Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| VA - Ordinances - § 3.2-6543. Governing body of any locality may adopt certain ordinances | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6543 | VA ST § 3.2-6543 | This Virginia statute provides that the governing bodies of counties, cities, and towns of the Commonwealth are hereby authorized to adopt, in their discretion, ordinances which parallel statutory sections dealing with licensing of dogs, taxation, impoundment, and regulation of dangerous dogs. It also provides that nothing in this section shall be construed so as to prevent or restrict any local governing body from adopting local animal control ordinances which are more stringent than the relevant state statutory sections. It further outlines how ordinances may impose civil penalties for violations of the above. | Statute | |
| OH - Horse slaughter - Chapter 919. Horse Meat | R.C. § 919.01 - 919.99 | OH ST § 919.01 - 919.99 | These Ohio statutes deal with horse slaughter and horse meat. Any person who has any establishment that processes and sells horse meat for human food must be licensed by the department of agriculture. The statutes also stipulate certain labeling, signage, and record-keeping requirements. A violation is a first degree misdemeanor. | Statute | |
| MO - Liberty - Breed - Sec. 4-24. - Keeping of pit bull dogs prohibited. | LIBERTY, MO., CITY CODE §§ 4-24 - 4-25 (2010) |
In Liberty, Missouri, it is be unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess any pit bull dog, with exceptions for pit bull dogs already residing in the city. Such dogs may remain as long as the owner complies with certain requirements, such as proper registration, proper confinement, the use of a leash and muzzle, the posting of "Beware of Dog-Pit Bull," keeping $50,000 liability insurance, and taking identification photographs. Any dog found to be the subject of a violation may be subject to seizure and impoundment. |
Local Ordinance | ||
| Grise v. State | Grise v. State, 37 Ark. 456 (1881). |
The Defendant was charged under the Arkansas cruelty to animal statute for the killing of a hog that had tresspass into his field. The Defendant was found guilty and appealed. The Supreme Court found that the lower court commited error by instructing the jury that all killing is needless. The Court reveresed the judgment and remanded it for further consideration. |
Case | ||
| SD - Fur - Chapter 40-35. Domesticated Fur-Bearing Animals. | S D C L § 40-35-1 to 6 | SD ST § 40-35-1 to 6 | These South Dakota statutes pertain to domesticated fur-bearing animals. These animals are subject to private ownership, and documentation is required to possess live fur-bearing animals. Products made from domestic furbearers are considered to be agricultural products and breeding such animals, or marketing the products, is an agricultural pursuit subject to the Department of Agriculture. | Statute | |
| NH - Exotic Pets, Wildlife - Chapter 207. Import, Possession, or Release of Wildlife. | N.H. Rev. Stat. § 207:14 - 207:15-a | NH ST § 207:14 - 207:15-a | This New Hampshire section states that no person shall import, possess, sell, exhibit, or release any live marine species or wildlife, or the eggs or progeny thereof, without first obtaining a permit from the executive director except as otherwise permitted. The executive director has the authority to determine the time period and any other conditions governing the issuance of such permit. Any wildlife release or imported contrary to these provisions are subject to seizure. | Statute | |
| Hearn v. City of Overland Park | 772 P.2d 758 (Kan. 1989) | 244 Kan. 638 (1989) |
Syllabus by the Court In an action to enjoin the City of Overland Park from enforcing an ordinance regulating the ownership of pit bull dogs within the city, the record is examined and it is held: (1) The ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; (2) the ordinance does not violate the due process rights of plaintiffs under the United States and Kansas Constitutions; (3) the ordinance does not violate the equal protection clauses of the United States and Kansas Constitutions; and (4) the district court did not err in dismissing the plaintiffs' claim for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). |
Case | |
| Chambers v. Justice Court Precinct One | 95 S.W.3d 874 (Tex.App.-Dallas, 2006) | 2006 WL 1792842 (Tex.App.-Dallas) |
In this Texas case, a justice court divested an animal owner of over 100 animals and ordered that the animals be given to a nonprofit organization. The owner sought review of the forfeiture in district court. The district court subsequently dismissed appellant's suit for lack of jurisdiction. Under the Texas Code, an owner may only appeal if the justice court orders the animal to be sold at a public auction. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the statute limiting right of appeal in animal forfeiture cases precluded animal owner from appealing the justice court order. |
