Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strickland v. Pinellas Cty. | --- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 6518761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2018) | Andy G. Strickland appealed an order dismissing with prejudice his complaint for declaratory relief against Pinellas County. The request stems from letters he received from Animal Services of Pinellas County about his dog. Strickland and a neighbor were involved in a dispute after their dogs attacked each other. The neighbor filed a complaint with Animal Services claiming that Strickland's dog was the "aggressor dog" and then sent a letter to the Pinellas County Board of Commissioners. The County then sent two letters to Strickland, the first informing him that his dog had exhibited dangerous propensities, and the second, from an assistant county attorney, informing him of the possible criminal ramifications for keeping a dangerous dog or being an "Irresponsible Pet Owner" under the county code. As a result of these letters, Strickland filed a complaint in circuit court saying that he was not afforded any opportunity to dispute those claims and that he is entitled to have the threat of criminal prosecution removed. The County moved to dismiss Strickland's complaint arguing that he failed to allege a justiciable controversy and a bona fide dispute between the County and him. The County claimed that there were no legal findings made with respect to Strickland's dog and that the letters were possible ramifications and explanations of law. The trial court agreed and granted the County's motion, finding the letters were not accusatory and the case presented no justiciable issue. On appeal here, this court upheld the lower court's order because Strickland's allegations did not present a bona fide dispute. Both letters emphasized that his dog had not been classified as dangerous and that no action was being taken by the county. A speculative fear by Strickland that he may be subject to future consequences does not warrant declaratory relief and does not show imminent danger of prosecution. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed Strickland's complaint. Affirmed. | Case | |
| Mitchell v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. | 188 F.Supp. 869 (D.C.Cal. 1960) |
In Mitchell v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. , 188 F.Supp. 869 (S.D. Cal. 1960), an expert was allowed to testify about a dog’s income-potential based on evidence that the dog could perform special tricks and made numerous appearances at charitable events. A jury verdict amounting to $5,000 was upheld where the court determined that the amount was not excessive and evidence of the dog’s income potential was not improper. |
Case | |
| Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n | 99 S.Ct. 3055 (1979) | 443 U.S. 658 (1979) |
The United States initiated an action seeking an interpretation of Indian fishing rights under treaties with Indian tribes of the Pacific Northwest. The Court held that the language of the treaties securing a "right of taking fish . . . in common with all citizens of the Territory" was not intended merely to guarantee the Indians access to usual and accustomed fishing sites and an "equal opportunity" for individual Indians, along with non-Indians, to try to catch fish, but instead secures to the Indian tribes a right to harvest a share of each run of anadromous fish that passes through tribal fishing areas. Thus, an equitable measure of the common right to take fish should initially divide the harvestable portion of each run that passes through a "usual and accustomed" place into approximately equal treaty and nontreaty shares, and should then reduce the treaty share if tribal needs may be satisfied by a lesser amount. The Court also held that any state-law prohibition against compliance with the District Court's decree cannot survive the command of the Supremacy Clause, and the State Game and Fisheries Departments, as parties to this litigation, may be ordered to prepare a set of rules that will implement the court's interpretation of the parties' rights even if state law withholds from them the power to do so. |
Case |
| Sykes v. Cook Cty. Circuit Court Prob. Div. | 837 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2016), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied (Oct. 27, 2016) | This case dealt with the plaintiff's denial of the use of her service dog while in a courtroom to present a motion. After the denial, the plaintiff filed an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) action, alleging that there was a violation for denial of reasonable accommodations under the ADA. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, because as a federal court, it was barred from hearing the claim under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The Court of Appeals agreed, and held that as a federal court, it was barred from hearing the claim under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state court losers challenging state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. Additionally, the district court held that it should exercise Younger abstention because the proceeding was ongoing and because the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to raise her federal claims about her dog in state court, but the Court of Appeals held that "Younger is now a moot question because there is no ongoing state proceeding for [the Court of Appeals] to disturb." As a result, the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was AFFIRMED. | Case | |
| MO - Trust - Creation of trust, care of living animals | V.A.M.S. 456.4-408 | MO ST 456.4-408 | This Missouri statute represents the state's pet trust law. The law provides that a trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal. | Statute |
| OR - Equine Liability Act - Chapter 30. Actions and Suits in Particular Cases. Actions Arising Out of Equine Activities. | O. R. S. § 30.687 - 697 | OR ST § 30.687 - 697 | This act stipulates that an equine sponsor or an equine professional is immune from liability for the death or injury of a participant, arising out of riding, training, driving, grooming or riding as a passenger upon an equine. However, there are exceptions to this rule: an equine sponsor or professional will be held liable for injuries of an equine activity participant if he or she displays a willful and wanton or intentional disregard for the safety of the participant. | Statute |
| Connecticut General Statutes 1918: Chapter 337: Section 6546 | Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6546 (1918) | Section 6546 of Chapter 337 from the 1918 General Laws of Connecticut covers jurisdiction and powers of courts. Specifically, the statute states the power of the court to issue search warrants for animal cruelty. | Statute | |
| GOODWIN v. E. B. NELSON GROCERY CO. | 132 N.E. 51 (Mass. 1921) | 239 Mass. 232 (1921) |
Plaintiff brought her dog into a store. The dog fought with the store owner's cat. After the fight was over, and the animals were calm, plaintiff reached down and grabbed the cat's front paw. The cat scratched and bit plaintiff, who brought a negligence action against the store owner. The court held that plaintiff could not recover because plaintiff did not exercise due care when she interfered with a strange animal, and there was no evidence that the cat was vicious. |
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| Citizens for Balanced Use v. Maurier | 303 P.3d 794 (Mont. 2013) | 2013 MT 166, 2013 MT 166, 370 Mont. 410, 2013 WL 3053594 |
Upon the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks’s decision to relocate a brucellosis-free herd of bison out of Yellowstone National Park and into tribal lands, plaintiffs sought an injunction to halt this movement until the department complied with MCA § 87-1-216. The District Court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction. Upon appeal by defendants and defendant intervenors, however, the Supreme Court of Montana held that MCA § 87-1-216 did not apply and that the District Court relied on erroneous grounds for issuing a preliminary injunction under MCA § 27-19-201(2). The case was therefore reversed, the preliminary injunction vacated and the case was remanded back to the District Court.
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| IL - Research - Act 93. Research Dogs and Cats Adoption Act | 510 I.L.C.S. 93/1 - 10 | IL ST CH 510 § 93/1 - 10 | This act, effective January 1, 2018, is entitled the Research Dogs and Cats Adoption Act. Under the act, a research facility shall assess the health of a dog or cat used in research and then make reasonable efforts to offer for adoption a dog or cat determined to be suitable for adoption, either through private placement or through an animal adoption organization. The research facility must have a facility adoption policy that is made available on its website. | Statute |