Results

Displaying 71 - 80 of 6577
Titlesort descending Author Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
A Show of Humanity to Slow Hugh, the Manatee: A Property Rights Proposal for the Sea Cow (with a Brief Consideration for his Friend, the Brown Pelican) Mark A. Mullins Animal Legal & Historical Center

This paper explores the background of the manatee and the issues the species faces. It then sets forth some of the applicable laws that are currently in place, followed by a consideration of the benefits and shortcomings of those laws. Finally, it reflects on some changes that have been suggested, and, ultimately, introduces a new approach—providing property rights to the West Indian Manatee—with a response to potential criticism in mind.

Article
A SLAVE BY ANY OTHER NAME IS STILL A SLAVE: THE TILIKUM CASE AND APPLICATION OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT TO NONHUMAN ANIMALS Jeffrey S. Kerr, Martina Bernstein, Amanda Schwoerke, Matthew D. Strugar, Jared S. Goodman 19 Animal L. 221 (2013) On its face, the Thirteenth Amendment outlaws the conditions and practices of slavery and involuntary servitude wherever they may exist in this country—irrespective of the victim’s race, creed, sex, or species. In 2011, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, on behalf of five wild-captured orcas, sued SeaWorld for enslaving the orcas in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The case presented, for the first time, the question of whether the Thirteenth Amendment’s protections can extend to nonhuman animals. This Article examines the lawsuit’s factual, theoretical, and strategic underpinnings, and argues that the district court’s opinion ultimately dismissing the suit failed to address the critical issues that animated this case of first impression: Who “counts” as a legal person for the purposes of law? Is it time to recognize nonhuman animals as legal persons, based on progressing scientific and normative views? What principles underlie the Thirteenth Amendment? When and how does the application of the Constitution expand? Can the meaning of the Constitution evolve to encompass the interests of nonhuman animals? Drawing on the United States Supreme Court’s long history of evolving constitutional interpretation, this Article presents four theories of constitutional change, under which the meanings of “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” are expansive enough to include nonhuman animals. Despite the district court’s decision, the case can be properly viewed as the first step toward the legal recognition that the Thirteenth Amendment protects the rights of nonhuman animals to be free from bondage. Article
A Step at a Time: New Zealand’s Progress Towards Hominid Rights Rowan Taylor 7 Animal L. 35 (2001)

Mr. Taylor writes about the Great Ape Project's campaign to win fundamental rights for all hominids with New Zealand's Animal Welfare Act. While the Act was a significant step in the struggle for hominids' rights, larger steps, including a Nonhuman Hominid Protection Bill, will soon follow.

Article
A Survey of Agreements and Federal Legislation Protecting Polar Bears in the United States Jamie M. Woolsey 1 Journal of Animal Law 73 (2005)

Throughout the past few decades, international concern for polar bear welfare has increased dramatically. The multinational agreements forged for their conservation require significant policing, cooperation, and understanding of the complex ecological and economic considerations surrounding these predators. Woolsey’s article explores the international agreements and measures designed to save both the bears and their critical habitat.

Article
A “FISHEYE” LENS ON THE TECHNOLOGICAL DILEMMA: THE SPECTER OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ANIMALS George Kimbrell & Paige Tomaselli 18 Animal L. 75 (2011)

One year ago, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) proposed approval of the first genetically engineered (GE or transgenic) animal for food production—a salmon engineered to grow much faster than normal using genetic material from an ocean pout. Faced with concerns from scientists and the public that these “super” salmon will escape into the wild and be the final blow to wild salmon, proponents crafted a scheme that is half Michael Crichton, half Kurt Vonnegut: The engineered salmon eggs will begin life in a lab on a frozen Canadian island, then be airlifted to a guarded Panamanian fortress, where they will grow in inland tanks. After the fish reach maturity, the company will ship them back to the U.S. and sell them in grocery stores, likely without any labeling. Unfortunately, this is not a bad science fiction novel. How did we get to this juncture, the brink of this approval? This Essay is a snapshot of GE animals through the lens of the first one proposed for commercial approval.

Article
ABC- Test DFthysyhkfhkjdgh Policy
Abundant Animal Care, LLC v. Gray 316 Ga.App. 193 (Ga.App. 2012) 2012 WL 2125842 (Ga.App.)

While either shadowing her aunt or during her first day working at the veterinary clinic, the plaintiff was bitten three times by a dog she had taken outside to exercise. Plaintiff subsequently filed numerous claims against the veterinary clinic, including: negligence; negligence per se; nuisance; and violation of a premise liability and a dangerous dog statute. After the lower court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, the defendant appealed to the Georgia appellate court. The appeals court stated that in a dog bite case, the plaintiff needed to produce evidence that the dog had a vicious propensity. Since the plaintiff failed to produce such evidence, the court held the defendant should have been granted a motion for summary judgment on its premise liability, nuisance, dangerous dog statute, and negligence per se claims. As for the negligence claim, the court held the defendant should have been granted a motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff was not aware of internal procedures to protect invitees and because the injuries were not proximately caused by negligent supervision. The lower court's judgment was therefore reversed.

Case
Access Now, Inc. v. Town of Jasper, Tennessee 268 F.Supp.2d 973, 26 NDLR P 107 (E.D.Tenn.,2003) Plaintiffs Access Now, Inc. and Pamela Kitchens, acting as parent and legal guardian on behalf of her minor daughter Tiffany brought this action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against defendant Town of Jasper, Tennessee under the ADA after the town denied her request to keep a keep miniature horse as service animal at her residence. The town's ordinance at issue provided that no person shall keep an enumerated animal within 1000 feet of any residence without a permit from the health officer. The Jasper Municipal Court held a hearing and determined that the keeping of the horse was in violation of the code and ordered it removed from the property. On appeal, this Court found that while the plaintiffs contended that the horse helped Tiffany in standing, walking, and maintaining her balance, Tiffany does not have a disability as defined by the ADA and does not have a genuine need to use the horse as a service animal. Further, the Court found that the horse was not a service animal within the meaning of 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 because the animal was not used in the capacity of a service animal and instead was a companion or pet to Tiffany. The plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed with prejudice. Case
Access to Eagles and Eagle Parts: Environmental Protection v. Native American Free Exercise of Religion Antonia M. DeMeo 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 771

This article explores the inherent conflict between the federal laws to protect eagles through the BGEPA, MBTA, and ESA and Native American religious rights. The author finds that the current eagle permit system for Native Americans is incompatible with free exercise of religion. The author concludes that a revamping of the federal eagle permit system as well as the passage of the Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act (NAFERA)would help accommodate religious needs of Native Americans.

Article
Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 7/2021 - Ciudad de México ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD 7/2021 Brought by the National Human Rights Commission, this action of unconstitutionality seeks the annulment of Article 10Bis, Section II, Subsection i) of the Animal Protection Law of Mexico City. This provision was added through Decree Number 495, published in the city's Official Gazette on December 16, 2020. The provision at issue allowed the Animal Squad (Brigada Animal) to enter enclosed areas where there was a presumption of animal cruelty without a warrant. The Supreme Court of Justice (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación (SCJN)) invalidated section i), section II, of article 10 Bis of the Animal Protection Law of Mexico City. Case

Pages