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U.S. ex rel. Haight v. Catholic Healthcare West 594 F.3d 694 (C.A. 9 (Ariz.), 2010) 2010 WL 376093 (C.A.9 (Ariz.))

The plaintiffs, In Defense of Animals and Patricia Haight brought suit against the defendants, Michael Berens, the principal research investigator of the study in question, and the Barrow Neurological Institute, St. Joseph’s Hospital and Medical Center, Catholic Healthcare West Arizona, and Catholic Healthcare West, his employers, under the False Claims Act.  In 1997, defendant Michael Berens, Ph.D., submitted a grant application to the NIH in which he sought federal funding for a project to develop a canine model to study glioma, a form of human brain cancer, and attempted to create a process for implanting gliomas in the brains of beagles. The plaintiffs brought suit against Dr. Berens under the False Claims Act asserting that he had lied in his grant application in order to obtain NIH funding. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the challenged grant application statements were objectively false.   In response, the plaintiffs filed a notice to appeal 51 days later, relying on a circuit court precedent allowing plaintiffs 60 days to file a notice of appeal in these types of cases.   However, an intervening Supreme Court decision declared that plaintiffs have only 30 days to file a notice to appeal in this type of case.   This case was amended and superseded by US ex rel Haight v. Catholic Healthcare West , 602 F.3d 949 (9th Cir., 2010).

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U.S. IVORY TRADE: CAN A CRACKDOWN ON TRAFFICKING SAVE THE LAST TITAN? Beth Allgood, Marina Ratchford, Peter LaFontaine 20 Animal L. 27 (2013) Rampant poaching has put African elephants on the verge of extinction in the wild, and the United States (U.S.) is complicit in this crisis. Despite the best efforts of federal agencies, porous national borders, legal loopholes, and deep-seated difficulties in law enforcement make the U.S. a major market for illicit ivory. While the White House, the United Nations, and the European Union, along with other voices, are sounding alarms, bold and concrete actions have been slow in coming. The U.S., in particular, is only beginning to acknowledge its own role in the slaughter, and still relies on a patchwork of inadequate laws and regulations to control its domestic ivory trade. The U.S. must quickly put a halt to its domestic ivory trade by adequately funding customs and wildlife inspectors and addressing the problem at every step along the chain of destruction—from the poachers and militants on the ground in Africa, to the international criminal syndicates underwriting the logistics of trafficking, to the consumers whose demand drives the crisis to ever-greater depths. This Article, analyzing never-before released data from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, shines a light on the scope and scale of the underground trade in the U.S., unpacks the problems facing regulators and enforcement officials, and builds the case for a total ban on the commercial ivory trade, which threatens the existence of one of the planet’s greatest icons. Article
U.S. Sportsmen's Alliance Foundation v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 867 A.2d 1147 (N.J. 2005) 182 N.J. 461 (S. Ct. 2005)

The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Division of Fish and Wildlife executed an administrative order preventing the issuance of bear hunting permits.  Hunters and hunting organizations sought judicial review of the administrative decision.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey ultimately held it was within the authority of the Environmental Protection Commissioner to approve policies of the Fish & Wildlife Council and, therefore, execute the administrative order against bear hunting permits.

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U.S. v. 2,507 Live Canary Winged Parakeets 689 F.Supp. 1106 (S.D.Fla., 1988) 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,101 (1988)

Plaintiff U.S. sought to forfeit the Defendant parakeets on the ground that they were imported in violation of Peruvian law and consequently, in violation of the Lacey Act.  The court held that, if even the "innocent owner" defense was available under the Lacey Act (which the court held it is not under the forfeiture provision of the statute), the claimant importer never attempted to independently confirm or verify that the parakeet species in question (brotogeris versicolorus) could be lawfully imported from Peru.  Thus, the court held the forfeiture valid where the U.S. established by probable cause to believe the Lacey Act was violated where the testimony at trial established that Peruvian Supreme Decree No. 934-73-AG prohibits from anywhere in the national territory the exportation of wild live animals coming from the forest or jungle region. 

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U.S. v. 3,210 crusted sides of Caiman crocodilus yacare 636 F.Supp. 1281 (S.D. Fla. 1986)

The plaintiff, the United States of America, seeks forfeiture of the defendant, 10,870 crusted sides of Caiman crocodilus yacare, an endangered species of wildlife (hides) transported from Bolivia to the U.S. in violation of the Lacey Act, among other statutes.  The court found that the testimony concerning the shrinkage of the crocodile hides during tanning did not meet the buren of the claimed owners showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the hides, which were shipped from Bolivia under the size limit imposed by Bolivian law, were not subject to the forfeiture provisions of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3374(a)(1) (1985).  The provision of the Lacey Act at issue prohibits the interstate or foreign commerce of any wildlife taken in violation of any foreign law. 

