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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
Kimball v. Betts 99 Wash. 348 (1918) 169 P. 849 (1918)

In an action for conversion of household goods kept for use and not for sale, it is not necessary to prove that such goods have no market value as a condition precedent to the right to introduce proof of actual value. If they have no market value, the measure of damages for their conversion is their value to the owner based on the actual money lost.

Case
Thurber v. Apmann 91 A.D.3d 1257 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2012) 2012 WL 225395 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.); 936 N.Y.S.2d 789

In 2007, the plaintiff and defendant were walking their respective dogs when one of defendant's two dogs, a retired K-9 dog, attacked the plaintiff's dog. Plaintiff sued defendant for damages she received as a result. While each dog did received "handler protection" training (where a K-9 dog is trained to react to an aggressive attack on defendant while on duty), that situation had never arisen because the dogs acted in passive roles as explosive detection dogs. Plaintiff countered that the severity of the attack coupled with the dogs' breed and formal police training should have put defendant on notice of the dogs' vicious propensities. In affirming the summary judgment, this court found that the formal police training was not evidence of viciousness and there was no support to plaintiff's assertion that defendant kept the dogs as "guard dogs."

Case
ZOOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF CINCINNATI v. THE GORILLA FOUNDATION Slip Copy, 2019 WL 414971 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2019) In 1991, the plaintiff, Zoological Society of Cincinnati, transferred a western lowland Gorilla named Ndume who had been living at the Zoo to The Gorilla Foundation (TGF) in Northern California. Ndume was sent to TGF in hopes that he and another gorilla there, named Koko, would mate and produce offspring. That never happened. In 2015, the Zoo and TGF entered into a new written agreement which expressly superseded any prior agreements. The agreement provided that upon the death of Koko, Ndume was to be placed at an institution that is accredited by the Association of Zoos and Aquariums (AZA). TGF is not an AZA accredited institution. KoKo died and the Zoo now wants to transfer Ndume back to the zoo. TGF has not made arrangements for a transfer to be carried out. The Zoo brought this suit seeking specific enforcement of the 2015 agreement and contends that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor. TGF argued that the agreement was illegal and unenforceable because the transfer would harm Ndume. TGF identified a number of potential risks, particularly, that Ndume has a Balantidium Coli infection. TGF contended that stress could trigger an outbreak which could be fatal. The court was unpersuaded and stated that TGF signed the 2015 agreement less than 3 years before the present dispute arose and that all of the circumstances that TGF contends makes compliance with the agreement risky existed when the agreement was negotiated. TGF also contended that the agreement is impracticable due to unreasonable (non-monetary) costs. However, the Court again stated that TGF knew these facts and circumstances when it entered into the agreement. The Court granted the Zoo's motion for summary judgment and denied TGF's request for a continuance to permit it to take discovery. The parties were ordered to confer and attempt to reach a consensus on as many aspects of the protocol for transporting Ndume to the Zoo as possible. If within 30 days of the date of the order the parties cannot reach a consensus, they will have to file a joint statement setting out any issues on which they have reached a stalemate. Case
Colombia, LEY 84, 1989, Statue of Animal Protection LEY 84, 1989 Ley 84 is the National Statute of Animal Protection in Colombia. Ley 84 establishes the general duties of humans towards animals. Among these duties includes the duty to provide animals with enough food, water and medicine to guarantee their well-being; the duty to provide animals with appropriate space so they can move adequately; and the duty to provide appropriate shelter. Article 7 contains the exceptions to the duty to protect animals, meaning that the practices listed in this section are legal under the current legal system even though they might be inherently cruel. This exceptions correspond to the different variations and forms of bullfighting rejoneo, coleo, las corridas de toros, novilladas, corralejas, becerradas y tientas, and cockfighting. Ley 84 also regulates the slaughter of animals for non-consumption, animals in experiments and research, animal transportation, as well as hunting and fishing, resources, penalties, legal competency, and procedures to follow in regards to this law. Statute
PA - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5531 - 5561; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3129; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8340.3 PA ST 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5531 - 5561; PA ST 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3129; PA ST 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8340.3 This document contains Pennsylvania's anti-cruelty laws that were amended in 2017 and 2018. In 2018, the state added a rescue and immunity provision for dogs and cats in "hot cars." Section 5532 covers neglect of animal and states that a person who has care of animal must provide: (1) necessary sustenance and potable water; (2) access to clean and sanitary shelter and protection from the weather; and (3) necessary veterinary care. Violation is a summary offense unless the violation causes bodily injury or puts the animal in imminent danger of bodily injury (then, it is a misdemeanor of third degree). A person commits cruelty to animals (Sec. 5533) if he or she intentionally, knowingly or recklessly illtreats, overloads, beats, abandons or abuses an animal. Aggravated cruelty is provided by Sec. 5534 and is defined as torture, or neglect or cruelty that causes serious bodily injury or death of an animal. Such conduct is a felony of the third degree. Another section creates legal presumptions with regard to tethering of a dog that relate to the length of time tethered, the type of collar/tether, and even the outside temperature (both low and high temperatures). Section 5539 makes it unlawful to transport an equine animal in or upon a vehicle with two or more levels stacked on top of one another. The state also prohibits the cropping of dogs' ears, debarking of dogs, docking of dogs' tails, performance of surgical births of dogs, and declawing of cats by persons other than veterinary doctors while the animals are anesthetized. Animal fighting is prohibited in the chapter as a felony of the third degree. Other provisions concern selling of dog and cat pelts, live animals as prizes, and harassment of service and police animals. Exemptions under the act include state game/hunting laws, the killing of a dog or cat in accordance with the Animal Destruction Method Authorization Law, the killing of an animal found pursuing domestic animals/fowl, destruction of public nuisance dogs, pest control, "[s]hooting activities not otherwise prohibited under this subchapter," and the authorized use of research animals. Statute
MT - Dangerous - CHAPTER 23. DOMESTIC ANIMAL CONTROL AND PROTECTION. MCA 7-23-2109 MT ST 7-23-2109 This Montana statute provides that the county governing body may regulate, restrain, control, kill, or quarantine any vicious dog, whether such dog is licensed or unlicensed, by the adoption of an ordinance which substantially complies with state dangerous dog laws. Statute
IN - Hunting - Chapter 37. Harassment of Hunters, Trappers, and Fishermen I.C. 14-22-37-1 to 14-22-37-3 IN ST 14-22-37-1 to 14-22-37-3

