Results
Title |
Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. v. Mackie | 681 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1982) |
Defendants challenge their eagle convictions under the MBTA, alleging that they should have been charged under the more specific BGEPA. Court holds the government may elect to proceed under either statute; nothing in the language or legislative history proscribes prosecution under the more general MBTA. For further discussion on the intersection of the MBTA and the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Martinelli | 240 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Cal. 1965) |
Court held the 1962 version of the BGEPA mandates a jury trial where defendant requests one, despite the fact it constitutes a "petty offense." For further discussion of criminal prosecutions under the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. McDougall | 25 F.Supp.2d 85 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) |
Defendants Goodfriend and Benney, commercial fishermen licensed pursuant to the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC"), are charged with catching and failing to return substantial quantities of eel and walleye from Lake Ontario and New York waters in violation of New York law that prohibits commerce in these fish because of health and conservation concerns. Aware of the ban prohibiting the sale of eel and walleye taken from these waters, Goodfriend and Benney subsequently sold the eel and walleye to a host of fish wholesalers and retailers, located within and outside New York. Defendant truck driver's alleged filing of false Canadian customs forms relating to eel and walleye he was transporting from the U.S. to his Canadian employer were violations of the Lacey Act, regardless of whether these acts violated Canadian law. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Miranda | 835 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1988) |
Jesus Ismael Miranda with his company, J.M. Seafood, Inc., and Mario Gonzalez with his company, Mario Seafood Company, were convicted of conspiring in Florida to sell undersized spiny lobster tails, also known as "shorts." The case was ultimately dismissed without prejudice because of a violation of the Speedy Trial Act. The court did find sufficient evidence that defendant and his company conspired to sell undersized spiny lobster tails where an undercover agent found sufficient connections in the form of conversations and business dealing between defendant and co-defendant Gonzales. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Mitchell | 985 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir. 1993) |
Defendant, a zoologist working for the Department of Interior, was charged in nine count indictment taking and transporting animals in violation of foreign law under the Lacey Act among other violations. Defendant filed motion to dismiss and government filed motion to determine foreign law. The government alleged in Count 8 that in September of 1987, Mitchell transported the hides and horns of a Punjab urial (wild sheep) and a Chinkara gazelle out of Pakistan and into the United States knowing that the animals had been taken, possessed or transported in violation of Pakistani law; the Pakistani Imports and Exports (Control) Act of 1950 and the Punjab Wildlife Act of 1974. The court rejected defendant's reading of the imports and exports law and found it unnecessary to determine the constitutionality of the Punjab Wildlife Act as the Lacey Act impinges on whether defendant violated the portions of the law prohibiting possession of the animals without a permit. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Molt | 599 F.2d 1217 (3rd Cir. 1979) | 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 14380 |
Defendants were indicted for conspiracy to smuggle snakes and other reptiles into the United States in violation of the Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 43. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss counts based on alleged violations of the laws of Fiji and of Papua New Guinea, finding that foreign laws and regulations referred to in the statute were designed and intended for the protection of wildlife in those countries. On appeal, the trial court's order dismissing an indictment against defendants for smuggling wildlife was affirmed as to Fiji, where the regulation relied on was a revenue ordinance. The court reversed as to Papua New Guinea where the law was intended to protect wildlife in the country of origin. |
Case |
| U.S. v. Molt | 615 F.2d 141 (3rd Cir. 1980) | 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 20576 | Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of knowingly importing Fijian reptiles contrary to the Tariff Act and of conspiring to commit such offense. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain finding of knowing importation and of receiving and concealing illegally imported reptiles. | Case |
| U.S. v. Molt | 631 F.2d 258 (3rd Cir. 1980) | 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13223; 10 ELR 20777 |
The court affirmed a judgment of sentence entered following defendant's conditional plea of guilty to smuggling and to violating the Lacey Act. The court held that the district court properly denied defendant's Speedy Trial Act motion where defendant incorrectly computed the number of excludable days. Therefore, the court concluded that more than 120 non-excludable days did not elapse between the indictment and the trial. |
Case |
| U.S. v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n, Inc. | 45 F.Supp.2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999) |
Defendant on appeal contends that its conduct of electrocuting migratory birds does not fall within the ambit of either the MBTA or the BGEPA because each statute is directed at the more traditional "physical" takings of migratory birds through hunting and poaching. The court disagrees, finding the plain language of the statute and legislative history demonstrate an intent to include electrocutions. The court further delineates the differences in intent under each statute, finding that while the MBTA is a strict liability crime, the BGEPA is not. For further discussion on the intersection of the MBTA and the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Okelberry | 112 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (D. Utah 2000) |
Defense counsel not deemed ineffective for failing to advise defendant that a conviction under the BGEPA could result in loss of grazing rights. |
Case |