Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KY - Horse - Chapter 189. Traffic Regulations | KRS § 189.510 | KY ST § 189.510 | This interesting Kentucky law provides that no person shall ride a horse, nor shall the owner of a horse consent to the racing of his horse, in a horse race on a highway. | Statute |
| Gurtek v. Chisago County | 1988 WL 81554 (Minn.App., 1988) (unpublished) |
Appellants sought review of a denial of a special-use permit to build a large campground adjacent to a bald eagle nesting site. They contended that the denial by the county board was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the denial was reasonable where the county proffered two legally valid reasons for denying the permit: the danger to the sensitive nesting eagle population and the detrimental effect the increased human activity would have on the unspoiled nature of the property. |
Case | |
| England, Wales & Scotland - Wild animals - Wild Mammals (Protection) Act 1996 | 1996 CHAPTER 3 | An Act providing protection for wild mammals against certain acts of deliberate harm. “Wild mammal” means any mammal which is not a “protected animal” within the meaning of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 (Schedule 3, Section 13 of the 2006 Act). The following offences are specified in relation to any wild mammal: to mutilate, kick, beat, nail or otherwise impale, stab, burn, stone, crush, drown, drag or asphyxiate. The offences require proof of intent to inflict unnecessary suffering. | Statute | |
| CO - State animals - § 24-80-910.5. State pets | C. R. S. A. § 24-80-910.5 | CO ST § 24-80-910.5 | Dogs and cats that are adopted from Colorado animal shelters and rescues are declared to be the state pets of the state of Colorado. | Statute |
| Cavallini v. Pet City and Supply | 848 A.2d 1002 (Pa. 2004) | 2004 PA Super 141 |
Appellant, Pet City and Supplies, Inc. appealed from the judgment in the amount of $1,638.52 entered in favor of Appellee, Christopher A. Cavallini following a bench trial. The trial court determined that Cavallini was entitled to damages due to Pet City's violations of the Dog Purchaser Protection provisions of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). Cavallini purchased a Yorkshire terrier puppy from Pet City that was represented as a pure bred. After several attempts, Pet City failed to supply Cavallini with the requisite registration papers. On appeal, Pet City contended that the trial court erred as a matter of law by determining a private action can be brought under the Dog provisions of the UTPCPL, and erred as a matter of law by imposing a civil penalty against Pet City under the UPTCPL. In finding that the statute does provide a private cause of action, the court looked to the purpose of the statute rather than the plain language. However, the court found the inclusion of a civil penalty in the part that allows a private action was inconsistent with the statute. |
Case |
| State v. Wilson | 464 So.2d 667 (Fla.App. 2 Dist.,1985) | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 602 (Fla.App. 2 Dist.,1985) |
In this Florida case, the state appeals a county court order that granted appellee's motion to dismiss two counts of an information and which also declared a state statute to be unconstitutional. Defendant-appellee was arrested for having approximately seventy-seven poodles in cages in the back of a van without food, water and sufficient air. In her motion to dismiss, defendant-appellee alleged that the phrases “sufficient quantity of good and wholesome food and water” and “[k]eeps any animals in any enclosure without wholesome exercise and change of air” as contained in sections 828.13(2)(a) and (b) were void for vagueness. In reversing the lower court, this court held that the prohibitions against depriving an animal of sufficient food, water, air and exercise, when measured by common understanding and practice, are not unconstitutionally vague. |
Case |
| MN - Endangered Species - Natural Resources (Ch. 83A-84). Chapter 84. Department of Natural Resources | M. S. A. §§ 84.0895, 84.944, 97A.245, 97A.501 | MN ST § 84.0895, 84.944, 97A.245, 97A.501 | This statute protects endangered and threatened species in Minnesota, as defined in the statute. Under the law, a person may not take, import, transport, or sell any portion of an endangered species of wild animal or plant, or sell or possess with intent to sell an article made with any part of the skin, hide, or parts of an endangered species of wild animal or plant. Violation of the statute is a misdemeanor. | Statute |
| HI - Importation, quarantine - Chapter 150A. Plant and Non-Domestic Animal Quarantine and Microorganism Import | H R S § 150A-5 - 15 | HI ST § 150A-5 - § 150A-15 | These laws concern the importation of animals, plants, and microorganisms into the State of Hawaii. | Statute |
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| People v. Harris | --- P.3d ---- 2016 WL 6518566 (Colo.App.,2016) | 2016 COA 159 (Colo.App.,2016) | Harris was convicted for twenty-two counts of cruelty to animals after dozens of malnourished animals were found on her property by employees of the Humane Society. On appeal, Harris raised two main issues: (1) that the animal protection agent who was an employee of the Humane Society was not authorized to obtain a search warrant to investigate her property and (2) that the mistreatment of the twenty-two animals constituted one continuous course of conduct and that the lower court violated her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause by entering a judgment on twenty-two counts of animal cruelty. The Court of Appeals reviewed the issue of whether the animal protection agent had the authority to obtain a search warrant to investigate the property and determined that the agent did not have the proper authority. The Court looked to the state statute that specifically stated that only “state employees” were able to investigate livestock cases. In this case, the animal protection agent was employed by the Humane Society and was not a state employee; therefore, he did not have the authority to obtain a search warrant to investigate the property. However, the Court found that there was no constitutional violation with regard to the search warrant because it was still obtained based on probable cause. For this reason, the Court denied Harris’ request to suppress evidence that was submitted as a result of the search warrant. Finally, the Court reviewed Harris’ argument regarding her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court found that under the statute dealing with animal cruelty, the phrases “any animal” and “an animal” suggests that a person commits a separate offense for each animal that is mistreated. Essentially, the Court held that the language of the statute “demonstrates that the legislature perceived animal cruelty not as an offense against property but as an offense against the individual animal.” As a result, Harris’ rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were not violated and the Court upheld the lower court’s decision. | Case |