Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| State ex rel. Zobel v. Burrell | 2005 WL 957908 (Mo. App. S.D. 2005) |
A trial court granted a local humane society permission to humanely dispose of horses placed in their custody by the Sheriff. A man filed petition for a writ of mandamus against the the trial judge and humane society to challenge the judge's order. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court holding the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the Humane Society of Missouri. Opinion transferred to State ex rel. Zobel v. Burrell , 167 S.W.3d 688 (Mo., 2005). |
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| US - Housing - Fair Housing. Subchapter I. Generally. Section 3602. Definitions. | 42 U.S.C.A. 3601 - 3604 | The following sections of the Fair Housing Act relate to "reasonable accommodations" for persons with a handicap or disability. In Section 3602, the definition of "handicap" includes a person with: (1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities; (2) a record of having such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. Section 3604 is the operative part of the law that makes it unlawful to discriminate because of a handicap in the sale or rental of a dwelling. Under subsection (3)(B), the law states that discrimination includes the refusal to make "reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." | Statute | |||||||||
| Expte. N° HC-656/21 - Habeas Corpus en favor del Tortugo Jorge | Expte. N° HC-656/21 | Jorge is an 80-year-old turtle living in the Municipal Aquarium of Medoza, Argentina. In 2021, three animal lawyers filed a habeas corpus on behalf of Jorge, arguing a violation of the turtle’s right to his locomotive freedom and a violation of Mendoza’s law 7.887, 2018, which prohibits the exhibit of animals in circuses or other events. The lawyers stated that Jorge had to be relocated to a more natural environment where he could live the last years of his life, raising concerns for his age and health. After learning that the government is turning the aquarium into a biodiversity center and after consulting with several experts, the tribunal denied the Habeas Corpus as it found the controversy was moot. It also rejected the idea of releasing Jorge into the wild. However, it is important to mention that the tribunal did not oppose his relocation into a sanctuary so long as his physical integrity was protected. | Case | |||||||||
| Fortgang v. Woodland Park Zoo | 387 P.3d 690 (Wash. Jan. 12, 2017) | 2017 WL 121589, 187 Wash. 2d 509, 92846-1, 2017 WL 121589, at *1–11 (Wash. Jan. 12, 2017) |
To address the Zoo's growing size and complexity, Defendant Woodland Park Zoo Society (WPZS) entered into an “Operations and Management Agreement” (Agreement) with the City of Seattle. The Agreement gave WPZS exclusive rights and responsibilities regarding many areas such as the care, sale, and purchase of the Zoo's animals. The Agreement also contained several provisions addressing public oversight of the Zoo. Plaintiff Alyne Fortgang requested several categories of records, all pertaining to the Zoo's elephants. She filed the request under the Public Records Act (PRA), which requires every government agency to make records available for public inspection and copying. The Zoo's director of Communications and Public Affairs responded to Fortgang's request by asserting that the PRA did not apply because WPZS was a private company. Fortgang filed a lawsuit and alleged that WPZS violated the PRA by refusing to disclose certain records. The trial court granted WPZS's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action on the ground that WPZS was not an agency subject to PRA disclosure requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that the Telford test was the proper analytical framework for evaluating the private entity’s disclosure requirement. The Supreme Court reasoned that under the Telford analysis, WPZS was not the functional equivalent of a government agency. The court stated that although the second Telford factor was inconclusive, all the other factors weighed against PRA coverage: (1) WPZS did not perform an inherently governmental function by operating the Zoo; (2) the City did not exercise sufficient control over the Zoo's daily operations to implicate PRA concerns; (3) WPZS was created solely by private individuals and not government action and (4) because operating a zoo is not a nondelegable, “core” government function, the case did not involve the privatization of fundamentally public services. The Court of Appeals' decision was affirmed. |
Case | ||||||||
| In re: Jennifer Caudill | 2013 WL 604009 (U.S.D.A. Feb. 1, 2013) | Although the Complaint alleged that Caudill made false or fraudulent statements and/or provided false or fraudulent records to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the emphasis in the Complaint suggested that primary reliance was being placed upon the more general determination of unfitness. The Complaint alleged that Respondents (collectively, including Caudill) engaged in activities designed to circumvent an order of the Secretary of Agriculture in revoking the Animal Welfare Act exhibitor's license previously held by Lancelot Kollman Ramos, and have acted as surrogates for Ramos. Caudill and Kalmanson were alleged to continue to act as Ramos's surrogates, and to facilitate the circumvention of his license revocation order. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found factual support for termination on the grounds of false statements and providing false documents to be lacking. The AJL also found little support for the conclusion that Caudill in any way was operating as a surrogate for Ramos. The ALJ did find that although Caudill had initiated discussions with Ramos concerning the purchase of his animals prior to the effective date of his license revocation, her subsequent consummation of the transaction after his license had been revoked constitutes a violation of 9 C.F.R. § 2.132. In the end, however, the evidence was insufficient to find that Respondent Caudill was unfit to hold an AWA license or that maintenance of a license by her would in any way be contrary to the purposes of the Act | Case | |||||||||
| Canada - Dog, dangerous - Nova Scotia Municipal Government Act | S.N.S. 1998, c. 18, s. 174 - 179 | Certain sections (ss.175-179) of this Nova Scotia statute deal with dog ownership, and the consequences for failing to control a dog, or owning one who causes harm to people or property. | Statute | |||||||||
| NV - Washoe County - Chapter 55: Animals and Fowl (Sections 55.110; 55.390 - 55.450) | The Washoe County Code, Chapter 55: Animals and Fowl, §§ 55.110, 55.390 - 55.450 (2012) |
These Washoe County, Nevada ordinances prohibit any person from keeping an animal unless the area in which the animal lives is kept clean and free of offensive odors and animal wastes. Additionally, these ordinances also require that any person who wishes to keep more than 3 adult dogs or 7 adult cats obtain a permit; permit requirement, exemption, and revocation or suspension provisions are also included, as are the penalties for violating these provisions. |
Local Ordinance | |||||||||
| Webb v. Amtower | 2008 WL 713728 (KS,2008 (not reported)) | 178 P.3d 80 (KS,2008 (table only)) |
The court applied the forum's traditional lex loci conflict-of-laws rule to determine what jurisdiction's law governed for both damages and recovery of possession. The "place of injury" for the tort/damages issue was Kansas since that's where the contract was signed. The court remanded the case to determine the law of the place where the dog was found to determine the right-to-possession since that was a personal property issue. |
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| Derecho Animal Volume 2 Núm 3 |
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| New England Anti-Vivisection Society v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service and Yerkes National Primate Research Center | 208 F. Supp. 3d 142 (D.D.C. 2016) | 2016 WL 4919871 (D.D.C., 2016) | New England Anti-Vivisection Society (NEAVS), a non-profit organization that dedicates itself to animal-welfare, brought suit against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) for issuing an export permit to Yerkes National Primate Research Center (Yerkes). NEAVS filed suit against FWS arguing that FWS had violated the Endangered Species Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. NEAVS argued that FWS had violated the acts by allowing Yerkes to export chimpanzees in exchange for making a financial donation that would be put towards a program to help with “habitat destruction and disease, which face wild chimpanzees in East Africa.” The court reviewed the case and determined that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to address the claims made by NEAVS. The court found that NEAVS was not able to establish standing under Article III of the Constitution because NEAVS had not “suffered an injury in fact.” Ultimately, the court held that NEAVS was unable to show that it had a “concrete and particularized injury in fact that is actual or imminent” and that is “traceable” to FWS’ actions. As a result, the court granted summary judgment in favor of FWS. | Case |