Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SD - Trap - 41-8-28. Trap robbing or injury as misdemeanor | S D C L § 41-8-28 | SD ST § 41-8-28 | This South Dakota law provides that any person who steals, damages or destroys a trap of another, or who steals, damages, or destroys animals, animal carcasses, or the pelts thereof, held fast by such traps, is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. | Statute |
| Kuehl v. Cass County | 555 N.W.2d 686 (Iowa 1996) | The issue before the Iowa Supreme Court was whether hog confinement buildings could be considered “agricultural” so as to fall within the state's agricultural zoning exemption. The court held that h og confinement buildings were within the agricultural building exemption and thus exempt from county zoning regulations. | Case | |
| Goldberger v. State Farm Fire and Casaulty Company | --- P.3d ----, 2019 WL 3792803 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2019) | Joel and Kim Goldberger owned residential rental property in Flagstaff that was insured by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company under a rental dwelling policy. The Goldbergers filed a claim asserting that their tenant allowed feral cats to access the property and cause approximately $75,000 in “accidental damage.” State farm subsequently denied the claim asserting that feral cats are domestic animals and therefore the damage was not covered under the policy. The Goldbergers filed suit alleging breach of contract and insurance bad faith. State Farm moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. State Farm claimed that the policy stated that accidental losses caused by “birds, vermin, rodents, insects, or domestic animals” were not covered by the policy. The superior court granted State Farm’s motion and this appeal followed. The Goldbergers argued that the superior court erred in dismissing their complaint due to the fact that the term “domestic animals” is reasonably susceptible to differing interpretations and must be construed against State Farm. State Farm argued that the exclusion in the policy was only susceptible to one reasonable interpretation. The Court stated that there were two interpretations to the term “domestic animal.” The first definition is a species-based definition that says that domestic animals are animals belonging to a broader class of animals that have been domesticated at some point in history. The second definition is an individualized definition that says that domestic animals are animals that are kept by a person for any of various purposes, including as pets. The Court ultimately decided that the individualized definition makes more sense in terms of the insurance policy itself as well as case law. In making this determination, the court noted the "nonsensical" outcome that would arise for exotic or nontraditional pets were a species-based definition adopted. Domestic animals encompass animals that are subject to the care, custody, and control of a person. On the facts alleged in the complaint alone, the Court could not say that the tenant was keeping the feral cats in such a manner that the exclusion would preclude coverage. The court therefore resolved all reasonable inferences in the Goldberger’s favor and presumed that the cats were feral. Because the feral cats that caused the damage are not domestic animals under all reasonable interpretations of the facts alleged in the complaint, the court erred in granting the insurer's motion to dismiss. The Court reversed the superior court’s order dismissing the Goldberger’s complaint and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. | Case | |
| Citizens' Rapid-Transit Co. v. Dew | 45 S.W. 790 (Tenn.1898) | 40 L.R.A. 518, 100 Tenn. 317, 16 Pickle 317, 66 Am.St.Rep. 754 |
This is an action for negligently injuring and killing a dog by the driver of a streetcar. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed a verdict for $200 after defendant train killed plaintiff’s dog. The Court reasoned that since large amounts of money are now invested in dogs, and since they are regarded as companions to many in society, they now have "a distinct and well established status in the eyes of the law." Thus, the owner of a dog has property rights in that dog to maintain an action at law. The Supreme Court of Tennessee found that the defendant company was guilty of negligence in the killing of Dew's dog, that his death could have been prevented by the exercise of proper care and diligence. |
Case |