Case | |
| State v. Archer | --- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 6579053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018) | This appeal concerns the lower court's granting of a motion to suppress evidence in an animal cruelty case. In April of 2017, a Ponce Inlet Police Department officer responded to defendant's residence after receiving a call about possible animal abuse. The caller described hearing sounds of a dog yelping and being beaten. Upon arrival, Officer Bines heard dog commands and the sounds of "striking flesh." He then knocked on defendant Archer's front door and began speaking with him on the front porch. Officer Bines told Archer that he was there to investigate a complaint of possible animal abuse to which Archer acknowledged that his dog bit him after he disciplined the dog for making a mess, so he "hit him a couple times." The officer then told Archer he had "probable cause" to enter the house or he could seek a warrant. Ultimately, Bines followed Archer to the backyard where Archer pointed to a dog in the corner that had its tongue out and was bloodied. Shortly thereafter, Bines determined the dog was dead. Archer was then cuffed and advised of his Miranda rights. After placing Archer in the police vehicle, Bines and other officers re-entered the home and yard to take pictures of the crime scene and to secure the canine's remains. After being charged with violating the cruelty to animals law (Section 828.12), Archer moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless entry of his home. The trial court granted and denied the motion in part, finding that while there were exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry, the exigency was over once it was determined that the dog was dead. The State of Florida appeals here. The appellate court first noted that while warrantless searches of homes are presumed illegal, an officer may enter when there are exigent circumstances including medical emergencies related to animals. Despite Archer's attempts to distinguish the instant facts from previous cases because there were no signs of blood or smells to indicate an emergency, the totality of the facts showed police received a call of animal cruelty in progress and the Officer Bines heard sounds of striking flesh. In addition, Archer advised Bines that he had struck the dog. Thus, the court found the officer "had reasonable grounds to believe that there was an urgent and immediate need to check on the safety and well-being of the dog and to connect the feared emergency to the house that they entered." As to suppression of the evidence found in plain view after entry onto the property, the appellate court also found the lower court erred in its decision. Under existing case law, once entry is allowed based on exigent circumstances, items found in plain view may be lawfully seized. The officer saw the dog in the corner before he knew the dog was dead, and thus, the exigency still existed. With respect to the photographs taken and the bodycam footage, the court held that re-entry into the home after Archer was in the patrol car did not require a warrant. Once an exigency that justified a warrantless search is over, law enforcement cannot go back and conduct further searches. However, in this case, the re-entry into Archer's house was a continuation of photographing evidence that was already found in plain view while the exigency existed (e.g., before the officers knew the dog was dead). The motion to suppress was affirmed in part and reversed in part. | Case | ||
| US - Pets and Housing - Subpart C. Pet Ownership for the Elderly or Persons with Disabilities | 24 C.F.R. § 5.300 to .327 |
This subpart implements section 227 of the Housing and Urban Rural Recovery Act of 1983 (12 U.S.C. 1701r-1) as it pertains to projects for the elderly or persons with disabilities under: (1) the housing programs administered by the Assistant Secretary for Housing - Federal Housing Commissioner; (2) projects assisted under the programs contained in chapter VIII of this title 24; and (3) the public housing program. The rule specifically states that it does not apply to assistance or service animals. The rule states that, except as otherwise provided, no project owner that manages a project for the elderly or disabled may restrict or discriminate against any person by reason of the person's ownership or presence of a common household pet in the person's dwelling unit. A "common household pet," is defined as "[a] domesticated animal, such as a dog, cat, bird, rodent (including a rabbit), fish, or turtle, that is traditionally kept in the home for pleasure rather than for commercial purposes" (excluding reptiles with exception of turtles). Notice of the allowance must be provided to tenants and tenants must be given the ability to access to pet rules. The project owner must establish reasonable rules to govern the keeping of pets.
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Administrative |