of the actions to be taken by the State(s) and the Secretary in furthering the purposes of the Act. The Secretary is authorized by the Act to cooperate with any State which establishes and maintains an adequate and active program for the conservation of various endangered and threatened species. |
Administrative | |
| UNITED STATES of America v. Robert J. v. STEVENS, Appellant |
The Third Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 48, the federal law that criminalizes depictions of animal cruelty, is an unconstitutional infringement on free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. This brief supports the United States' petition for certiorari. Cert. was granted in April of 2009 by the U.S. Supreme Court. |
Pleading | |||
| US - Bears - Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Reexamination of Regulatory Mechanisms in Relation to the 1998 Flori | FR Doc. 04-690 Filed 1-13-04 |
The Fish and Wildlife Service reexamined the regulatory mechanisms in relation to the 1998 finding for a petition to list the Florida black bear (Ursus americanus floridanus), under the Endangered Species Act. Pursuant to a court order, the Service reexamined only one factor, the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms in effect at the time of our previous 1998 12-month finding. Pursuant to that order, the Service reexamined the existing finding considering the laws, regulations, and policies that directly or indirectly provide protection to the bear or its habitats. Based on this review, the FWS concluded that the existing regulatory mechanisms applicable in 1998 are not inadequate and do not warrant listing the Florida black bear. |
Administrative | ||
| Montier v. Hall | 2002 CarswellAlta 156 | 2002 ABQB 70, 314 A.R. 299 |
This is a Provincial Court Civil Claims appeal from an award to plaintiffs/respondents for $865.00 in veterinary expenses as against defendant/appellant. This matter arose out of the sale of a black female Belgian Sheepdog that was eventually euthanized by the respondents at four months of age, two months after it was purchased due to serious hereditary defects. The purchase agreement signed by respondents warranted the puppy against serious hereditary defects or illness until 25 months of age, but limited the damages to replacement of the puppy with another puppy. In affirming the award of damages, this court found that the contract does not specifically exclude compensation for veterinary expenses or for consequential damages; hence, it does not exclude liability by the supplier for the purchaser's veterinary expenses incurred as a result the defective dog. |
Case | |
| Gill Terrace Ret. Apartments, Inc. v. Johnson | 2017 VT 88, 177 A.3d 1087 (Vt. 2017) | 2017 VT 88 (Vt. Oct. 6, 2017), 2017 WL 4453007 (Vt. Oct. 6, 2017) | This is an appeal of a trial court's ruling in favor of a landlord finding that the tenant violated two material terms of her residential rental agreement. One of the material violations involved the keeping of a pet in violation of a no-pets policy. The facts show that the dog, "Dutchess," initially came to the tenant's apartment in 2009 with the tenant's son. While the dog never attacked another person or pet, it did display aggressive behavior, including lunging, baring her teeth, and rearing up on her hind legs. Other tenants expressed fear of Dutchess. After the son moved out in 2013, the dog stayed, and, in 2014, the landlord sent tenant a letter indicating the keeping of the dog was a violation of the lease. Two months after that notice, an informal meeting was held and tenant then claimed the dog as a reasonable accommodation for her disability. The landlord's attorney sent paperwork to effectuate this request, which the tenant said she never received. Months later, the landlord served the tenant with an eviction action to which tenant responded with a request to keep her dog as a reasonable accommodation. The request to keep a pet as a reasonable accommodation was granted shortly thereafter by landlord; however, the landlord did not approve of Dutchess as the specific animal due to concerns of behavior and hostility toward other residents. At an eviction hearing in June of 2016, the landlord's request to terminate the tenant's lease was granted by the court, which concluded that the reasonable accommodation for an assistance animal did not extend to Dutchess. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court noted that a request for an assistance animal as a reasonable accommodation may be denied if "the specific assistance animal in question poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others." While there was no dispute in this case that the tenant has a disability-related need for an ESA, there was credible evidence that supported the lower court's decision that Dutchess posed a threat and/or would cause substantial physical damage to the property. This included testimony from other tenants and tenant's own statements that she might not be able to control Dutchess. The court stated: "[l]ike the trial court, we acknowledge tenant's attachment to Dutchess and her need for an emotional support animal, but the court properly weighed the evidence regarding Dutchess's aggressive behavior against landlord's concerns for the safety and wellbeing of the other residents." The court concluded that the lower court did not err in affirming landlord's denial of tenant's reasonable accommodation request. | Case | |
| MN - Hospitals and pets - § 144A.30. Pets in nursing homes | M.S.A. § 144A.30 | Minn. Stat. Ann. § 144A.30 (West) | This Minnesota statute states that animal nursing homes must be "reasonable" in their care, type, and maintenance of pets. | Statute | |
| US - Marine Mammals - Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations | 1999 WL 379911 (F.R.) |
NMFS proposes regulations to implement provisions of the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA). These regulations would allow the entry of yellowfin tuna into the United States under certain conditions from nations signatory to the International Dolphin Conservation Program (IDCP) that otherwise would be under embargo. |
Administrative |