This section reflects Indiana's hunter harassment law. A person who knowingly or intentionally interferes with the legal taking of a game animal by another person with intent to prevent the taking commits a Class C misdemeanor. A person who fails to obey the order of a law enforcement officer to desist from conduct in violation of section 2 of this chapter commits a Class B misdemeanor if the law enforcement officer (1) observed the person or (2) has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has engaged in the conduct that day or intends to engage in the conduct that day on specific premises.

Statute
Commonwealth v. Lee 2007 WL 4555253 (Pa. Super. 2007)

Sheriffs removed Defendant's starving dog from his garage and took it to a shelter for hospitalization.  Following a conviction and sentencing for animal cruelty and an order of restitution payable to the shelter, Defendant appealed.  The Superior Court remanded for re-sentencing and vacated the order of restitution, holding that the shelter was not a victim of Defendant's actions, and that restitution is only payable to humans.

Case
Oak Creek Whitetail Ranch, L.L.C. v. Lange 326 S.W.3d 549 (Mo.App. E.D., 2010) 2010 WL 4751676 (Mo.App. E.D.)

A Missouri statute places liability on a dog owner where such dog kills or maims a sheep or "other domestic animal" of another. On December 10, 2006, three dogs of Defendant Glendon Lange entered Oak Creek’s deer breeding farm and killed 21 of Oak Creek's "breeder deer." The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, disagreed with the trial court, finding that "domestic" should have been interpreted by the "plain meaning" of the word, which therefore includes Oak Creek’s breeder deer.

Case
Causa Nº 17001-06-00/13 “Incidente de apelación en autos G. B., R. s/inf. ley 14346” Causa Nº 17001-06-00/13 This is an appeal of a decision in first instance where the lower court gave the custody of 68 dogs to the Center for Prevention of Animal Cruelty. The 68 dogs were found in extremely poor conditions, sick, malnourished, dehydrated under the custody of the Defendant. Various dogs had dermatitis, conjunctivitis, otitis, sparse hair and boils, lacerations, pyoderma and ulcers. The officers that executed the search also found the decomposing body of a dead dog inside the premises. The lower court determined the defendant had mental disabilities, which did not allow her to comprehend the scope of her acts, for which she was not found guilty of animal cruelty. However, the court determined that she was not suited to care for the dogs. The Defendant appealed the decision arguing that the dogs were not subject to confiscation. Case

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