Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSPCA v Harrison | (1999) 204 LSJS 345 | [1999] SASC 363 |
The respondent was the owner of a dog which was found with skin ulcerations, larval infestations and saturated in urine. On appeal, it was found that the trial judge failed to give proper weight to cumulative circumstantial evidence as to the respondent's awareness of the dog's condition. It was also found that 'illness' was intended to cover a wide field of unhealthy conditions and included the larval infestation. The respondent was convicted and fined. |
Case | |
| Pfeil v. Rogers | 757 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1985) |
Where sheriffs deputies acted in accordance with applicable state laws, there was no violation of Fourth Amendment rights in the shooting of plaintiff's dogs. |
Case | ||
| NV - Rabies - 441A.435. Owner required to maintain dog, cat or ferret currently vaccinated | NV ADC 441A.435 | Nev. Admin. Code 441A.435 | This Nevada regulation states that an owner of a dog, cat or ferret shall maintain the dog, cat or ferret currently vaccinated against rabies in accordance with the provisions of this section and the recommendations set forth in the Compendium of Animal Rabies Prevention and Control, 2008 edition, published by the National Association of State Public Health Veterinarians, Inc. A licensed veterinarian may exempt a dog, cat or ferret from vaccination for health reasons. | Administrative | |
| VA - Restaurant - § 3.2-5115. Animals | VA Code Ann. § 3.2-5115 | VA ST § 3.2-5115 | This Virginia law states that no animal shall be permitted in any area used for the manufacture or storage of food products. However, a dog may be allowed in designated areas of a distillery, winery, or brewery as defined in the law. | Statute | |
| GA - Breeding - Chapter 40-13-13. Animal Protection | GA ADC 40-13-13-.01 to .09 | Ga Comp. R. & Regs. 40-13-13-.01 to .09 | There regulations set out the requirements for licensing animal shelters, pet dealers, kennels, and stable operators. They also provide provisions for controlling disease and shipping animals into the state. | Administrative | |
| WA - Dangerous Dog - 16.08.040. Dog bites. Liability and Dangerous dogs and related provisions. | West's RCWA 16.08.010 - 110 | WA ST 16.08.010 - 110 | This Washington statute outlines the state's dangerous dog laws. Under the law, the owner or keeper of any dog shall be liable to the owner of any animal killed or injured by such dog for the amount of damages sustained in a civil action. Further, there is strict liability for the owner of any dog that bites any person while in a public place or lawfully on a private place including the property of the owner of such dog, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness. However, proof of provocation of the attack by the injured person shall be a complete defense to an action for damages. | Statute | |
| Kangas v. Perry | 620 N.W.2d 429 (Wis. 2000) |
Plaintiff, a passenger of a horse-drawn sled sued the owner of the property on which the accident occurred, as well as the owner of the horses and the sled for the injuries she suffered when thrown from the sled. The Court of Appeals found that the equine immunity statute provided protection for the owner of the horse against tort liability. The plain language of the statute provides that immunity from civil liability is available to all persons , “ including an equine activity sponsor or equine professional…”; thus, protection is not limited only to those who are sponsors or professionals, rather they are examples of types of people to whom the statute applies. |
Case | ||
| Pine v. State | 889 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. App. 1994). |
Mens rea in cruelty conviction may be inferred from circumstances. With regard to warrantless seizure, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit seizure when there is a need to act immediately to protect and preserve life (i.e. "emergency doctrine"). |
Case | ||
| Nonhuman Rights Project on behalf of Tommy and Kiko v. | 31 N.Y.3d 1054, 100 N.E.3d 846 (2018) | 2018 WL 2107087 (Mem), 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 03309 | The petitioner, Nonhuman Rights Project brought this appeal on behalf of Tommy and Kiko, who are two captive chimpanzees. The chimpanzees had been confined by their owners in small cages within a warehouse and a cement storefront in a crowded residential area, respectively. Petitioner sought leave to appeal from an order of the Appellate Division, which affirmed two judgments of the Supreme Court declining to sign orders to show cause to grant the chimpanzees habeas relief. The lower courts based their denial of habeas corpus for the chimpanzees on the dictionary definition for "person." The term “person” tends to lean towards an entity that is recognized by law as having most of the rights and duties of a human. The Appellate Division also reasoned that chimpanzees are not considered people because they lack the capacity to bear legal duties or to be held legally accountable for their actions. As a counter, the Petitioner argued that the same can be said for human infants or comatose human adults, yet no one would say that it is improper to seek a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of one of them. The Appellate Division therefore based their denial on the fact that chimpanzees are not a member of the human species. In the instant action, Court of Appeals of New York denied the motion for leave to appeal. In the concurring opinion, Judge Fahey states that the better approach is not to ask whether a chimpanzee fits the definition of a person or whether it has the same rights and duties as a human being, but whether he or she has the right to liberty protected by habeas corpus. The concurring opinion also found that the Appellate Division erred by misreading the case it relied on and holding that a habeas corpus challenge cannot be used to seek transfer; a habeas corpus challenge can be used to seek a transfer to another facility. Although Judge Fahey recognizes that Chimpanzees share at least 96% of their DNA with humans and are autonomous, intelligent creatures, he concurred with the Appellate Division’s decision to deny leave to appeal. However, he ultimately questioned whether the Court was right to deny leave in the first instance. | Case | |
| TX - Dangerous - Subchapter B: Dogs That Are A Danger to Animals | V. T. C. A., Health & Safety Code § 822.011 - 013 | TX HEALTH & S § 822.011 - 013 | Subchapter B prohibits dogs from running at large and enumerates the criminal penalty for such violation. | Statute |