Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SC - Ordinances - § 47-3-20. Local animal care and control ordinances authorized. | Code 1976 § 47-3-20 | SC ST § 47-3-20 | This South Carolina statute provides that the governing body of each county or municipality in this State may enact ordinances and promulgate regulations for the care and control of dogs, cats, and other animals and to prescribe penalties for violations. | Statute |
| People v. Baniqued | 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 835 (Cal.App.3 Dist.,2000). |
Defendant appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, California, ordering their conviction for cockfighting in violations of animal cruelty statutes. The court held that roosters and other birds fall within the statutory definition of "every dumb creature" and thus qualify as an "animal" for purposes of the animal cruelty statutes. |
Case | |
| VA - Rabies - § 3.2-6522. Rabid animals | Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-6522 | VA ST § 3.2-6522 | This Virginia statute provides that, when there is sufficient reason to believe that a rabid animal is at large, the governing body of any county, city or town shall have the power to pass an emergency ordinance that shall become effective immediately upon passage, requiring owners of all dogs and cats therein to keep the same confined. It further outlines the steps that must be undertaken pursuant to such an ordinance, including proof of vaccination from pet owners, procedures for impounding and euthanizing suspected infected animals, and procedures relating to an animal biting a person. | Statute |
| Parker v. Parker | 195 P.3d 428 (Or.App.,2008) | 223 Or.App. 137 (2008); 2008 WL 4570581 |
Plaintiff and his 12 year-old quarter horse were visiting defendant at defendant's property when defendant's dog rushed at the horse causing it to run into a steel fence. The horse suffered severe head trauma, which necessitated its later euthanization. Plaintiff filed suit for damages asserting liability under common law negligence and O.R.S. 609.140(1) - the statute that allows an owner to recover double damages where livestock is injured due to being injured, chased, or killed by another person's dog. The appellate court agreed with plaintiff that O.R.S. 609.140(1) creates an statutory cause of action independent from negligence. Further, the court found that plaintiff fell within the class of persons the statute aims to protect because the legislature did not intend to limit the statute's application to property owned by the livestock's owner. |
Case |
| People v. Leach | Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2006 WL 2683727 (Mich.App.) |
Defendant's conviction arises from the killing of a rabbit during the execution of a civil court order at defendant's home on April 15, 2004. Because the court did not find MCL 750.50b unconstitutionally vague and further found sufficient evidence in support of defendant's conviction, defendant's conviction was affirmed. The evidence showed that defendant killed the rabbit in a display of anger arising from the execution of a court; thus, the terms, "[m]alicious", "willful", and "without just cause" are sufficiently specific terms with commonly understood meanings such that enforcement of the statute will not be arbitrary or discriminatory." |
Case | |
| OH - Cemeteries, Pet - Chapter 961. Pet Cemeteries | R.C. § 961.01 - 99 | OH ST § 961.01 - 99 | This Ohio chapter concerns the establishment of "pet cemeteries." The owner of land used for a pet cemetery must file a declaration in the county recorder's office that the land is to be used only for such purposes. Unless the deed restriction is removed, no person shall use land restricted as provided in this section for any purpose other than for pet cemetery purposes. The pet cemetery must be at least three acres in size and the owner must comply with deposit requirements described under the "endowment care fund." Violation of the provisions relating to& the land use restriction (961.02), the size of the pet cemetery (961.03), or the endowment care fund requirement (961.04) results in a fine of up to $5,000 or imprisonment for up to one year, or both. | Statute |
| Coos County Board of County Com'rs v. Kempthorne | 531 F.3d 792 (9th Cir., 2008) | 08 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7939, 2008 WL 2522202 (C.A.9 (Or.)) | The issue here is whether FWS has an enforceable duty promptly to withdraw a threatened species from the protections of the ESA after a five-year agency review mandated by the Act found that the species does not fit into a protected population category. The species at issue here are murrelets-small, dove-sized birds that feed primarily on sea life and nest in coastal mature and old-growth forests. This Court concluded that Coos County has not alleged a failure to perform a nondiscretionary act or duty imposed by the ESA, whether premised on the petition process deadlines or on the agency's more general duty to act on its own determinations. | Case |
| Argentina - Marine mammals - Ley 25.052, 1998 | Ley 25.052 | Ley 25.052/98 prohibits the hunt or capture of orca whales (Orcinus orca) by nets or by the forced stranding system. The penalty for violating this law will result in fines starting from one million Argentine pesos, and up to two million pesos when the capture resulted in the death of the specimen. The Secretary of Natural Resources, through the Direction of Ictícolas and Acuícolas Resources, are the authorities in charge of the application of this law. The Naval Prefecture of Argentina is the authority that exercises police power, and federal justice will know of the complaints made by the enforcement authority, the police authority, or any citizen or non-governmental institution. | Statute | |
| Kimball v. Betts | 99 Wash. 348 (1918) | 169 P. 849 (1918) |
In an action for conversion of household goods kept for use and not for sale, it is not necessary to prove that such goods have no market value as a condition precedent to the right to introduce proof of actual value. If they have no market value, the measure of damages for their conversion is their value to the owner based on the actual money lost. |
Case |
| Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Common Council of City of Albany | 56 A.D.3d 32, 865 N.Y.S.2d 365 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.,2008) | 2008 WL 4500223 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.), 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 07703 |
An Organization dedicated to the protection of the Karner Blue Butterfly and other species that live in an area of land used as a nature preserve brought challenge against the City Common Council’s; (“Council”) approval of a Developer’s rezoning application for the land. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York, held that the Organization had standing to bring suit, because the Organization showed the existence of an actual injury different from that of the general public, due to the Organization’s regular use of the preserve, at least one member’s nearby residency to the preserve, and the Organization’s historic involvement in the protection and preservation of the preserve. (2010 - Order Reversed by Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Common Council of City of Albany, 13 N.Y.3d 297, 918 N.E.2d 917, 890 N.Y.S.2d 405, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 07667 (N.Y. Oct 27, 2009) (NO. 134)). |
Case |