Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strickland v. Medlen | -397 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. 2013) | 2013 WL 1366033 (Tex.,2013) |
The Supreme Court of Texas considers petitioner's appeal from the court of appeals' decision holding that a dog owner may recover intangible loss-of-companionship damages in the form of intrinsic or sentimental-value property damages. The facts underlying the action involved the improper euthanization of respondents' dog, Avery. They sued for Avery's “sentimental or intrinsic value” because the dog had little or no market value and was irreplaceable. The trial court found that Texas law barred such damages, and dismissed the suit with prejudice. The Court of Appeals of Texas became the first court to hold that a dog owner may recover intangible loss-of-companionship damages in the form of intrinsic or sentimental-value property damages. The Supreme Court reverses that decision here, ruling that dogs are ordinary property, with damages limited to market value, and noneconomic damages based in relational attachment are not permitted. |
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| NY - Enforcement, Conservation - Article 71. Enforcement. | McKinney's ECL § 71-0101 to 71-0927 | NY ENVIR CONSER § 71-0101 to 71-0927 | This set of statutes outlines the procedures and penalties for violations of New York's Environmental Conservation Law. | Statute | ||||||
| Woudenberg v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture | 794 F.3d 595 (6th Cir., 2015) | 2015 WL 4503212 (6th Cir., 2015) | According to Department of Agriculture regulations promulgated under the federal Animal Welfare Act (with certain exceptions not applicable here), persons who were in the business of buying and selling dogs and cats (i.e. class B dealers) may not obtain dogs or cats from an individual donor “who did not breed and raise them on his or her premises.” Another provision required a dealer in such a case to “obtain [ ] a certification that the animals were born and raised on that person's premises.” The question in this case was whether there was a violation when the dealer obtained the required certification, but the certification was false. The regulatory language was clear that a dealer violated the law by obtaining a dog or cat from an individual donor who did not breed or raise it on the donor's premises and it was still a violation even when the dealer in good faith obtained certifications that the animals had been so bred and raised. The certification requirement was an enforcement mechanism for the prohibition, not an exception. The Department of Agriculture therefore properly entered a cease-and-desist order against the petitioner. | Case | ||||||
| MI - Trapping - Chapter 324. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. | M.C.L.A. 324.42501 - 42507 | MI ST 324.42501 - 42507 | These sections describe the regulations for trapping for furs, hides and pelts. This includes the requirement for a fur dealer's license and for a monthly report of all pelts on hand. | Statute | ||||||
| Commonwealth v. Brown | Commonwealth v. Brown, 66 Pa. Super. 519 (1917). | No. 16, Oct. T., 1916 |
The defendant was convicted of cruelty to animals for the use of acid on some horses' feet. The defendant appealed the descision because the lower court had found the Commonwealth's circumstantial evidence to be enough to submit the question of quilt to the jury. The Superior Court found that some of the evidence was improperly admitted by the lower court. Thus, the Superior Court reversed the judgement. |
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| FL - Agriculture & Consumer Services - Department Duties and Enforcement | West's F. S. A. § 585.001 - 585.008 | FL ST § 585.001 - 585.008 | This set of laws explains the powers and duties of the Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services in enforcing the Animal Industry laws (Chapter 585). Any person or officer that is charged with a duty under the Animal Industry laws may be compelled to perform the same by mandamus, injunction, or other court-ordered remedy. Department employees are authorized to enter any premises in the state for the purposes of carrying out their duties under the Animal Industry laws and it is illegal for any person to interfere with the discharge of those duties. | Statute | ||||||
| Citizens for Balanced Use v. Maurier | 303 P.3d 794 (Mont. 2013) | 2013 MT 166, 2013 MT 166, 370 Mont. 410, 2013 WL 3053594 |
Upon the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks’s decision to relocate a brucellosis-free herd of bison out of Yellowstone National Park and into tribal lands, plaintiffs sought an injunction to halt this movement until the department complied with MCA § 87-1-216. The District Court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction. Upon appeal by defendants and defendant intervenors, however, the Supreme Court of Montana held that MCA § 87-1-216 did not apply and that the District Court relied on erroneous grounds for issuing a preliminary injunction under MCA § 27-19-201(2). The case was therefore reversed, the preliminary injunction vacated and the case was remanded back to the District Court.
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| HI - Facility dog - [§ 621-30]. Use of a facility dog | H R S § 621-30 | HI ST § 621-30 | This Hawaii law enacted in 2016 states that a court may permit the use of a facility dog in a judicial proceeding involving the testimony of a vulnerable witness (as defined) if the court determines that there is a compelling necessity for the use of a facility dog to facilitate the testimony of the vulnerable witness. Prior to use, the moving party must establish that the dog is credentialed; the dog is adequately insured; and that there is a relationship between the witness and the facility dog. | Statute | ||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 11 Núm 3 |
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| Gordon v. Norton | 322 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2003) | 322 F.3d 1213, 55 ERC 2135 |
Appellants Stephen Gordon and the Diamond G Ranch, Inc. challenged the Fish and Wildlife Service's control of gray wolves introduced under the Northern Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Plan near the Diamond G in the Dunoir Valley of northwestern Wyoming. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, they filed this action in federal district court alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the regulations promulgated under the Endangered Species Act. The district court dismissed the takings claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the ESA claims as not yet ripe for review. This court affirmed the lower court. |
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