Results
Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
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State v. Maynard | 673 S.E.2d 877 (N.C.App.,2009) | 2009 WL 672682 (N.C.App.) |
In this North Carolina case, defendant challenged her conviction for violating that city ordinance that limited the number of dogs greater than five months of age that can be kept on premises within the city limits to three. After conviction, defendant appealed the constitutionality of the ordinance, arguing that it was “arbitrary and without any justification” and “fails to stand upon a rational basis.” This Court disagreed. First noting that legislative enactments have a presumption of constitutionality, the Court held that the town of Nashville enacted the ordinance for the purpose of reducing noise and odor problems. These objectives are clearly legitimate public purposes, and the limitation on the number of dogs is directly related to those objectives. |
Case | |
County of Pasco v. Riehl | 620 So.2d 229 (Fla.App. 2 Dist.,1993) | 18 Fla. L. Weekly D1468 |
When owners of a "dangerous dog" attempted to enjoin such a classification, this court held the dangerous dog statute was unconstitutional. Because dogs are subjects of property and ownership, the owner's deprivation of a dog entitles him to procedural due process. |
Case | |
US - Slaughter - Humane Slaughter of Livestock Regulations | 9 C.F.R. 313.1 - 313.90 | These regulations outline the requirements for the humane treatment of livestock prior to and during slaughter. Included are the requirements for pens, holding, and transportation areas, and the special circumstances for transporting and holding "downed" (nonambulatory) livestock. The regulations emphasize the minimization of "excitement and discomfort" to the livestock prior to transportation or slaughter. Of special note are the requirements for humane methods of slaughter, including the use of carbon dioxide gas, captive bolt "stunners" and projectiles, gunshot, and electrical current. | Administrative | ||
Milburn v. City of Lebanon | 221 F. Supp. 3d 1217 (D. Or. 2016) | 2016 WL 6908100 (D. Or. Nov. 21, 2016) |
Plaintiff Milburn was acquitted of misdemeanor animal abuse on appeal, but a Lebanon police officer removed Milburns’ dog from her possession. While the appeal was pending, the Defendant, City of Lebanon, gave the dog to an animal shelter. The dog was later adopted by a new owner. The Linn County Circuit Court ordered the City to return the dog to Milburn after the acquittal but the Defendant City failed to comply. Milburn then brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 against the City of Lebanon. The City moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim, and the United States District Court, for the District of Oregon, granted that motion while giving leave for Milburn to amend her complaint. In the Amended Complaint, Milburn contended that the City’s refusal to return her dog pursuant to the state court order deprived her of property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Milburn also asserted a violation of her procedural due process rights. The United States District Court, for the District of Oregon, reasoned that while Milburn alleged a state-law property interest in her dog, she failed to allege that the Defendant City deprived her of that interest without adequate process. Milburn also did not allege state remedies to be inadequate. Those two omissions in combination were fatal to Miburn's procedural due process claim. Also, Milburn's assertion that the court issued an order and that the City did not comply with, is an attack on the result of the procedure. The court reasoned that attacking the result instead of the process of a procedure does not state a procedural due process claim. Milburn’s procedural due process claim was then dismissed. The Court also held that it did not have jurisdiction over Milburn’s injunctive relief claim. Therefore, Milburn's request for injunctive relief was dismissed with prejudice. However, the court held that Milburn could seek monetary damages. While Defendant City’s second motion to dismiss was granted, Milburn was granted leave to amend her complaint within 90 days with regard to her claim for actual and compensatory damages.
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Case | |
Warren v. Delvista Towers Condominium Ass'n, Inc. | 49 F.Supp.3d 1082 (S.D. Fla. 2014) | In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s accommodation request under the Federal Fair Housing Act (the “FHA”) to modify Defendant's “no pet” policy was unreasonable because Plaintiff's emotional support animal was a pit bull and pit bulls were banned by county ordinance. In denying the Defendant’s motion, the District Court found that changing a no pets policy for an emotional support animal was a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. The court also found that enforcing the county ordinance would violate the FHA by permitting a discriminatory housing practice. However, in line with US Department of Housing and Urban Development notices, the court found genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the dog posed a direct threat to members of the condominium association, and whether that threat could be reduced by other reasonable accommodations. | Case | ||
MN - Exotic pet - 346.155. Possessing regulated animals | M. S. A. § 346.155 | MN ST § 346.155 | This Minnesota law defines "regulated animal" to mean all members of the Felidae family except the domestic cat, bears, and all non-human primates. Unless a person possessed a regulated animal on or before January 1, 2005, and came into compliance with AWA regulations, possession of the above-mentioned regulated animals is unlawful. A person who lawfully possessed a regulated animal before that date, must comply with registration, microchipping, fee, and inspection requirements. | Statute | |
HI - Domestic Violence - Chapter 586. Domestic Abuse Protective Orders | H R S § 586-4 | HI ST § 586-4 | This law reflects Hawaii's provision for temporary restraining orders in cases of domestic abuse. The ex parte temporary restraining order may also enjoin or restrain both of the parties from taking, concealing, removing, threatening, physically abusing, or otherwise disposing of any animal identified to the court as belonging to a household, until further order of the court (see (c)(4)). | Statute | |
Pepper v. Triplet | 864 So.2d 181 (La. 2004) | 2004 WL 97101 (La. 2004) |
Neighbor sued dog owner for injuries resulting from dog bite. Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must show that, first, that the injuries could have been prevented by the dog owner and that the plaintiff did not provoke the dog to attack, second, that the dog presented an unreasonable risk of harm, and third, that the owner failed to exercise reasonable care. Plaintiff did not accomplish this. Reversed. (Extensive history of state dog bit law.) |
Case | |
Bronk v. Ineichen | 54 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1995) | 54 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1995) |
Plaintiffs appealed decision of district court denying their claim that defendants violated the Federal Fair Housing Act for failing to allow a hearing dog in their rental unit as a reasonable accommodation for their hearing disability. The landlord denied the request, alleging that the dog was not a "hearing dog," and that the tenants did not have a legitimate need for the dog because the dog lacked professional training. The Court of Appeals held that if the dog was not necessary as a hearing dog then the plaintiffs were not entitled to the dog as a reasonable accommodation under the FHA. Also, the court held that a disabled person must meet two standards in arguing that an accommodation be made: (1) the accommodation must facilitate the disabled person's ability to function; and (2) the accommodation must survive a cost-benefit balancing that takes both parties' needs into account. The court vacated the decision of the lower court and ordered a new trial because of misleading jury instructions. |
Case | |
Tillett v. Bureau of Land Management | Slip Copy (unpublished decision), 2016 WL 1312014 (D. Mont. Apr. 4, 2016) | In this case, plaintiff (proceeding pro se) filed suit against the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) challenging its management of wild horses on the Pryor Mountain Wild Horse Range (PMWHR). Plaintiff filed suit challenging BLM’s fertility control and gather programs. BLM argued that plaintiff’s claims should be denied as a matter of summary judgment. The court ultimately held that plaintiff failed to provide any “legal authority” or “jurisdictional basis” for the remedies in which she was seeking. The court held that BLM was within its own authority to rely on its own data and surveys of its programs and was under no obligation to review its programs based on plaintiff’s alleged observations. Finally, the court held in favor of BLM as a matter of summary judgment. | Case |