Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MI - Cruelty - 712A.18l. Juveniles, guilty of cruelty to animals or arson; court ordered psychiatric or psychological treatment | M. C. L. A. 712A.18l | MI ST 712A.18l | This statute provides that if a juvenile is found to be within the court's jurisdiction for an offense that, if committed by an adult, would be a violation of the Michigan penal code relating to either cruelty to animals or arson, the court shall order that the juvenile be evaluated to determine if he or she needs psychiatric or psychological treatment. If the court determines that psychiatric or psychological treatment is appropriate, the court may order that treatment in addition to any other treatments or penalties allowed by law. | Statute |
| Anderson v Ah Kit | [2004] WASC 194 |
In proceedings for defamation, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant published information giving rise to the imputations that the plaintiff left animals to starve and that the Northern Territory government had to intervene to feed those animals. The defendant pleaded, inter alia, the defences of Polly Peck and fair comment. The Court ruled that the Polly Peck defense was sufficiently justified to survive the plaintiff's strike out application. It was held, however, that although animal welfare generally was a matter of public interest, the welfare of some animals held on private property was not, and could not be made by extensive media coverage, a matter of public interest. |
Case | |
| Safari Club International v. Zinke | 878 F.3d 316 (D.C. Cir. 2017) | 2017 WL 6544114 | This case dealt with an action brought by an organization of safari hunters and firearm advocacy association under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS), challenging the decision to suspend imports of sport-hunted African elephant trophies from Zimbabwe. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia entered summary judgment in FWS's favor, and the organization and association appealed. Under the ESA, sport-hunted African elephant trophies may only be imported into the United States if, among other things, the FWS makes “[a] determination ... that the killing of the trophy animal will enhance the survival of the species”. The Court of Appeals held that 1) FWS's interpretation of Special Rule forbidding import of sport-hunted elephant trophies was permissible; 2) FWS could base finding that killing of African elephants did not enhance species' survival on absence of evidence that sport hunting enhanced survival of species; 3) FWS's conclusion that it lacked evidence to make finding that killing African elephants in Zimbabwe would enhance survival of species rebutted any presumption that importation did not violate any provision of ESA or regulation issued pursuant to ESA; 4) removal of enhancement requirement from Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora did not require FWS to reconsider Special Rule; 5) finding constituted rule rather than adjudication; and 6) FWS's failure to engage in notice-and-comment prior to finding was not harmless error. Affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded so the FWS can initiate rule making to address enhancement findings for the time periods at issue in this case. | Case |
| Custer v. Coward | 667 S.E.2d 135 (Ga.App.,2008) | 293 Ga.App. 316 (2008); 2008 WL 3551225 |
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The plaintiffs' 5-year-old child was bitten by the defendants' dog while the plaintiffs were visiting the defendants, who were also their neighbors. While jumping on the defendants' trampoline, the plaintiffs' child fell onto the defendants' dog who bit the child on the leg and would not let go for a few minutes. The plaintiffs contended at trial that the defendants' knowledge that the dog had "Wobbler's Syndrome," a cranial neck instability that causes leg problems, somehow put the defendants on notice of the dog's vicious propensity. However, the court discarded plaintiffs' argument, finding that is no evidence that Butkus had bitten or attempted to bite anyone before the incident. Further, there was no reason for the defendants to believe that the dog's leg condition would make it more apt to attack humans. |
Case |
| OR - Trusts - 130.185. Pet trust. | O. R. S. § 130.185 | OR ST § 130.185 | This statute comprises Oregon's Pet Trust law based on the Uniform Trust Code. Under the law, a trust may be created to provide for the care of one or more animals that are alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one animal, upon the death of the last surviving animal. | Statute |
| MO - Impound - Chapter 273. Dogs--Cats. Local Option Dog Tax. | V. A. M. S. 273.100 | MO ST 273.100 | This Missouri statute provides that every city or town marshal of every incorporated city or town shall seize and impound all dogs found running at large without collars around their necks. These dogs will be kept for a period of one week after which they shall be put to death by humane methods. The statute further states that any marshal who shall fail or refuse to take up and impound any such dog shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof fined not less than five dollars nor more than twenty-five dollars. | Statute |
| AZ - Phoenix - Chapter 8 - ANIMALS. | Chapter 8 |
The following comprises Phoenix, Arizona's animal-related ordinances. Topics include the keeping of reptiles or wild animals, vicious animal provisions, and sections addressing animal cruelty. An entire article (Article IV) deals with the confinement of animals in motor vehicles. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Crisman v. Hallows | 999 P.2d 1249 (Utah App.,2000) | 393 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2000 UT App 104 (2000) |
Plaintiff dog owners appeal the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant Ted Hallows. Hallows. a Division of Wildlife Resources employee, shot the dogs after they got loose from plaintiffs' backyard. While the factual accounts of the shooting differed, Hallows asserted that he shot the dogs within the scope of his employment and was therefore protected under the Governmental Immunity Act. On appeal, the court first found that plaintiffs may maintain an action against Hallows for conduct outside the scope of his employment and this claim was not barred by their admitted failure to comply with the Immunity Act's notice of claim and statute of limitations requirements. Further, as to plaintiffs' claims that Hallows was not acting within his scope of employment when the shooting occurred, there was sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. |
Case |
| AZ - Facility Dog - § 8-422. Use of a facility dog in court proceedings; definition | A. R. S. § 8-422 | AZ ST § 8-422 | This Arizona law states that a court shall allow a facility dog to accompany a victim who is under 18 while he or she is testifying in court. A party seeking the use of a facility dog must file a notice with the court that includes the certification of the facility dog, the name of the person or entity who certified the dog and evidence that the facility dog is insured. It is discretionary for the court to allow a facility dog for a victim over the age of 18. | Statute |
| In re: PETER A. LANG, d/b/a SAFARI WEST | 57 Agric. Dec. 91 (1998) | 1998 WL 241639 (U.S.D.A.) | Proof of willfulness is not prerequisite to concluding that respondent violated Animal Welfare Act or assessing civil penalty or issuing cease and desist order. | Case |