Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Friesen v. Saskatchewan Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals | 2008 CarswellSask 438 | 2008 SKQB 150 |
An animal protection officer received a complaint that two dogs were not receiving proper care. Officer Barry Thiessen, an animal protection officer employed by the S.S.P.C.A., observed that dogs appeared malnourished and in distress from lack of food and water. Upon returning the next day, Thiessen determined that the conditions were unchanged and the dogs were then seized pursuant to the warrant. The appellant dog owner brought an application for declaration that the officer seized dogs in contravention of an owner's rights under s. 8 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and in excess of officer's authority. In dismissing his application, the court found that the warrant was lawfully obtained pursuant to provisions of the Animal Protection Act, 1999. The officer had a legitimate reason to come to property of the dog owner to investigate after he received a complaint, and it was there that he saw the dogs’ condition in "plain view" according to the court. |
Case |
| People v. Berry | 1 Cal. App. 4th 778 (1991) | 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 416 (1991) |
In a prosecution arising out of the killing of a two-year-old child by a pit bulldog owned by a neighbor of the victim, the owner was convicted of involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b)), keeping a mischievous animal (Pen. Code, § 399), and keeping a fighting dog (Pen. Code, § 597.5, subd. (a)(1)). The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that an instruction that a minor under the age of five years is not required to take precautions, was proper. The court further held that the trial court erred in defining "mischievous" in the jury instruction, however, the erroneous definition was not prejudicial error under any standard of review. The court also held that the scope of defendant's duty owed toward the victim was not defined by Civ. Code, § 3342, the dog-bite statute; nothing in the statute suggests it creates a defense in a criminal action based on the victim's status as a trespasser and on the defendant's negligence. |
Case |
| VA - Hunting - § 29.1-521. Unlawful to hunt, trap, possess, sell or transport wild birds and wild animals except as permitted; e | Va. Code Ann. § 29.1-521 | VA ST § 29.1-521 | This statute makes it a Class 3 misdemeanor to take listed wild animals. In 2014, Virginia prohibited hunting or killing any deer or bear with a gun, firearm, or other weapon with the aid or assistance of dogs on Sundays. This statute also provides a procedural mechanism for registered Virginia Native Americans to obtain wild animal parts (i.e., eagle feathers) for ceremonial religious use. | Statute |
| United States v. Charette | 893 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir., 2018) | 2018 WL 3117903, 18 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6479 (9th Cir. June 26, 2018) | Defendant Charette was convicted by bench trial of taking a grizzly bear behind his home in Montana in violation of the federal Endangered Species Act. On appeal, defendant challenges his conviction on three grounds: (1) there was insufficient evidence to infer that he did not have a permit to take the grizzly bear; (2) his request for a jury trial was improperly denied; and (3) the lower court incorrectly analyzed his self-defense claim under an objective standard as opposed to the correct subjective standard. On appeal here, the court observed that the plain language of the ESA and legislative history makes it clear that permits and exceptions under the ESA are affirmative defenses, and not elements of the crime. In this case, Charette had the burden of proving the existence of a valid permit, which he did not do at trial. The court also quickly dispensed with the Sixth Amendment jury trial issue, finding that the taking of a grizzly bear is a petty offense. As to defendant's last argument on his self-defense claim, this court did find that the trial court erred in applying an objectively reasonable standard. This error was not harmless because it affected defendant's decision to testify as to his subjective belief in the need for self-defense. As a result, this court reversed the district court's decision, vacated defendant's conviction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. | Case |
| KS - Spring Hill - Breed - 2-402. PROHIBITED ANIMALS - GENERALLY (Pit Bull Ordinance) | SPRING HILL, KS., CITY CODE §§ 2-401 - 2-404 (2008) |
Spring Hill, Kansas, considers pit bull dogs to be inherently dangerous and makes it unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess any pit bull dog. Any dog in violation may be immediately seized and impounded. even killed if necessary. A violation may result in a $500 - $2,000 fine and imprisonment for up to 179 days. The dog will also have to be removed from the city.
|
Local Ordinance | |
| Hatfield v. Bd. of Supervisors of Madison Cty. | 235 So.3d 18 (Miss. Aug. 10, 2017) | 2017 WL 3452426 (Miss. Aug. 10, 2017) | This Mississippi Supreme Court decision considers the construction of a zoning ordinance that prohibits the "keeping or raising poultry" in the "R-1 Residential District" of Madison County. The property owner, Hatfield, was found to be violating R-1 by the Madison County Board of Supervisors after county officials found around 60 "ducks, geese and other fowl" on this property. Hatfield appealed this decision to the Circuit Court as arbitrary and capricious based on an unconstitutionally vague ordinance section. The Circuit Court, as the reviewing appellate body for the ordinance violation, found the Board's decision was supported by evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. On appeal by Hatfield, the Supreme Court first observed that there are two districts in appellant's subdivision: Agricultural and Residential. In the Agricultural Districts, breeding, raising, and feeding fowl is an expressly permitted use. Appellant lives the zoned Residential Estate District. While the R-1 zoning allows "livestock" and "grazing livestock" on tracts of land one acre or greater, it does not allow the breeding, raising, and feeding chickens, ducks, or other fowl as a permitted use. Hatfield suggested that grazing/livestock section (Section 601) could be interpreted to include poultry, fowl, and/or birds. However, the Supreme Court found that position unreasonable since the examples listed in the code section are "obviously limited to large, four-legged, hoofed animals." This is further supported by the fact raising fowl is expressly permitted in one district, but not the other. Thus, the Ordinance was sufficiently clear and not manifestly unreasonable. The circuit court's decision was affirmed. | Case |
| Williams v. McMahan | 2002 WL 242538 (Wa. 2002) | 110 Wash.App. 1031 (2002) |
The plaintiff sued for damages as a result of the wrongful spaying of her purebred dog, which she intended to breed. The court found that damages should be measured by the fair market value of the dog. |
Case |
| In the Matter of: Richard O'Barry | 1999 NOAA LEXIS 1 | 1999 NOAA LEXIS 1 |
In 1999, civil penalties in the amount of $59,500 were assessed for the release of two dolphins from captivity. The dolphins were not prepared to survive in the wild and sustained life-threatening injuries as a result of their release. An administrative law judge found that the release of two dolphins without providing them with the necessary skills for survival resulted in harassment and injury to them, and therefore, constituted a violation of the MMPA. |
Case |
| SC - Exotic Pets - § 47-5-50. Prohibition on sale of wild carnivores as pets; sale of domesticated ferrets. | Code 1976 § 47-5-20, § 47-5-50 | SC ST § 47-5-20, § 47-5-50 | This South Carolina law provides that no carnivores, which normally are not domesticated, may be sold as pets in this State. A carnivore kept by an individual must not be allowed to run at large and then returned to confinement. A normally wild animal indigenous to this State, if held captive for a period of time, may be released to the wild. This section does not apply to domesticated ferrets. Each business that sells ferrets must also display a notice about the potential danger of unprovoked attacks against humans. | Statute |
| RSPCA v. McCormick | [2016] EWHC 928 (Admin) | It was held that for an animal fight to have taken place, contrary to Section 8 of the Animal Welfare Act, the following must have occurred: a "protected animal" must have been placed with another animal in an environment where the ability of both to escape is restricted and controlled by some person or persons connected with that activity or by some artificial restraint. ‘Placed with’ is to be construed as a ‘matter of normal language.’ | Case |