Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Houseman v. Dare | 966 A.2d 24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) | 405 N.J.Super. 538 (2009) |
An engaged, live-in couple purchased a dog together and listed both of their names on the American Kennel Club registration. While speaking to his girlfriend about ending the relationship, the boyfriend promised her that she could keep the dog, but failed to fulfill that promise; the court required specific enforcement of that promise. In addition, the court found that dogs possess special subjective value similar to "heirlooms, family treasures, and works of art." |
Case |
| AL - Restaurant - § 22-20-5.3. Pet dogs permitted in outdoor dining areas | Ala.Code 1975 § 22-20-5.3; Ala.Code 1975 § 22-20-5.4 | AL ST § 22-20-5.3; § 22-20-5.4 | This Alabama law enacted in 2021 states that a pet dog that is under the control of a person shall be permitted in an outdoor dining area of a food service establishment if conditions listed in the law are all met. These include things like the food service facility owner filing a waiver with the State Health Department stating they will adhere to the prescribed rules, a prominent sign that puts the public on notice, a separate entrance for the dogs and owners that does not go through the food establishment, and making sure the pet owners adhere to rules like keeping dogs on leashes or in carriers. | Statute |
| Just Puppies, Inc. v. Frosh | 438 F. Supp. 3d 448 (D. Md. 2020), vacated and remanded, No. 20-1631, 2021 WL 4452349 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 2021) | The State of Maryland passed a “No More Puppy-Mill Pups Act” which went into effect January 1, 2020. The Act prohibits retail pet stores in Maryland from offering for sale or otherwise transferring or disposing of cats or dogs. Four pet stores, a dog breeder, and a dog broker filed suit against Brian Frosh, the Attorney General of Maryland, the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Maryland Attorney General (CPD), the Maryland House Economic Matters Committee, and the Maryland State Senate Finance Committee seeking an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Act as well as a declaration that it is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Defendants were all entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, unless an exception were to apply. Under the Ex parte Young exception “private citizens may sue state officials in their official capacities in federal court to obtain prospective relief from ongoing violations of federal law.” The CPD and Committee Defendants were not State officials and, therefore, they did not fall within the Ex parte Young exception. The Ex parte Young exception, however, applied to Mr. Frosh as he was the Attorney General of Maryland since he had some connection with the enforcement of the Act. In Counts I, II, and III, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act violated the Constitution's Commerce Clause. The Court found that the Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the Act discriminated against out-of-state breeders and brokers in its text, in its effect, or in its purpose. Count IV alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act was preempted by the AWA. The Court found that prohibiting Maryland pet stores from selling dogs or cats had no effect on the operation of the AWA. The Puppy-Mill Act's impact on pet stores did not clash with the AWA, because pet stores were explicitly exempt from the AWA. Count V alleged that the Puppy-Mill Act deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional right to the equal protection of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court found no merit in this argument. Count VI asserted that the Act created a monopoly prohibited by Article 41 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court found that the Puppy-Mill Act did not constitute an exclusive right to sell cats and dog in Maryland. Although the Act prohibited brick and mortar stores from participating in the sale of cats and dogs, consumers still had a plethora of choices when seeking to obtain a pet, including rescue shelters, animal control units, USDA licensed breeders and brokers, and unregulated hobby breeders. The Court ultimately dismissed all claims against the CPD and the Committee Defendants and allowed the claims against Brian Frosh to proceed. | Case | |
| WY - Feral animals - Chapter 48. Feral Livestock | W. S. 1977 § 11-48-101 to 102 | WY ST § 11-48-101 to 102 | This Wyoming chapter deals with feral livestock. Under the chapter, "feral" means a domestic animal that is not under the control of nor cared for by a person and which has returned to a wild or semi-wild state. Before livestock can be declared feral, an attempt must be made to locate the owner. If the owner cannot be located, the director of the Wyoming livestock board or state veterinarian can then capture or dispose of any feral livestock damaging public or private property, and destroy any feral livestock thought to be infected with disease. The owner of feral livestock is responsible for costs associated with this chapter for damage or care of the feral livestock. | Statute |
| SC - Impound - § 47-3-540. Destruction of identifiable dog by animal control officer; prior notification of owner | Code 1976 § 47-3-540 | SC ST § 47-3-540 | This South Carolina statute provides that animal control officers must not destroy any positively identifiable dog until they have notified the owner at his or her last known address by registered mail that they have the dog in their possession. The owner then has two weeks to reclaim his or her dog, after which the animal may be destroyed. | Statute |
| Phillips v. San Luis Obispo County Dept. | 228 Cal.Rptr. 101 Cal.App. (2 Dist.,1986) | 183 Cal.App.3d 372 (1986) |
In this case, the owners of dog petitioned for writ of mandamus requesting vacation of destruction order and declaration that ordinances under which the dog was seized were unconstitutional. The Court of Appeal held that due process required that owners have hearing prior to seizure of or destruction of dog (a property interest) and that a "courtesy hearing" did not satisfy due process requirements. Further, the court concluded that the ordinances here were unconstitutional for failing to provide for notice and a hearing either before or after the seizure of an uncontrollable biting or vicious dog. |
Case |
| Koivisto v. Davis | 745 N.W.2d 824 (Mich.App., 2008) | 2008 WL 81559 (Mich.App.), 277 Mich.App. 492 (2008) |
Defendants, the Macaks, owned two dogs being boarded at Chieftan Kennels. Plaintiff was outside on her deck when the dogs entered her property and attacked her cats, one of which died later from its injuries. The plaintiff rushed to defend the cats and suffered multiple bites from the dogs. The trial court held that the plaintiff had “provoked” the dogs. The Court of Appeals reversed. “The dogs were already provoked and, in fact, were in a state of attack, for whatever reason when plaintiff responded to their behaviors while on her own property.” |
Case |
| The Future of Animal Law |
The Future of Animal Law, David Favre, Professor, Michigan State University College of Law, Edward Elgar Publishing (2021).
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Policy | ||
| VA - Cruelty - Article 7. Animal Control Officers and Humane Investigators. | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6555 - 3.2-6569 | VA ST § 3.2-6555 - 3.2-6569 | These chapters relate to the qualifications and duties of animal control officers and the procedures for impounding stray animals. | Statute |
| OK - Game Animals - Part 4. Protected Game. § 5-410. Hawks; falcons; owls; eagles | 29 Okl. St. Ann. § 5-410 | OK ST T. 29 § 5-410 | Oklahoma law prohibits the knowing and willful killing or molestation of hawks, falcons, owls, or eagles, or their nests, eggs, or young. The only exceptions to this prohibition are the taking of a hawk or owl in the act of destroying domestic birds or fowl, or the use of hawks, owls, falcons, or eagles by licensed falconers. | Statute |