| IL - Divorce - Act 5. Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act | 750 I.L.C.S. 5/452; 750 ILCS 5/501 - 503 | IL ST CH 750 § 5/452 | Effective January 1, 2018, the Illinois Legislature amended several provisions under Act 5, the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. Under the Joint Simplified Dissolution Procedure, the amendments added the following requirement to the conditions that must be present to do a simplified dissolution: (k) The parties have executed a written agreement allocating ownership of and responsibility for any companion animals owned by the parties. As used in this Section, “companion animal” does not include a service animal as defined in Section 2.01c of the Humane Care for Animals Act." Under Part V, "Property, Support and Attorney Fees," three sections were amended. Section 5/501 deals with temporary relief and amendments in 2018 added subsection (f): "Companion animals. Either party may petition or move for the temporary allocation of sole or joint possession of and responsibility for a companion animal jointly owned by the parties. In issuing an order under this subsection, the court shall take into consideration the well-being of the companion animal." In Section 5/502 on amicable settlement agreements between parties, the following provision was added to subsection (a): "The parties may also enter into an agreement allocating the sole or joint ownership of or responsibility for a companion animal. As used in this Section, “companion animal” does not include a service animal as defined in Section 2.01c of the Humane Care for Animals Act. Any agreement pursuant to this Section must be in writing, except for good cause shown with the approval of the court, before proceeding to an oral prove up." Finally, under § 503 on "Disposition of property and debts," amendments added this subsection: "(n) If the court finds that a companion animal of the parties is a marital asset, it shall allocate the sole or joint ownership of and responsibility for a companion animal of the parties. In issuing an order under this subsection, the court shall take into consideration the well-being of the companion animal. As used in this Section, “companion animal” does not include a service animal as defined in Section 2.01c of the Humane Care for Animals Act." | Statute |
| Porter v. DiBlasio | 93 F.3d 301 (Wis.,1996) |
Nine horses were seized by a humane society due to neglect of a care taker without giving the owner, who lived in another state, notice or an opportunity for a hearing. The owner filed a section 1983 suit against the humane society, the county, a humane officer and the district attorney that alleged violations of substantive and procedural due process, conspiracy, and conversion. The district court dismissed the claims for failure to state a viable claim. On appeal, the court found that the owner had two viable due process claims, but upheld the dismissal for the others. |
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| O'Neill v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government | 662 F.3d 723 (C.A.6 (Ky.), 2011) | 2011 WL 5345409 (C.A.6 (Ky.)) |
Dog owners sued city-county government and director of city animal-control agency under § 1983 for violations of Fourteenth Amendment after a warrantless search of home and seizure of their dogs. The Court of Appeals held that the owners did not need a breeder's license because their home was not a “Class A kennel.” It also held that the initial entry into owners' home by undercover animal-control officers was not a Fourth Amendment search because it did not infringe on owners' expectation of privacy. However, the consent-once-removed doctrine did not allow uniformed animal-control officers to enter home without a warrant. |
Case |
| OK - Ecoterrorism - G-1. Farm Animal, Crop, and Research Facilities Protection Act | 2 Okl. St. Ann. § 5-103 to 107 | OK ST T. 2 § 5-103 to 107 | This article is known as the “Oklahoma Farm Animal, Crop, and Research Facilities Protection Act." A person commits an offense if, without the consent of the owner, the person acquires or otherwise exercises control over an animal facility, an animal from an animal facility, or other property from an animal facility with the intent to deprive the owner of such facility, animal, or property and to disrupt or damage the enterprise conducted at the animal facility. Violation is a felony and results in a fine of up to $10,000 and/or 3 years imprisonment. | Statute |
| Republic v. Teischer | Republica v. Teischer, 1 Dall. 335 (Penn. 1788) |
The Defendant had been convicted in the county of Berks upon an indictment for maliciously, wilfully, and wickedly killing a Horse; and upon a motion in arrest of Judgment, it came on to be argued, whether the offence, so laid, was indictable? The court affirmed the trial court's conviction of defendant for killing a horse. |
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| UK - Wildlife - The Humane Trapping Standards Regulations 2019 | 2019 No. 22 | These Regulations amend the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 in order to implement requirements contained in the agreement on international humane trapping standards concluded between the European Community, the Government of Canada and the Government of the Russian Federation. They introduce a prohibition on using or setting in position any trap or snare for the purpose of killing or taking the Stoat or the European Beaver. The prohibitions in section 11(2)(a) and (b) (as revised) (relating to using or setting in position a trap or snare) do not apply in relation to any animal specified in Schedule 6ZA where the use or setting of the trap is under and in accordance with a Government issued license. | Statute |