Results
Displaying 71 - 80 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cruelty, Police Shooting Pets, Domestic Violence and Hoarding | Policy | ||||
| US - Whales - Whaling Provisions; Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling Quotas | FR Doc. 05-2001 | Docket No. 050114009-5009-01; I.D. 011105B |
NMFS announces the aboriginal subsistence whaling quota for bowhead whales, and other limitations deriving from regulations adopted at the 2002 Special Meeting of the International Whaling Commission (IWC). For 2005, the quota is 75 bowhead whales struck. This quota and other limitations will govern the harvest of bowhead whales by members of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC). |
Administrative | |
| ND - Livestock - State Board of Animal Health | NDCC 36-01-00.1 - 36 | ND ST 36-01-00.1 - ND ST 36-01-36 | This Chapter of North Dakota laws deals with the state board of animal health, state veterinarian, and special provisions for keeping certain non-traditional livestock. Section 36-01-08.2 states that any person who keeps a mountain lion, wolf, or wolf hybrid in captivity must obtain an identification number from the state board. Section 36-01-08.4 also provides that a person may not keep a skunk or raccoon in captivity, and that the state board must adopt rules concerning the keeping of a primate, wolf, or wolf-hybrid in captivity. The remainder of the chapter deals primary with infectious disease control in livestock, although section 36-01-31 contains a ban on the keeping of a live venomous reptile. | Statute | |
| KY - Trade - Buying and selling protected wildlife | KRS § 150.180; 150.390; 150.990 | KY ST § 150.180; 150.390; 150.990 | These statutes relate to trade in wildlife. The first statute prohibits the trade in protected wildlife. The next law prohibits the hunting of bears. Finally, the Kentucky statute providing punishment for violation of aforementioned statutes is provided. | Statute | |
| Com. v. Hackenberger | 836 A.2d 2 (Pa.2003) | 575 Pa. 197 (2003) |
Defendant was convicted and sentenced to 6 months to 2 years jail following a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas of cruelty to animals resulting from his shooting of a loose dog more than five times. On appeal, appellant contends that the use of a deadly weapon sentencing enhancement provision does not apply to a conviction for cruelty to animals since the purpose is to punish only those offenses where the defendant has used a deadly weapon against
persons.
The Commonwealth countered that the purpose behind the provision is immaterial because the plain language applies to any offense where the defendant has used a deadly weapon to
commit the crime, save for those listed crimes where possession is an element of the offense. This Court agreed with the Commonwealth and held that the trial court was not prohibited from applying the deadly weapon sentencing enhancement to defendant's conviction for cruelty to animals.
|
Case | |
| England, Wales & Scotland - Wildlife, badgers - Protection of Badgers Act 1992 | 1992 CHAPTER 51 | This Act prohibits the deliberate killing, injuring or capturing of a wild badger; and any interfering with badger setts (and the attempt to do so). General exemptions are provided, and licenses may be issued for the taking and killing of badgers (for example, as obtained for recent badger culls). | Statute | ||
| Citizens for Balanced Use v. Maurier | 303 P.3d 794 (Mont. 2013) | 2013 MT 166, 2013 MT 166, 370 Mont. 410, 2013 WL 3053594 |
Upon the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks’s decision to relocate a brucellosis-free herd of bison out of Yellowstone National Park and into tribal lands, plaintiffs sought an injunction to halt this movement until the department complied with MCA § 87-1-216. The District Court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction. Upon appeal by defendants and defendant intervenors, however, the Supreme Court of Montana held that MCA § 87-1-216 did not apply and that the District Court relied on erroneous grounds for issuing a preliminary injunction under MCA § 27-19-201(2). The case was therefore reversed, the preliminary injunction vacated and the case was remanded back to the District Court.
|
Case | |
| MI - Cruelty - Chapter 750. Michigan Penal Code. | M. C. L. A. 750.51 | MI ST 750.51 | This Michigan law provides that no railroad company shall permit the confinement of animals in railroad cars for longer than 36 consecutive hours without unloading for rest, water, and feeding of at least 5 consecutive hours unless prevented by a storm, or other "accidental causes." Any company, owner or custodian of such animals, who does not comply with the provisions of this section, can be fined between $100 and $500 for each and every such offense. However, when animals are carried in cars where they have proper food, water, space and opportunity for rest, the provisions of this section that require unloading do not apply. | Statute | |
| HI - Endangered Species - Chapter 195D. Conservation of Aquatic Life, Wildlife, and Land Plants | H R S § 195D-1 - 32 | HI ST § 195D-1 to 32 | Hawaii endangered species law prohibits any taking, transport or commerce in designated species. It further outlines conservation programs that mandate continued research on listed species. Broad arrest and search and seizure provisions are given to law enforcement officials to enforce these acts. Violation of the regulations result in a misdemeanor conviction with both criminal fines and administrative fines that graduate for subsequent convictions. | Statute | |
| SAM LAMBERT & ANDRIA LAMBERT v. SALLY MORRIS & STEVE HAIR | --- S.E.2d ----, 2018 WL 6314142 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2018) | Plaintiffs Sam Lambert and Andria Lambert appeal the trial court's granting of summary judgment in this lost dog case. Specifically, plaintiffs filed an action against defendants Sally Morris and Steve Hair alleging conversion, civil conspiracy, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, as well as injunctive relief and damages related to the disappearance of their dog, Biscuit. Biscuit went missing in August of 2015. After searching for Biscuit for several days, plaintiffs contacted the local animal control and posted Biscuit as a lost dog on animal control's unofficial Facebook page. Over a month later, a citizen brought Biscuit (who had no microchip or collar on) to animal control where she was placed in a holding cell. After the 72-hour hold, Biscuit was transferred to the Humane Society. Biscuit was spayed and examined by a veterinarian, and a picture was posted on the Humane Society website. At the vet exam, tumors were discovered in Biscuit's mammary glands and so surgery was performed, some of it paid for by defendant Hair. Hair eventually adopted Biscuit. Almost a year later, plaintiffs found an old picture of Biscuit on the Humane Society Facebook page and attempted to claim Biscuit. Defendant Hair learned of this and requested that plaintiffs reimburse for veterinary expenses, to which they agreed. After some discussion, Hair learned plaintiffs had over 14 dogs and refused to return Biscuit without a home inspection. That caused a heated discussion and the meeting between plaintiffs and defendant ended without the dog returning. About a month later, plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, whereupon defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On appeal here, the court first noted that, per state law, an animal shelter hold a lost or abandoned dog for at least 72-hours. Here, animal control satisfied its legal duty by keeping Biscuit in custody for the required holding period before transferring her to the Humane Society. Thus, plaintiffs lost any ownership rights to Biscuit after the 72-hour mark. Moreover, almost a month had passed between the time Biscuit was taken in by animal control and the formal adoption by defendant Hair at the Humane Society. As a result, the court found that Hair was the rightful owner of Biscuit and was entitled to negotiate with plaintiffs as he saw fit. Thus, no genuine issues of material fact existed for plaintiffs at trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendants and dismissing plaintiffs’ claims. | Case |