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Title Citation Alternate Citation Summary Type
OK - Leash - § 2217. Public access and use of state parks--Prohibitions (dog leash) 74 Okl.St.Ann. § 2217 OK ST T. 74 § 2217 No person may enter a state park with a dog, unless the dog is on a leash, or permit any dog to enter a state park or recreation area under the jurisdiction of the Commission. It is further provided that any authorized member of the Department or any authorized employee of the Oklahoma Department of Wildlife Conservation may kill any vicious dog found running loose in any state park which poses imminent threat to humans or other animals, or which may be chasing or running any game in the state park. Any such authorized employees of the Departments shall not be held liable for the killing of said dog. Statute
MN - Wildlife, possession - Chapter 97A. Game and Fish. Possession and Transportation of Wild Animals. M. S. A. § 97A.501 - 56 MN ST § 97A.501 - 56 These Minnesota statutes restrict possession and transportation of wild animals. No one may transport wild animals taken, bought, or sold in violation of the game and fish laws. In general, a person may not take, import, transport, or sell an endangered species of wild animal, but there are exceptions. Statute
Animal Liberation (Vic) Inc v Gasser (1991) 1 VR 51 (1990) Aust Torts Reports 81-027

Animal Liberation were injuncted from publishing words claiming animal cruelty in a circus or demonstrating against that circus. They were also found guilty of nuisance resulting from their demonstration outside that circus. On appeal, the injunctions were overturned although the finding of nuisance was upheld.

Case
Beckett v. Warren 921 N.E.2d 624 (Ohio, 2010) 2010 WL 46003 (Ohio), 124 Ohio St.3d 256 (2010)

On a certified conflict from the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided here whether a plaintiff pursuing a claim for bodily injuries caused by a dog must elect either a statutory remedy under R.C. 955.28 or a remedy at common law for negligence. The Supreme Court found that the defense's conflict case, Rodenberger v. Wadsworth, 1983 WL 7005, did not turn on the issue of whether both claims could be pursued simultaneously, but rather whether the statutory cause of action abrogated the common law cause of action (which it held did not). In looking at the plain language of R.C. 955.28, the Court found that the statute itself does not preclude a simultaneous common law action for damages for bodily injuries caused by a dog. Under both theories of recovery, compensatory damages remain the same so there is no issue of double recovery. Thus, a plaintiff may, in the same case, pursue a claim for a dog bite injury under both R.C. 955.28 and common law negligence.

Case
San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose 402 F.3d 962 (C.A.9 (Cal.),2005) 05 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2853, 2005 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3920

In this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendants-Appellants, seven San Jose City Police Officers and Deputy Sheriff Linderman, appeal from an order of the district court denying in part their motions for qualified immunity. This action arises out of the simultaneous execution of search warrants at the residences of members of the Hells Angels, and at the Hells Angels clubhouse on January 21, 1998. While executing search warrants at two plaintiffs' residences, the officers shot a total of three dogs. This court held that the shooting of the dogs at the Vieira and Souza residences was an unreasonable seizure, and an unreasonable execution of the search warrants, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Exigent circumstances did not exist at either residence, as the officers had a week to consider the options and tactics available for an encounter with the dogs. The unlawfulness of the officers' conduct would have been apparent to a reasonable officer at the time the officers planned for serving the search warrants.

Case
People v. Miller 159 A.D.3d 1608 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) 72 N.Y.S.3d 750, 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 02109 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) In this New York case, defendant appeals his conviction for burglary in the second degree, petit larceny, and criminal contempt in the first degree. The incident occurred when defendant went back over to his girlfriend's house after he called her to ask permission to visit the dogs. The complainant declined, saying she had plans for an outing with the dogs that day. Witnesses later observed defendant banging on the complainant's door and subsequently opening a window and climbing in her residence. After forcing entry, defendant took the dogs and complainant called 911. Subsequently, defendant led police on a high speed chase, and, after being arrested, defendant claimed the dogs were licensed to him. The appellate court viewed all the evidence of the elements for each crime and rejected defendant's contention that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Thus, the judgment was affirmed. Notably, two judges dissented on this appeal, finding that defendant "had at least a good faith basis for claiming an ownership interest the dogs." The dissent found the dogs may have been jointly owned and that, prior to his arrest, "defendant simply intended to take the dogs for a walk and then return them." Case
U.S. v. Tomono 143 F.3d 1401 (11th Cir. 1998)

Kei Tomono pleaded guilty to violations of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(a)(1) & 3373(d)(1)(B), and the federal anti-smuggling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 545, in connection with his illegal importation of reptiles. At sentencing, the district court granted a three-level downward departure for what it termed "cultural differences."  The court held that "cultural differences" were not significant enough to remove this case from the body of cases contemplated by the Sentencing Guidelines so as to allow for downward departure.

Case
Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos v. New York City Police Dept 152 A.D.3d 113, 55 N.Y.S.3d 31 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) 2017 WL 2429221 (N.Y. App. Div. June 6, 2017) Kaporos is a customary Jewish ritual which entails grasping a live chicken and swinging the bird three times overhead while saying a prayer. Upon completion of the prayer, the chicken's throat is slit and its meat is donated. The practice takes place outdoors, on public streets in Brooklyn. The Plaintiffs include the Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos and individual Plaintiffs who reside, work or travel, within Brooklyn neighborhoods. The Defendants included City defendants such as the New York City Police Department and non-City defendants such as individual Orthodox Jewish rabbis. The Plaintiffs alleged that Kaporos is a health hazard and cruel to animals. Plaintiffs requested the remedy of mandamus to compel the City Defendants to enforce certain laws related to preserving public health and preventing animal cruelty. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York affirmed the Supreme Court's dismissal of the proceedings against the City defendants. The Court reasoned that none of the laws or regulations that the Plaintiffs relied on precluded the City Defendants from deciding whether or not to engage in Kaporos. Also, the Plaintiffs did not have a “clear legal right” to dictate which laws are enforced, how, or against whom. The Court stated that determining which laws and regulations might be properly enforced against the non-City defendants without infringing upon their free exercise of religion could not be dictated by the court through mandamus. Case
NJ - Veterinary - Chapter 16. Veterinary Medicine, Surgery and Dentistry. NJSA 45:16-1 to 45:16-18 NJ ST 45:16-1 to 45:16-18 These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. Statute
MD - Endangered Species - Nongame and Endangered Species Conservation Act MD Code, Natural Resources, § 10-2A-01 - 09 MD NAT RES § 10-2A-01 - 09 These Maryland statutes comprise the Nongame and Endangered Species Conservation Act. Under the Act, any species designated under the federal Endangered Species Act is deemed an endangered species as are other species designated by the state secretary based on habitat and population factors. Violators of the Act shall be fined not more than $1,000 or be imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both and equipment used in the taking of designated species may be seized. Statute

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