Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Committee for Humane Legislation v. Richardson | 414 F. Supp. 297 (1976) |
At issue in this case are the statutory limitations on the authority of the Secretary of Commerce to adopt regulations, pursuant to the MMPA, that provide for the issuance of permits for the "taking" of dolphins incidental to commercial fishing activities. |
Case | |
| MS - Veterinary - Chapter 39. Veterinarians. | Miss. Code Ann. § 73-39-51 to 73-39- 95 | MS ST § 73-39-51 to 73-39- 95 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |
| Revista Brasileira de Direito Animal (Brazilian Animal Rights Review) |
Revista Brasileira de Direito Animal (Brazilian Animal Rights Review)Each vol. is available as full text .pdfOnly in Original Portugese
|
Policy | ||
| Hohenstein v. Dodds | 10 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 1943) | 215 Minn. 348 (1943) | This is an action against a licensed veterinarian to recover damages for his alleged negligence in the diagnosis and treatment of plaintiff's pigs. Plaintiff alleged defendant-veterinarian negligently vaccinated his purebred pigs for cholera. The court held that a n expert witness's opinion based on conflicting evidence which he is called upon to weigh is inadmissible. Further, a n expert witness may not include the opinion of another expert witness as basis for his own opinion. | Case |
| Woodside Village v. Hertzmark | 1993 WL 268293 (Conn. 1993) | 4 NDLR P 104 | The question in this case is whether federal and state laws outlawing discrimination in housing prohibit the eviction of a mentally disabled defendant from his federally subsidized apartment because of his failure to comply with the plaintiff's pet policy. The plaintiff here had disabilities including schizophrenia and severe learning disabilities. The plaintiff-landlord allowed tenants to keep pets, but required pet care, which included walking the dogs in a designated area and requiring that tenants use a "pooper scooper" to clean up behind their pets. The tenant-defendant here does not dispute that he failed to comply, but claims the plaintiff-landlord, as a recipient of federal funds, failed to reasonably accommodate his disability. The court found that plaintiff-landlord did in fact accommodate the defendant-tenant's disability by either waiving the provisions of its pet policy or permitting the defendant to build a fenced in area for the dog in the rear of the defendant's apartment. The eviction here was not based on the fact that defendant-tenant possesses a dog, but on his "demonstrated inability to comply with the plaintiff's pet policy." This, said the court, put other residents' health, safety and comfort at risk. | Case |
| Kennedy House, Inc. v. Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations | 143 A.3d 476 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 11, 2016) | 2016 WL 3667992 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 11, 2016) |
In this case, Kennedy House appealed the lower court’s decision in finding that it had violated Section 9–1108 of the Philadelphia Fair Practice Ordinance when it denied Jan Rubin’s request for a housing accommodation in the form of a waiver of its no-dog policy. Rubin applied for a housing accommodation at Kennedy House because she suffered from multiple physical aliments. In a meeting with Kennedy House, Rubin did state that her dog was not a trained service animal that helped with her physical and mobility issues but rather helped with reminding her to take medication and getting out of bed. The lower court determined that Rubin had satisfied her burden of proving that her dog was necessary in helping with her medical issues. After reviewing the lower court’s decision, the Commonwealth Court held that the lower court had erred in its decisions. Ultimately, the court found that because Ms. Rubin's physician described a disability related to her mobility, and there was no evidence establishing a nexus between her mobility-related needs and the requested assistance animal, Ms. Rubin did not meet her burden necessary for Kennedy House to waive its no-dog policy. As a result, the court reversed the lower court’s decision. |
Case |
| VA - Virginia Beach - Chapter 1 General Provisions and Chapter 5: Animals and Fowl (ARTICLE V: ANIMAL WELFARE. DIVISION 3: PROHIBITED ACTS) | Virginia Beach City Code §§ 1-9, 5-540 |
Under this Virginia Beach ordinance, if a person knows or has reason to believe a dog is a guide dog or a leader dog and that person, without just cause, willfully impedes or interferes with said dog, then that person is guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor and is subject to fines not to exceed more than $500. However, if a person knows or has reason to believe a dog is a guide dog or a leader dog and that person, without just cause, willfully injures said dog, then that person is guilty of a class 1 misdemeanor and is subject to fines not to exceed more than $2,500. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Fleet v District Court of New South Wales | [1999] NSWCA 363 |
The appellant's dog was removed by police officers and later euthanised. The dog was emaciated and suffering from numerous ailments. The appellant was charged and convicted with an animal cruelty offence and failure to state his name and address when asked. On appeal, it was found that the court had failed to address the elements of the animal cruelty offence and that the charge of failing to state name and address could not stand. |
Case | |
| MN - Declaw - 504B.114. Pet declawing and devocalization prohibited | M.S.A. § 504B.114 | MN ST § 504B.114 | This Maine law, effective January 1, 2024, prohibits a landlord who allows an animal from: (1) advertising the availability of a real property for occupancy in a manner designed to discourage application for occupancy of that real property because an applicant's animal has not been declawed or devocalized; (2) refusing to allow the occupancy of a real property, refusing to negotiate the occupancy of a real property, or otherwise making unavailable or deny to another person the occupancy of a real property because of that person's refusal to declaw or devocalize an animal; or (3) requiring a tenant or occupant of real property to declaw or devocalize an animal allowed on the premises. | Statute |
| Callahan v. Woods | 736 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1984) |
Plaintiff alleged the requirement that his infant daughter receive a social security number as a prerequisite to obtain public benefits infringed on his free exercise of religion. Since the court held that the the social security number requirement substantially interfered with plaintiff's free exercise of religious beliefs, the compelling interest test was applied to determine constitutionality of the regulation. This substantial burden/compelling interest test became the model for infringement of religious exercise claims, including those under the BGEPA. For application of this test to religious challenges to the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act . |
Case |