Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ley Municipal Autonomica No. 239 para Animales de Compañía | Ley Municipal Autonomica No. 239 | This municipal law seeks to promote companion animal welfare and public health in La Paz, Bolivia. It is modified by "Ley municipal 316, 2018." This ordinance establishes the duties for companion animal owners in La Paz. It creates the mandatory municipal registries of companion animals, and service and assistance animals; the registry of dangerous dogs for citizen safety; and the registry of societies for animal protection, veterinary hospitals, and companion animal stores. It regulates the sale of companion animals and establishes penalties for those who mutilate their companion animals for aesthetic purposes. | Local Ordinance | ||||||||
| NV - Horses, wild - 504.490. Unlawful acts; penalty | N.R.S. 504.490 | NV ST 504.490 | This Nevada law prohibits any unauthorized person from doing certain acts with regard to wild horses such as removing them from public lands, harassing wild horses, or using aircraft or a motor vehicle to hunt wild horses (among other listed actions). Violation is a gross misdemeanor. A person who willfully and maliciously kills a wild horse is guilty of a category C felony. | Statute | |||||||
| State v. Gerberding | 767 S.E.2d 334 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) | 2014 WL 6907352 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) | After stabbing and slicing a dog to death, defendant was indicted for felonious cruelty to animals and conspiracy to commit felonious cruelty to animals. She was tried and found guilty of both counts before a jury. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 5 to 15 months for the felonious cruelty to animal conviction, and 4 to 14 months for the conspiracy conviction with both sentences suspended for a term of 18 months probation. Defendant appealed on the basis that the trial court erred on its instructions to the jury. After careful consideration, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly instructed the jury according to the North Carolina pattern jury instructions. Further, the trial court responded appropriately to the question posed by the jury regarding the jury instructions. Accordingly, the appeals court held that the defendant received a fair, error-free trial. Judge Ervin concurs in part and concurs in result in part by separate opinion. | Case | |||||||
| MO - Carthage - Breed - Sec. 4-5.1. Pit bulldogs prohibited. | CARTHAGE, MO., CODE § 4-5.1 |
In Carthage, Missouri, it is unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess any pit bulldog as defined. An exception is made for pit bulldogs registered as of the effective day (Jan. 26, 1993), as long as the dog is properly confined or kept on a leash and wearing a muzzle. The owner must also take photographs of the dog for identification purposes. Any person violating the provisions may be fined up to $500. The dog may also be removed from the city. |
Local Ordinance | ||||||||
| Indiana v. Massachusetts | 202 L. Ed. 2d 564, 139 S. Ct. 859 (2019) | 139 S.Ct. 859 (Mem) (U.S.,2019) | A coalition of multiple states filed a lawsuit against Massachusetts in the U.S. Supreme Court. Thirteen states, Indiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, filed suit against the state of Massachusetts in response to the animal welfare laws created by Massachusetts Question 3. The states claimed to have direct standing to challenge the Massachusetts law because state agencies and instrumentalities own and operate farms that are subject to the Massachusetts law and wish to continue to sell products to other states, including Massachusetts. The states also claimed parens patriae standing on behalf of farmers and consumers within their borders that would be affected by the Massachusetts law. The plaintiff states filed suit in the U.S. Supreme Court requesting that the Court declare the Massachusetts law unconstitutional. The Court denied the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint because hearing the case would not be an appropriate use of the Court’s original jurisdiction. The Court stated that, in order to resolve plaintiff’s challenge and address the issues of standing and the merits of the case, the Court would need to resolve complex factual disputes. The Court reasoned that such disputes are better suited to resolution in federal district court, not the U.S. Supreme Court. | Case | |||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 12 Núm 2 |
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Policy | |||||||||
| IL - Exotic pets - Act 68. Herptiles-Herps Act | 510 ILCS 68/1-1 to 510 ILCS 68/110–5 | IL ST CH 510 § 68/1-1 to IL ST CH 510 § 68/110–5 | Under the Herptiles-Herps Act reptiles and amphibians are exempt from the definition of “aquatic life” under the Fish and Aquatic Life Code. All rules and enforcement actions under the Illinois Conservation Law and the dangerous animals statutes related to reptiles and amphibians are now covered exclusively by this Act. | Statute | |||||||
| Massa v. Department of Registration and Education | 507 N.E.2d 814 (Ill. 1987) | 116 Ill.2d 376 (1987) |
Dr. Massa sought judicial review of the gross malpractice finding and resulting license revocation in the circuit court after the circuit court reversed the Department's finding of gross malpractice as a conclusion against the manifest weight of the evidence. This finding arises from the death of plaintiff’s German Shepard, after Dr. Massa removed the dog’s healthy uterus and ovaries, while failing to treat the dog’s soon-to-be fatal thoracic condition. The Department's findings in this case could only be disturbed only upon Dr. Massa's showing that they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Court held that the record in this case was plainly sufficient to support the Department's determination of gross malpractice in that Dr. Massa ignored the serious nature of Charlie's lung condition and proceeded to remove reproductive organs which, at least at the time of surgery, he knew or should have known to have been healthy. |
Case | |||||||
| American Society For Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus | 317 F.3d 334 (C.A.D.C.,2003) | 55 ERC 1904, 354 U.S.App.D.C. 432 |
The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the Animal Welfare Institute, the Fund for Animals, and Thomas Rider sued Ringling Bros. and its owner, Feld Entertainment, Inc., claiming that Asian elephants are an endangered species and that the circus mistreated its elephants in violation of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. The only question was whether, as the district court ruled in dismissing their complaint, plaintiffs (including a former elephant handler) lack standing under Article III of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the former elephant handler demonstrated present or imminent injury and established redressability where the elephant handler alleged enough to show that his injuries will likely be redressed if he is successful on the merits. |
Case | |||||||
| Free v. Jordan | 10 S.W.2d 19 (Ark. 1928) | 178 Ark. 168 (1928) |
In a replevin action to recover possession of a lost dog from its finder, the court reversed and remanded the case so a jury could determine whether the statute of limitations was tolled due to the defendant's alleged fraudulent concealment of his possession of the dog. |
Case |