Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MI - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes (MCL 750.49 - 70) | M. C. L. A. 750.49 - 70a; M.C.L.A. 750.158 | MI ST 750.49 - 70a; 750.158 | The Michigan Legislature has designed three primary provisions related to cruelty to animals: intentional infliction of pain and suffering, duty to provide care, and anti-animal fighting. The intentional infliction of pain and suffering provision carries the most severe penalties for animal cruelty and a violation is automatically a felony. A violation of the duty to provide care provision is initially a misdemeanor, which becomes a felony for a second or subsequent violation. A violation of the anti-animal fighting provision is either a misdemeanor or a felony, depending on the severity of conduct related to fighting. The provision does not apply to the lawful killing of livestock or customary animal husbandry of livestock, or lawful fishing, hunting, trapping, wildlife control, pest or rodent control, and animal research. | Statute |
| Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools | 137 S.Ct. 743 (U.S., 2017) | 2017 WL 685533 (U.S., 2017) |
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) offers federal funds to States in exchange for “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) to children with certain disabilities. The Act also establishes formal administrative procedures for resolving disputes between parents and schools. When trained service dog, Wonder, attempted to join Plaintiff E.F. in kindergarten, officials at Ezra Eby Elementary School refused. Plaintiff E.F. is a child with severe cerebral palsy; Wonder assists her with various daily life activities. E.F.'s parents, Plaintiffs Stacy and Brent Fry, removed E.F. from the school and filed a complaint with the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR). The Plaintiffs claimed that the exclusion of E.F.'s service dog violated her rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. OCR agreed, and school officials invited E.F. to return to the school. Yet, the Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court against the Defendants, Ezra Eby's local and regional school districts, and the principal, (collectively, the school districts). In the federal suit, Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants violated Title II and § 504 and sought declaratory and monetary relief. The Defendant school districts filed a motion to dismiss. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the motion. The Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit where the District Court's motion to dismiss was affirmed. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court of the United States vacated and remanded. The Supreme Court held that, on remand, the Appeals Court should: (1) establish whether (or to what extent) the plaintiff parents invoked the IDEA's dispute resolution process before bringing this suit; and (2) decide whether Plaintiffs' actions reveal that the gravamen of their complaint is indeed the denial of FAPE. The court reasoned that Exhaustion of the IDEA's administrative procedures is unnecessary where the gravamen of the Plaintiffs' suit is something other than the denial of the IDEA's core guarantee of a FAPE. |
Case |
| Eddleman v. U.S. | 729 F.Supp. 81 (D.Mont.,1989) |
An action was brought against the BLM under the Federal Tort Claims Act claiming that the government was negligent in failing to inform the adopters that they would not be eligible to receive title if they intended to sell the horses to slaughter. The court dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction, characterizing the issue as one sounding in contract, based upon the PMCA, and one that therefore should be brought before the U.S. Claims Court. |
Case | |
| MN - Liens - § 514.93. Summary sale of unclaimed animal; notice; proceeds; record | M. S. A. § 514.93 - .94 | MN ST § 514.93 - .94 | Under Minnesota statute, a veterinarian may lawfully sell an animal if it is left unclaimed with the veterinarian for ten or more days following a procedure that is provided by the veterinarian. Prior to sale, the veterinarian must provide notice to the owner of the animal. The veterinarian is also required to follow all necessary procedures before and after the sale of the animal that is listed in the statute. | Statute |
| Woods v. KittyKind, Inc. | 2005 WL 1404712 (N.Y.Sup.,2005 (not reported)) | 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 50911(U); 801 N.Y.S.2d 782 (table only) |
The court granted the plaintiff's motion for an animal shelter to disclose the identity of her lost cat's adopter because the plaintiff alleged that the shelter did not comply with the law and its transfer of ownership was therefore invalid. |
Case |
| NE - Livestock - Article 23. Domesticated Cervine Animal Act | Neb. Rev. St. § 54-2301 to 54- 2324 | NE ST § 54-2301 to 54- 2324 | This set of laws comprises Nebraska's Domesticated Cervine Animal Act. Under the act, it is unlawful for any person to own, possess, buy, sell, or barter any domesticated cervine animal in this state unless such animal is individually identified and kept at a premises for which a domesticated cervine animal facility permit has been issued by the department. A municipal, state, or federal zoo, park, refuge, or wildlife area, a bona fide circus or animal exhibit, or any private, nonprofit zoological society is not required to obtain a permit in order to own, possess, buy, sell, or barter a domesticated cervine animal, but such facilities are still governed by the provisions of the act regarding the testing, control, and eradication of cervidae diseases including chronic wasting disease. | Statute |
| State v. Meerdink | 837 N.W.2d 681 (Table) (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) | 2013 WL 3457628 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) |
After defendant/appellant took a baseball to the head of and consequently killed a 7-month-old puppy, the Iowa District Court of Scott County found defendant/appellant guilty of animal torture under Iowa Code section 717B.3A (1). Defendant/appellant appealed the district court's decision, arguing that the evidence shown was insufficient to support a finding he acted “with a depraved or sadistic intent,” as stated by Iowa statute. The appeals court agreed and reversed and remanded the case back to district court for dismissal. Judge Vaitheswaran authored a dissenting opinion. |
Case |
| KY - Ecoterrorism - Chapter 437. Offenses Against Public Peace | KRS § 437.410 - 429 | KY ST § 437.410 - 429 | This chapter concerns the protection of animal enterprise facilities in Kentucky. Prohibited acts include exercising control over a facility or its property without consent of the owner, disruption or destruction of property of a facility, entering a facility with the intent to commit a prohibited act, and entering a facility with the intent to disrupt or damage the enterprise and then remaining on the grounds knowing that entry is forbidden. Any person who violates any provision of KRS 437.410 to 437.420 shall be subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not less than 6 months but not more than 1 year, or both, for each violation. | Statute |
| Eastern Band of Cherokee - Natural resources - Sec. 14-10.10- Cutting timber, removing rock, trapping animals | The Cherokee Code. Part II. Section 14. Article III. Sec. 14-10.10 |
This statute is intended to preserve natural resources and protect wild animals from any trapping conducted without the knowledge of a property owner or the Tribe. The language provides for both land owner through a tribal assignment or lease, as well as lands that are reserved and used exclusively by the Tribe. The language also restricts any person, firm, or corporation from engaging in this conduct without consent and knowledge from the land owner and/or the Tribe. |
Statute | |
| Dehart v. Town of Austin | 39 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 1994) | 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 30106 |
The breeder was in the business of buying, breeding, raising, and selling of exotic and wild animals. The town passed an ordinance making it unlawful to keep certain wild animals, and the breeder filed suit challenging the constitutionality of a local ordinance. On appeal, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the town because: (1) the ordinance was not preempted by the Animal Welfare Act; (2) the ordinance was not an impermissible attempt to regulate interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause; and (3) the town did not deprive him of his property interest in his federal and state licenses without due process. |
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