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U.S. v. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, More or Less 687 F.Supp. 525 (W.D. Wash. 1987)

Defendants were charged with exporting salmon from Taiwan in violation of Taiwanese regulations.  The regulations and public announcement of the Taiwan Board of Foreign Trade restricting the export of salmon from Taiwan constituted "foreign law" as that term is used in the Lacey Act, despite the fact this was embodied in regulation, not statute.  Moreover, this provision of the Lacey Act was not void for vagueness for failing to expressly state that the term "foreign law" encompassed both foreign statutes and regulations. 

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U.S. v. Abbate 439 F.Supp.2d 625 (E.D.La., 2006) 2006 WL 1968931 (E.D.La.)

Before the Court is the appeal of Frank J. Abbate, Jr.from a misdemeanor conviction for violating a provision of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA") after a Louisiana Department of Fisheries and Wildlife agent witnessed Abbate illegally taking or attempting to take wood ducks after legal shooting hours. At trial, appellant was found guilty of the offense charged and sentenced him to a two-year term of probation. As a special condition, the magistrate ordered that appellant pay a fine of $500 and refrain from hunting birds during the probationary period. Appellant petitions this Court to review his portrayal of the facts and reconsider the credibility of the witnesses and evidence in light of the arguments and allegations presented in his appellate brief. However, rules of procedure governing this appeal preclude appellant from receiving a trial de novo. Accordingly, this Court cannot consider new facts which appellant did not allege at trial and disregarded appellant's arguments which raise conflict over the weight and credibility of testimony. With regard to sentencing, the court found that the magistrate properly exercised his discretion where appellant had a prior conviction under the MBTA for illegal hunting and the revocation of his hunting license would properly prevent future MBTA violations.

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U.S. v. Abeyta 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986)

Defendant, an Indian who resided on a reservation charged with the possession of golden eagle parts under the BGEPA, challenged the indictment as a violation of treaty rights and an unconstitutional burden on his exercise of religion.  In an unusual decision, the court found that the BGEPA placed an unconstitutional burden on defendant's exercise of religion, where the golden eagle was not threatened in New Mexico and permits to kill depredating eagles had previously been issued.  The court also held that the treaty at issue granted special religious accommodations to the tribe, thereby preserving a treaty right to harvest eagles for religious needs.  For further discussion on religious challenges to the BGEPA by Native Americans, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act .

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U.S. v. Antoine 318 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003)

Defendant was a member of a Canadian tribe when he brought eagle feathers across the border to the U.S. for a "potlatch" ceremony (exchange of eagle parts for money and goods, which was religiously significant to defendant).  On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction under the RFRA (Religious Freedom Restoration Act), arguing in part that the government lacked an asserted compelling interest where the USFWS had issued a proposed delisting of the eagle from the ESA list.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding the evidentiary weight of the proposed delisting was lacking and that defendant was not discriminated against based on religion, but rather was excluded from the permit system based on the secular component of the Act (i.e., the requirement for membership in a federally-recognized tribe).

Case
U.S. v. Apollo Energies, Inc. 611 F.3d 679 (C.A.10 (Kan.), 2010) 2010 WL 2600502 (C.A.10 (Kan.))

Appellants, Apollo Energies, Inc. and Dale Walker, were charged with violating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act after an agent with the USFWS discovered dead migratory birds lodged in each appellant's "heater-treater," a piece of equipment used in the course of appellants' Kansas oil drilling businesses, on several occasions. At trial, both Apollo and Walker were convicted of  misdemeanor violations for "taking" or "possessing" migratory birds. On appeal, Apollo and Walker contested that (1) the MBTA is not a strict liability crime or, (2) if it is a strict liability crime, the MBTA is unconstitutional as applied to their conduct. Bound by a previous holding that found misdemeanor violations of the MBTA are strict liability crimes, the court concluded that the MBTA includes no mens rea requirement. As to Appellants' second contention challenging the constitutionality of the Act, the court concluded that while the Act is not unconstitutionally vague, "the MBTA requires a defendant to proximately cause the statute's violation for the statute to pass constitutional muster.

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